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Winter 1991–92

Samuel P. Huntington — How Countries Democratize

Paul E. Peterson — The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox

William Julius Wilson — Another Look at *The Truly Disadvantaged*

Ethan Barnaby Kapstein — International Collaboration in Armaments Production

Loree Bykerk
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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON analyzes the diverse political processes through which thirty-five countries have moved from authoritarianism toward democracy in the past fifteen years and derives guidelines from these experiences for future "democratizers."

PAUL E. PETERSON discusses four different theories using the concept of underclass to explain poverty in the United States and summarizes the empirical evidence with respect to each of them. He is critical of some aspects of the recent major work on the urban underclass, William Julius Wilson's *The Truly Disadvantaged*.

WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON recapitulates the major arguments he advanced in *The Truly Disadvantaged* and assesses issues raised by authors from different academic disciplines who addressed the major arguments in the book. Wilson reaffirms his own analysis of the causes of the urban underclass.

ETHAN BARNABY KAPSTEIN argues that international arrangements within NATO to produce advanced weapons systems represent a "second-best solution" to defense procurement. Rather than purchase arms off the shelf from the most efficient supplier, NATO members have used arms collaboration to maintain their domestic defense industrial bases. To the extent that arms collaboration has encouraged the global spread of defense-related technology, it has made conventional arms control more difficult to achieve.

LOREE BYKERK and ARDITH MANEY examine congressional hearing data to find that organized consumer interests remained active in Washington during the decade of business resurgence. Representatives of state and local officials also played prominant roles in consumer protection.

WILBUR EDEL claims that the State Department has distorted post-World War II diplomatic history by deliberately omitting important facts in the record of American intervention in Iran and Guatemala while including documents that misrepresent the United States government's part in those events. He finds no justification for such misrepresentation in volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States* that are published twenty or thirty years after the fact.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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How Countries Democratize

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

Between 1974 and 1990 more than thirty countries in southern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe shifted from authoritarian to democratic systems of government. This "global democratic revolution" is probably the most important political trend in the late twentieth century. It is the third wave of democratization in the modern era.

A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occurs within a specified period and that significantly outnumbers transitions in the opposite direction in the same period. The first wave began in America in the early nineteenth century and culminated at the end of World War I with about thirty countries having democratic regimes. Mussolini's march on Rome in 1922 began a reverse wave, and in 1942 there were only twelve democracies left in the world. The Allied victory in World War II and decolonization started a second movement toward democracy which, however, petered out by the early 1960s when about thirty-six countries had democratic regimes. This was then followed by a second reverse movement towards authoritarianism, marked most dramatically by military take-overs in Latin America and the seizure of power by personal despots such as Ferdinand Marcos.

The causes of the third wave, like those of its predecessors, were complex and peculiar to that wave. This article, however, is concerned not with the why of the third wave but rather with the question of how third wave democratizations

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SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON is Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, and recent president of the American Political Science Association. He has published numerous books and articles on the processes and problems of democracies. This article is drawn from his recent book, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, published by the University of Oklahoma Press.

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occurred: the ways in which political leaders and publics in the 1970s and 1980s ended authoritarian systems and created democratic ones. The routes of change were diverse, as were the people primarily responsible for bringing about change. Moreover, the starting and ending points of the processes were asymmetric. Obvious differences exist among democratic regimes: some are presidential, some are parliamentary, some embody the Gaullist mixture of the two; so also some are two-party, some are multiparty, and major differences exist in the nature and strength of the parties. These differences have significance for the stability of the democratic systems that are created, but relatively little for the processes leading to them.[1] Of greater importance is that in all democratic regimes the principal officers of government are chosen through competitive elections in which the bulk of the population can participate. Democratic systems thus have a common institutional core that establishes their identity. Authoritarian regimes—as the term is used in this study—are defined simply by the absence of this institutional core. Apart from not being democratic they may have little else in common. It will, consequently, be necessary to start the discussion of change in authoritarian regimes by identifying the differences among those regimes and the significance of those differences for democratization processes.

Authoritarian Regimes

Historically, nondemocratic regimes have taken a wide variety of forms. The regimes democratized in the first wave were generally absolute monarchies, lingering feudal aristocracies, and the successor states to continental empires. Those democratized in the second wave had been fascist states, colonies, and personalistic military dictatorships and often had had some previous democratic experience. The regimes that moved to and toward democracy in the third wave generally fell into three groups: one-party systems, military regimes, and personal dictatorships.

The one-party systems were created by revolution or Soviet imposition and included the communist countries plus Taiwan and Mexico (with Turkey also fitting this model before its second wave democratization in the 1940s). In these systems, the party effectively monopolized power, access to power was through the party organization, and the party legitimated its rule through ideology. These systems often achieved a relatively high level of political institutionalization.

The military regimes were created by coups d'etat replacing democratic or civilian governments. In them, the military exercised power on an institutional basis, with the military leaders typically either governing collegially as a junta or circulating the top governmental position among top generals. Military regimes existed in large numbers in Latin America (where some approximated the

[1] See G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), chaps. 5-9; Juan J. Linz, "Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Winter 1990): 51-69.

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bureaucratic-authoritarian model) and also in Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Nigeria, and South Korea.

Personal dictatorships were a third, more diverse group of nondemocratic systems. The distinguishing characteristic of a personal dictatorship is that the individual leader is the source of authority and that power depends on access to, closeness to, dependence on, and support from the leader. This category included Portugal under António Salazar and Marcello Caetano, Spain under Francisco Franco, the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, India under Indira Ghandi, and Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu. Personal dictatorships had varied origins. Those in the Philippines and India were the result of executive coups. Those in Portugal and Spain began with military coups (which in the latter case led to civil war) with the dictators subsequently establishing bases of power independent of the military. In Romania, a personal dictatorship evolved out of a one-party system. Chile under Augusto Pinochet originated as a military regime but in effect became a personal dictatorship due to his prolonged tenure and his differences with and dominance over the leaders of the military services. Some personal dictatorships, such as those of Marcos and Ceausescu, like those of Anastasio Somoza, François Duvalier, Sese Seko Mobutu, and the shah, exemplified Weber's model of sultanistic regimes characterized by patronage, nepotism, cronyism, and corruption.

One-party systems, military regimes, and personal dictatorships suppressed both competition and participation. The South African system differed from these in that it was basically a racial oligarchy with more than 70 percent of the population excluded from politics but with fairly intense political competition occurring within the governing white community. Historical experience suggests that democratization proceeds more easily if competition expands before participation.[2] If this is the case, the prospects for successful democratization were greater in South Africa than in countries with the other types of authoritarian systems. The process in South Africa would, in some measure, resemble the nineteenth-century democratizations in Europe in which the central feature was the expansion of the suffrage and the establishment of a more inclusive polity. In those cases exclusion had been based on economic, not racial, grounds. Hierarchical communal systems, however, historically have been highly resistant to peaceful change.[3] Competition within the oligarchy thus favored successful South African democratization; the racial definition of that oligarchy created problems for democratization.

Particular regimes did not always fit neatly into particular categories. In the

[2] Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 33–40.

[3] See Donald L. Horowitz, "Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics," *World Politics* 23 (January 1971): 232–36; Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge I. Domínguez, "Political Development" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 74–75.

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TABLE 1

Authoritarian Regimes and Liberalization/Democratization Processes, 1974–90

	Regimes			
Processes	*One-Party*	*Personal*	*Military*	*Racial Oligarchy*
Transformation	(Taiwan)[a] Hungary (Mexico) (USSR) Bulgaria	Spain India Chile	Turkey Brazil Peru Ecuador Guatemala Nigeria* Pakistan Sudan*	
16	5	3	8	
Transplacement	Poland Czechoslovakia Nicaragua Mongolia	(Nepal)	Uruguay Bolivia Honduras El Salvador Korea	(South Africa)
11	4	1	5	1
Replacement	East Germany	Portugal Philippines Romania	Greece Argentina	
6	1	3	2	
Intervention	Grenada		(Panama)	
2	1		1	
Totals				
35	11	7	16	1

Note: The principal criterion of democratization is selection of a government through an open, competitive, fully participatory, fairly administered election.

[a] Parentheses indicate a country that significantly liberalized but did not democratize by 1990.

* Indicates a country that reverted to authoritarianism.

early 1980s, for instance, Poland combined elements of a decaying one-party system and of a military-based martial law system led by a military officer who was also secretary general of the Communist party. The communist system in Romania (like its counterpart in North Korea) started out as a one-party system but by the 1980s had evolved into a sultanistic personal dictatorship. The Chilean regime between 1973 and 1989 was in part a military regime but also, in contrast to other South American military regimes, during its entire existence had only one leader who developed other sources of power. Hence it had many of the characteristics of a personal dictatorship. The Noriega dictatorship in Panama, on the other hand, was highly personalized but dependent almost entirely on military power. The categorizations in Table 1, consequently, should be viewed as rough approximations. Where a regime combined elements of two types it is

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categorized in terms of what seemed to be its dominant type as the transition got underway.

In the second wave, democratization occurred in large measure through foreign imposition and decolonization. In the third wave, as we have seen, those two processes were less significant, limited before 1990 to Grenada, Panama, and several relatively small former British colonies also mostly in the Caribbean area. While external influences often were significant causes of third wave democratizations, the processes themselves were overwhelmingly indigenous. These processes can be located along a continuum in terms of the relative importance of governing and opposition groups as the sources of democratization. For analytical purposes it is useful to group the cases into three broad types of processes. Transformation (or, in Juan J. Linz's phrase, *reforma*) occurred when the elites in power took the lead in bringing about democracy. Replacement (Linz's *ruptura*) occurred when opposition groups took the lead in bringing about democracy, and the authoritarian regime collapsed or was overthrown. What might be termed transplacement or "*ruptforma*" occurred when democratization resulted largely from joint action by government and opposition groups.[4] In virtually all cases groups both in power and out of power played some roles, and these categories simply distinguish the relative importance of government and opposition.

As with regime types, historical cases of regime change did not necessarily fit neatly into theoretical categories. Almost all transitions, not just transplacements, involved some negotiation—explicit or implicit, overt or covert—between government and opposition groups. At times transitions began as one type and then became another. In the early 1980s, for instance, P. W. Botha appeared to be initiating a process of transformation in the South African political system, but he stopped short of democratizing it. Confronting a different political environment, his successor, F. W. de Klerk, shifted to a transplacement process of negotiation with the principal opposition group. Similarly, scholars agree that the Brazilian government initiated and controlled the transition process for many years. Some argue that it lost control over that process as a result of popular mobilization and strikes in 1979–1980; others, however, point to the government's

[4] For reasons that are undoubtedly deeply rooted in human nature, scholars often have the same ideas but prefer to use different words for those ideas. My tripartite division of transition processes coincides with that of Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, but we have our own names for those processes:

Huntington		*Linz*		*Share/Mainwaring*
(1) transformation	=	*reforma*	=	transaction
(2) replacement	=	*ruptura*	=	breakdown/collapse
(3) transplacement	=	—	=	extrication

See Juan J. Linz, "Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration" in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 35; Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, "Transitions Through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain" in Wayne A. Selcher, ed., *Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 177–79.

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success in resisting strong opposition demands for direct election of the president in the mid-1980s. Every historical case combined elements of two or more transition processes. Virtually every historical case, however, more clearly approximated one type of process than others.

How did the nature of the authoritarian regime relate to the nature of the transition process? As Table 1 suggests, there was no one-to-one relation. Yet the former did have consequences for the latter. With three exceptions, all the transitions from military regimes involved transformation or transplacement. In the three exceptions—Argentina, Greece, and Panama—military regimes suffered military defeats and collapsed as a result. Elsewhere military rulers took the lead, at times in response to opposition and popular pressure, in bringing about the change in regime. Military rulers were better placed to terminate their regimes than were leaders of other regimes. The military leaders virtually never defined themselves as the permanent rulers of their country. They held out the expectation that once they had corrected the evils that had led them to seize power they would exit from power and return to their normal military functions. The military had a permanent institutional role other than politics and governorship. At some point, consequently, the military leaders (other than those in Argentina, Greece, and Panama) decided that the time had come to initiate a return to civilian democratic rule or to negotiate their withdrawal from power with opposition groups. Almost always this occurred after there had been at least one change in the top leadership of the military regime.[5]

Military leaders almost invariably posited two conditions or "exit guarantees" for their withdrawal from power. First, there would be no prosecution, punishment, or other retaliation against military officers for any acts they may have committed when they were in power. Second, the institutional roles and autonomy of the military establishment would be respected, including its overall responsibility for national security, its leadership of the government ministries concerned with security, and often its control of arms industries and other economic enterprises traditionally under military aegis. The ability of the withdrawing military to secure agreement of civilian political leaders to these conditions depended on their relative power. In Brazil, Peru, and other instances of transformation, the military leaders dominated the process and civilian political leaders had little choice but to acquiesce to the demands of the military. Where relative power was more equal, as in Uruguay, negotiations led to some modifications in the military demands. Greek and Argentinean military leaders asked for the same assurances other leaders did. Their requests, however, were rejected out of hand by civilian leaders, and they had to agree to a virtual unconditional surrender of power.[6]

[5] See Martin C. Needler, "The Military Withdrawal from Power in South America," *Armed Forces and Society* 6 (Summer 1980): 621–23.

[6] For discussion of the terms under which military rulers arranged their exits from power, see Robert H. Dix, "The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes," *Western Political Quarterly* 35 (De-

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It was thus relatively easy for military rulers to withdraw from power and to resume professional military roles. The other side of the coin, however, is that it could also be relatively easy for them to return to power when exigencies and their own interests warranted. One successful military coup in a country makes it impossible for political and military leaders to overlook the possibility of a second. The third wave democracies that succeeded military regimes started life under this shadow.

Transformation and transplacement also characterized the transitions from one-party systems to democracy through 1989, except for those in East Germany and Grenada. One-party regimes had an institutional framework and ideological legitimacy that differentiated them from both democratic and military regimes. They also had an assumption of permanence that distinguished them from military regimes. The distinctive characteristic of one-party systems was the close interweaving of party and state. This created two sets of problems, institutional and ideological, in the transition to democracy.

The institutional problems were most severe with Leninist party states. In Taiwan as in communist countries the "separation of the party from the state" was "the biggest challenge of a Leninist party" in the process of democratization.[7] In Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany constitutional provisions for "the leading role" of the communist party had to be abrogated. In Taiwan comparable "temporary provisions" added to the constitution in 1950 were similarly challenged. In all Leninist party systems major issues arose concerning ownership of physical and financial assets—did they belong to the party or the state? The proper disposition of those assets was also in question—should they be retained by the party, nationalized by the government, sold by the party

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cember 1982): 567–68, for "exit guarantees"; Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory and the Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy," *PS* 20 (Fall 1987): 864–65; Enrique A. Baloyra, "Conclusion: Toward a Framework for the Study of Democratic Consolidation" in Enrique A. Baloyra, ed., *Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 299–300; Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 64–65; Philip Mauceri, "Nine Cases of Transitions and Consolidations" in Robert A. Pastor, ed., *Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989), 225, 229; Luis A. Abugattas, "Populism and After: The Peruvian Experience" in James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 137–39; Aldo C. Vacs, "Authoritarian Breakdown and Redemocratization in Argentina" in Malloy and Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats*, 30–31; P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Transition to, and Consolidation of, Democratic Politics in Greece, 1974–83: A Tentative Assessment" in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., *The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece, and Portugal* (London: Frank Cass, 1984), 54; Harry J. Psomiades, "Greece: From the Colonels' Rule to Democracy" in John H. Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 253–54.

[7] Tun-jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," *World Politics* 41 (July 1989): 496.

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to the highest bidder, or distributed in some equitable manner among social and political groups? In Nicaragua, for instance, after losing the election in February 1990, the Sandinista government apparently moved quickly "to transfer large amounts of Government property to Sandinista hands." "They are selling houses to themselves, selling vehicles to themselves," alleged one anti-Sandinista businessman.[8] Similar allegations were made about the disposal of government property to the Communist party as Solidarity was about to take over the government in Poland. (In a parallel move in Chile, the Pinochet government as it went out of power transferred to the military establishment property and records that had belonged to other government agencies.)

In some countries party militias had to be disbanded or brought under government control, and in almost all one-party states the regular armed forces had to be depoliticized. In Poland, as in most communist countries, for instance, all army officers had to be members of the Communist party; in 1989, however, Polish army officers lobbied parliament to prohibit officers from being members of any political party.[9] In Nicaragua the Sandinista People's Army had been the army of the movement, became also the army of the state, and then had to be converted into being only the latter. The question of whether party cells within economic enterprises should continue was also a highly controversial issue. Finally, where the single party remained in power, there was the question of the relation between its leaders in government and the top party bodies such as the Politburo and the central committee. In the Leninist state the latter dictated policy to the former. Yet this relationship was hardly compatible with the supremacy of elected parliamentary bodies and responsible cabinets in a democratic state.

The other distinctive set of problems was ideological. In one-party systems, the ideology of the party defined the identity of the state. Hence opposition to the party amounted to treason to the state. To legitimize opposition to the party it was necessary to establish some other identity for the state. This problem manifested itself in three contexts. First, in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, communist ideology and rule had been imposed by the Soviet Union. The ideology was not essential to defining the identity of the country. In fact, in at least three of these countries nationalism opposed communism. When the communist parties in these countries gave up their claim to undisputed rule based on that ideology, the countries redefined themselves from "people's republics" to "republics" and reestablished nationalism rather than ideology as the basis of the state. These changes hence occurred relatively easily.

Second, several one-party systems where democratization became an issue had been created by national revolutions. In these cases—China, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Turkey—the nature and purpose of the state were defined by the ideology of the party. In China the regime staunchly adhered to its ideology and identified

[8] *New York Times*, 9 March 1990; 11 March 1990.

[9] Bronislaw Geremek, "Postcommuninism and Democracy in Poland," *Washington Quarterly* 13 (Summer 1990): 129.

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democratic opposition to communism with treason to the state. In Turkey, the government followed an uncertain and ambivalent policy toward Islamic groups challenging the secular basis of the Kemalist state. In Mexico the leadership of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) held somewhat comparable views concerning the liberal challenge of the opposition Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) to the revolutionary, socialist, corporatist character of the PRI state. In Nicaragua Sandinista ideology was the basis of not just the program of a party but also of the legitimacy of the state created by the Nicaraguan revolution.

Third, in some instances the ideology of the single party defined both the nature of the state and its geographical scope. In Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union communist ideology provided the ideological legitimacy for multinational states. If the ideology were rejected, the basis for the state would disappear and each nationality could legitimately claim its own state. In East Germany communism provided the ideological basis for a separate state; when the ideology was abandoned, the rationale for an East German state disappeared. The ideology of the Kuomintang (KMT) defined the government on Taiwan as the government of China, and the regime saw opposition elements supporting an independent Taiwan as subversive. The problem here was less serious than in the other three cases because the ideology legitimated an aspiration rather than a reality. The KMT government functioned in fact as the highly successful government of Taiwan even though in its own eyes its legitimacy depended on the myth that it was the rightful government of all China.

When the military give up their control of government, they do not also give up their control of the instruments of violence with which they could resume control of government. Democratization of a one-party system, however, means that the monopolistic party places at risk its control of government and becomes one more party competing in a multiparty system. In this sense its separation from power is less complete than it is for the military when they withdraw. The party remains a political actor. Defeated in the 1990 election, the Sandinistas could hope "to fight again another day" and come back to power through electoral means.[10] In Bulgaria and Romania former communist parties won elections; in other East European countries they had less sanguine expectations of participating in a coalition government sometime in the future.

After democratization a former monopolistic party is in no better position than any other political group to reinstate an authoritarian system. The party gives up its monopoly of power but not the opportunity to compete for power by democratic means. When they return to the barracks, the military give up both, but they also retain the capacity to reacquire power by nondemocratic means. The transition from a one-party system to democracy, consequently, is likely to be more difficult than the transition from a military regime to democracy, but it is also likely to be more permanent.[11] The difficulties of transforming one-party

[10] *New York Times*, 11 March 1990.

[11] For a similar conclusion, see I. William Zartman, "Transition to Democracy from Single-Party

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systems are perhaps reflected in the fact that as of 1990 the leaders of such regimes in Taiwan, Mexico, and the Soviet Union had initiated the liberalization of their regimes but were moving only slowly toward full democratization.

The leaders of personal dictatorships were less likely than those of military and one-party regimes to give up power voluntarily. Personal dictators in countries that transited to democracy as well as those that did not usually tried to remain in office as long as they could. This often created tensions between a narrowly based political system and an increasingly complex and modern economy and society.[12] It also led on occasion to the violent overthrow of the dictator, as happened in Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Iran, and the dictator's replacement by another authoritarian regime. In the third wave of democratization, uprisings similarly overthrew personal dictatorships in Portugal, the Philippines, and Romania. In Spain, the dictator died and his successors led a classic case of democratic transformation from above. In India and in Chile, the leaders in power submitted themselves to elections in the apparent but mistaken belief that the voters would confirm them in office. When this did not happen, they, unlike Marcos and Manuel Noriega, accepted the electoral verdict. In the cases of sultanistic regimes, the transitions to democracy were complicated by the weakness of political parties and other institutions. Transitions to democracy from personal dictatorship thus occurred when the founding dictator died and his successors decided on democratization, when the dictator was overthrown, and when he or she miscalculated the support that the dictator could win in an election.

Transition Processes

The third wave transitions were complex political processes involving a variety of groups struggling for power and for and against democracy and other goals. In terms of their attitudes toward democratization, the crucial participants in the processes were the standpatters, liberal reformers, and democratic reformers in the governing coalition, and democratic moderates and revolutionary extremists in the opposition. In noncommunist authoritarian systems, the standpatters within the government were normally perceived as right-wing, fascist, and nationalist. The opponents of democratization in the opposition were normally left-wing, revolutionary, and Marxist-Leninist. Supporters of democracy in both government and opposition could be conceived as occupying middle positions on the left-right continuum. In communist systems left and right were less clear. Standpatters were normally thought of as Stalinist or Brezhnevite. Within the

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Regimes: Lessons from North Africa" (Paper presented to Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 31 August–3 September 1989), 2–4.

[12] See Richard K. Betts and Samuel P. Huntington, "Dead Dictators and Rioting Mobs: Does the Demise of Authoritarian Rulers Lead to Political Instability?" *International Security* 10 (Winter 1985–86): 112–46.

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FIGURE 1

Political Groups Involved in Democratization

	Attitudes Toward Democracy			
	Against	*For*		*Against*
Government		*Reformers* *Democratizers*	*Liberals*	*Standpatters*
Opposition	Radical Extremists	Democratic Moderates		

opposition, the extremist opponents of democracy were not revolutionary left-wingers but often nationalist groups thought of as right-wing.

Within the governing coalition some groups often came to favor democratization, while others opposed it, and others supported limited reform or liberalization (see Figure 1). Opposition attitudes toward democracy were also usually divided. Supporters of the existing dictatorship always opposed democracy; opponents of the existing dictatorship often opposed democracy. Almost invariably, however, they used the rhetoric of democracy in their efforts to replace the existing authoritarian regime with one of their own. The groups involved in the politics of democratization thus had both conflicting and common objectives. Reformers and standpatters divided over liberalization and democratization but presumably had a common interest in constraining the power of opposition groups. Moderates and radicals had a common interest in bringing down the existing regime and getting into power but disagreed about what sort of new regime should be created. Reformers and moderates had a common interest in creating democracy but often divided over how the costs of creating it should be borne and how power within it should be apportioned. Standpatters and radicals were totally opposed on the issue of who should rule but had a common interest in weakening the democratic groups in the center and in polarizing politics in the society.

The attitudes and goals of particular individuals and groups at times changed in the democratization process. If democratization did not produce the dangers they feared, people who had been liberal reformers or even standpatters might come to accept democracy. Similarly, participation in the processes of democratization could lead members of extremist opposition groups to moderate their revolutionary propensities and accept the constraints and opportunities democracy offered.

The relative power of the groups shaped the nature of the democratization process and often changed during that process. If standpatters dominated the government and extremists the opposition, democratization was impossible, as, for example, where a right-wing personal dictator determined to hang on to power confronted an opposition dominated by Marxist-Leninists. Transition to democracy was, of course, facilitated if prodemocratic groups were dominant in

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both the government and opposition. The differences in power between reformers and moderates, however, shaped how the process occurred. In 1976, for instance, the Spanish opposition urged a complete "democratic break" or *ruptura* with the Franco legacy and creation of a provisional government and a constituent assembly to formulate a new constitutional order. Adolfo Suárez was powerful enough, however, to fend this off and produce democratization working through the Franco constitutional mechanism.[13] If democratic groups were strong in the opposition but not in the government, democratization depended on events undermining the government and bringing the opposition to power. If democratic groups were dominant in the governing coalition, but not in the opposition, the effort at democratization could be threatened by insurgent violence and by a backlash increase in power of standpatter groups possibly leading to a coup d'etat.

The three crucial interactions in democratization processes were those between government and opposition, between reformers and standpatters in the governing coalition, and between moderates and extremists in the opposition. In all transitions these three central interactions played some role. The relative importance and the conflictual or cooperative character of these interactions, however, varied with the overall nature of the transition process. In transformations, the interaction between reformers and standpatters within the governing coalition was of central importance; and the transformation only occurred if reformers were stronger than standpatters, if the government was stronger than the opposition, and if the moderates were stronger than the extremists. As the transformation went on, opposition moderates were often coopted into the governing coalition while standpatter groups opposing democratization defected from it. In replacements, the interactions between government and opposition and between moderates and extremists were important; the opposition eventually had to be stronger than the government, and the moderates had to be stronger than the extremists. A successive defection of groups often led to the downfall of the regime and inauguration of the democratic system. In transplacements, the central interaction was between reformers and moderates not widely unequal in power, with each being able to dominate the antidemocratic groups on its side of the line between the government and the opposition. In some transplacements, government and former opposition groups agreed on at least a temporary sharing of power.

TRANSFORMATIONS

In transformations those in power in the authoritarian regime take the lead and play the decisive role in ending that regime and changing it into a democratic

[13] See Raymond Carr, "Introduction: The Spanish Transition to Democracy in Historical Perspective" in Robert P. Clark and Michael H. Haltzel, eds., *Spain in the 1980s: The Democratic Transition and a New International Role* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987), 3–4.

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system. The line between transformations and transplacements is fuzzy, and some cases might be legitimately classified in either category. Overall, however, transformations accounted for approximately sixteen out of thirty-five third wave transitions that had occurred or that appeared to be underway by the end of the 1980s. These sixteen cases of liberalization or democratization included changes from five one-party systems, three personal dictatorships, and eight military regimes. Transformation requires the government to be stronger than the opposition. Consequently, it occurred in well-established military regimes where governments clearly controlled the ultimate means of coercion vis-à-vis the opposition and/or vis-à-vis authoritarian systems that had been successful economically, such as Spain, Brazil, Taiwan, Mexico, and, compared to other communist states, Hungary. The leaders of these countries had the power to move their countries toward democracy if they wanted to. In every case the opposition was, at least at the beginning of the process, markedly weaker than the government. In Brazil, for example, as Alfred Stepan points out, when "liberalization began, there was no significant political opposition, no economic crisis, and no collapse of the coercive apparatus due to defeat in war."[14] In Brazil and elsewhere the people best situated to end the authoritarian regime were the leaders of the regime—and they did.

The prototypical cases of transformation were Spain, Brazil, and, among communist regimes, Hungary. The most important case, if it materializes, will be the Soviet Union. The Brazilian transition was "liberation from above" or "regime-initiated liberalization." In Spain "it was a question of reformist elements associated with the incumbent dictatorship, initiating processes of political change from within the established regime."[15] The two transitions differed significantly, however, in their duration. In Spain in less than three and a half years after the death of Franco, a democratizing prime minister had replaced a liberalizing one, the Franco legislature had voted the end of the regime, political reform had been endorsed in a referendum, political parties (including the Communist party) were legalized, a new assembly was elected, a democratic constitution was drafted and approved in a referendum, the major political actors reached agreement on economic policy, and parliamentary elections were held under the new constitution. Adolfo Suárez reportedly told his cabinet that "his strategy would be based on speed. He would keep ahead of the game by introducing specific measures faster than the *continuistas* of the Francoist establishment could respond to them." While the reforms were compressed within a short period of time, however, they were also undertaken sequentially. Hence, it has also been argued that "By staggering the reforms, Suárez avoided antagonizing too many sectors of the

[14] Alfred Stepan, "Introduction," in Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), ix.

[15] Ibid.; Scott Mainwaring, "The Transition to Democracy in Brazil," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 28 (Spring 1986): 149; Kenneth Medhurst, "Spain's Evolutionary Pathway from Dictatorship to Democracy in Pridham, ed., *New Mediterranean Democracies*, 30.

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franquist regime simultaneously. The last set of democratic reforms provoked open hostility from the military and other franquist hardliners, but the President [Suárez] had greatly gained considerable momentum and support." In effect, then, Suárez followed a highly compressed version of the Kemalist "Fabian strategy, blitzkrieg tactics" pattern of reform.[16]

In Brazil, in contrast, President Ernesto Geisel determined that political change was to be "gradual, slow, and sure." The process began at the end of the Médici administration in 1973, continued through the Geisel and Figueiredo administrations, jumped forward with the installation of a civilian president in 1985, and culminated in the adoption of a new constitution in 1988 and the popular election of a president in 1989. The regime-decreed movements toward democratization were interspersed with actions taken to reassure hardliners in the military and elsewhere. In effect, Presidents Geisel and Figueiredo followed a two-steps forward, one-step backward policy. The result was a creeping democratization in which the control of the government over the process was never seriously challenged. In 1973 Brazil had a repressive military dictatorship; in 1989 it was a full-scale democracy. It is customary to date the arrival of democracy in Brazil in January 1985, when the electoral college chose a civilian president. In fact, however, there was no clear break; the genius of the Brazilian transformation is that it is virtually impossible to say at what point Brazil stopped being a dictatorship and became a democracy.

Spain and Brazil were the prototypical cases of change from above, and the Spanish case in particular became the model for subsequent democratizations in Latin America and Eastern Europe. In 1988 and 1989, for instance, Hungarian leaders consulted extensively with Spanish leaders on how to introduce democracy, and in April 1989 a Spanish delegation went to Budapest to offer advice. Six months later one commentator pointed to the similarities in the two transitions:

> The last years of the Kadar era did bear some resemblance to the benign authoritarianism of Franco's decaying dictatorship. Imre Pozsgay plays the part of Prince Juan Carlos in this comparison. He is a reassuring symbol of continuity in the midst of radical change. Liberal-minded economic experts with links to the old establishment and the new entrepreneurial class provide a technocratic elite for the transition, much as the new bourgeois elites associated with Opus Dei did in Spain. The opposition parties also figure in this analogy, emerging from underground in much the same way the Spanish exiles did once it was safe to come out. And as in Spain, the Hungarian oppositionists—moderate in style, radically democratic in substance—are playing a vital role in the reinvention of democracy.[17]

[16] Paul Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (London: Methuen, 1986), 93; Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, "Transitions Through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain" in Wayne A. Selcher, ed., *Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 179; Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 344–57.

[17] Jacques Rupnik, "Hungary's Quiet Revolution," *New Republic*, 20 November 1989, 20; *New York Times*, 16 April 1989.

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Third wave transformations usually evolved through five major phases, four of which occurred within the authoritarian system.

Emergence of reformers. The first step was the emergence of a group of leaders or potential leaders within the authoritarian regime who believed that movement in the direction of democracy was desirable or necessary. Why did they conclude this? The reasons why people became democratic reformers varied greatly from country to country and seldom were clear. They can, however, be grouped into five categories. First, reformers often concluded that the costs of staying in power—such as politicizing their armed forces, dividing the coalition that had supported them, grappling with seemingly unsolvable problems (usually economic), and increasing repression—had reached the point where a graceful exit from power was desirable. The leaders of military regimes were particularly sensitive to the corrosive effects of political involvement on the integrity, professionalism, coherence, and command structure of the military. "We all directly or indirectly," General Morales Bermudez observed as he led Peru toward democracy, "had been witnesses to what was happening to this institution fundamental to our fatherland, and in the same vein, to the other institutions. And we don't want that." In a similar vein, General Fernando Matthei, head of the Chilean air force, warned, "If the transition toward democracy is not initiated promptly, we shall ruin the armed forces in a way no Marxist infiltration could."[18]

Second, in some cases reformers wished to reduce the risks they faced if they held on to power and then eventually lost it. If the opposition seemed to be gaining strength, arranging for a democratic transition was one way of achieving this. It is, after all, preferable to risk losing office than to risk losing life.

Third, in some cases, including India, Chile, and Turkey, authoritarian leaders believed that they or their associates would not lose office. Having made commitments to restore democratic institutions and being faced with declining legitimacy and support these rulers could see the desirability of attempting to renew their legitimacy by organizing elections in anticipation that the voters would continue them in power. This anticipation was usually wrong.

Fourth, reformers often believed that democratizing would produce benefits for their country: increase its international legitimacy, reduce U.S. or other sanctions against their regime, and open the door to economic and military assistance, International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, invitations to Washington, and inclusion in international gatherings dominated by the leaders of the Western alliance.

Finally, in many cases, including Spain, Brazil, Hungary, and Turkey and some other military regimes, reformers believed that democracy was the "right" form of government and that their country had evolved to the point where, like other developed and respected countries, it too should have a democratic political system.

[18] Quoted by Abugattas in Malloy and Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats*, 129, and by Sylvia T. Borzutzky, "The Pinochet Regime: Crisis and Consolidation" in ibid., 85.

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Liberal reformers tended to see liberalization as a way of defusing opposition to their regime without fully democratizing the regime. They would ease up on repression, restore some civil liberties, reduce censorship, permit broader discussion of public issues, and allow civil society—associations, churches, unions, business organizations—greater scope to conduct their affairs. Liberalizers did not, however, wish to introduce fully participatory competitive elections that could cause current leaders to lose power. They wanted to create a kinder, gentler, more secure and stable authoritarianism without altering fundamentally the nature of their system. Some reformers were undoubtedly unsure themselves how far they wished to go in opening up the politics of their country. They also at times undoubtedly felt the need to veil their intentions: democratizers tended to reassure standpatters by giving the impression that they were only liberalizing; liberalizers attempted to win broader popular support by creating the impression they were democratizing. Debates consequently raged over how far Geisel, Botha, Gorbachev, and others "really" wanted to go.

The emergence of liberalizers and democratizers within an authoritarian system creates a first-order force for political change. It also, however, can have a second-order effect. In military regimes in particular it divides the ruling group, further politicizes the military, and hence leads more officers to believe that "the military as government" must be ended in order to preserve "the military as institution." The debate over whether or not to withdraw from government in itself becomes an argument to withdraw from government.

Acquiring power. Democratic reformers not only had to exist within the authoritarian regime, they also had to be in power in that regime. How did this come about? In three cases leaders who created the authoritarian regime presided over its transition to democracy. In India and Turkey, authoritarian regimes were defined from the start as interruptions in the formal pattern of democracy. The regimes were short-lived, ending with elections organized by the authoritarian leaders in the false anticipation that they or the candidates they supported would win those elections. In Chile General Pinochet created the regime, remained in power for seventeen years, established a lengthy schedule for the transition to democracy, implemented that schedule in anticipation that the voters would extend him in office for eight more years, and exited grudgingly from power when they did not. Otherwise those who created authoritarian regimes or who led such regimes for prolonged periods of time did not take the lead in ending those regimes. In all these cases, transformation occurred because reformers replaced standpatters in power.

Reformers came to power in authoritarian regimes in three ways. First, in Spain and Taiwan, the founding and long-ruling authoritarian leaders, Franco and Chiang Kai-shek died. Their designated successors, Juan Carlos and Chiang Ching-kuo, succeeded to the mantle, responded to the momentous social and economic changes that had occurred in their countries, and began the process of democratization. In the Soviet Union, the deaths in the course of three years of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantine Chernenko allowed Gorba-

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chev to come to power. In a sense, Franco, Chiang, and Brezhnev died in time; Deng Xiao-ping did not.

In Brazil and in Mexico, the authoritarian system itself provided for regular change in leadership. This made the acquisition of power by reformers possible but not necessary. In Brazil two factions existed in the military. Repression reached its peak between 1969 and 1972 during the presidency of General Emílio Médici, a hard-liner. In a major struggle within the military establishment at the end of his term, the soft-line Sorbonne group was able to secure the nomination of General Ernesto Geisel for president, in part because his brother was minister of war. Guided by his chief associate, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, Geisel began the process of democratization and acted decisively to ensure that he would, in turn, be succeeded in 1978 by another member of the Sorbonne group, General João Batista Figueiredo. In Mexico, outgoing President José Lopez Portillo in 1981 followed standard practice in selecting his minister of planning and budgets, Miguel de la Madrid, as his successor. De la Madrid was an economic and political liberalizer and, rejecting more traditional and old-guard candidates, chose a young reforming technocrat, Carlos Salinas, to continue the opening up process.

Where authoritarian leaders did not die and were not regularly changed, democratic reformers had to oust the ruler and install prodemocratic leadership. In military governments, other than Brazil, this meant the replacement by coup d'etat of one military leader by another: Morales Bermudez replaced Juan Velasco in Peru; Alfredo Poveda replaced Guillermo Rodríguez Lara in Ecuador; Oscar Mejía replaced Jose Rios Montt in Guatemala; Murtala Muhammed replaced Yacubu Gowon in Nigeria.[19] In the one-party system in Hungary, reformers mobilized their strength and deposed the long-ruling Janos Kadar at a special party conference in May 1988, replacing him as secretary general with Karoly Grosz. Grosz, however, was only a semireformer, and a year later the Central Committee replaced him with a four-person presidium dominated by reformers. In October 1989 one of them, Rezso Nyers, became party president. In Bulgaria in the fall of 1989, reform-minded Communist party leaders ousted Todor Zhivkov from the dominant position he had occupied for thirty-five years. The leadership changes associated with some liberalizing and democratizing reforms are summarized in Table 2.

The failure of liberalization. A critical issue in the third wave concerned the role of liberal reformers and the stability of a liberalized authoritarian polity. Liberal reformers who succeeded standpatter leaders usually turned out to be transition figures with brief stays in power. In Taiwan, Hungary, and Mexico, liberalizers were quickly succeeded by more democratically oriented reformers. In Brazil, although some analysts are dubious, it seems reasonably clear that

[19] See Needler, "The Military Withdrawal," 621–23 on "second phase" coups and the observation that "the military government that returns power to civilian hands is not the same one that seized power from the constitutional government in the first place."

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TABLE 2

Leadership Change and Reform, 1973–90

Country	Standpat Leader	Change	Reform Leader I	Change	Reform Leader II	First Democratic Election
Nigeria	Gowon	July 1975 coup	Murtala Mohammed	February 1976 death	Obasanjo	August 1979
Ecuador	Rodriguez Lara	January 1976 coup	Poveda	–	–	April 1979
Peru	Velasco	August 1975 coup	Morales Bermudez	–	–	May 1980
Brazil	Medici	March 1974 succession	Geisel	March 1979 succession	Figueiredo	January 1985
Guatemala	Rios Montt	August 1983 coup	Mejia	–	–	December 1985
Spain	Franco	November 1975 death	Juan Carlos	–	Juan Carlos	March 1979
	Carrero Blanco	December 1973 death	Arias	July 1976 ouster	Suárez	
Taiwan	Chiang Kai-shek	April 1975 death	Chiang Ching-kuo	January 1988 death	Lee Teng-hui	
Hungary	Kadar	May 1988 ouster	Grosz	May–October 1989 ouster	Nyers-Pozsgay	March 1990
Mexico	Portillo	December 1982 succession	De la Madrid	December 1988 succession	Salinas	
South Africa	Vorster	September 1978 ouster	Botha	September 1989 ouster	de Klerk	
USSR	Chernenko	March 1985 death	Gorbachev			
Bulgaria	Zhivkov	November 1989 ouster	Mladenov	–	–	June 1990

Geisel and Golbery do Couto e Silva were committed to meaningful democratization from the start.[20] Even if they did just intend to liberalize the authoritarian system rather than replace it, João Figueiredo extended the process to democratization. "I have to make this country into a democracy," he said in 1978 before taking office, and he did.[21]

In Spain the hard-line prime minister, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, was assassinated in December 1973, and Franco appointed Carlos Arias Navarro to succeed him. Arias was the classic liberal reformer. He wished to modify the Franco regime in order to preserve it. In a famous speech on 12 February 1974, he proposed an opening (*apertura*) and recommended a number of modest reforms including, for instance, permitting political associations to function but not political parties. He "was too much of a conservative and Francoist at heart to carry out a true democratization of the regime." His reform proposals were torpedoed

[20] Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 32–40; and Thomas E. Skidmore, "Brazil's Slow Road to Democratization: 1974–1985" in Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil*, 33. This interpretation coincides with my own impression of Golbery's intentions that I formed in 1974 working with him on plans for Brazil's democratization. For a contrary argument, see Silvio R. Duncan Baretta and John Markoff, "Brazil's *Abertura*: A Transition from What to What?" in Malloy and Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats*, 45–46.

[21] Quoted in Francisco Weffort, "Why Democracy?" in Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil*, 332.

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by the standpatters of the "bunker," including Franco; at the same time the proposals stimulated the opposition to demand a more extensive opening. In the end, Arias "discredited *aperturismo* just as Luis Carrero Blanco had discredited immobilism."[22] In November 1975 Franco died and Juan Carlos succeeded him as chief of state. Juan Carlos was committed to transforming Spain into a true, European-style parliamentary democracy, Arias resisted this change, and in July 1976 Juan Carlos replaced him with Adolfo Suárez, who moved quickly to introduce democracy.

The transition from liberalized authoritarianism, however, could move backward as well as forward. A limited opening could raise expectations of further change that could lead to instability, upheaval, and even violence; these, in turn, could provoke an antidemocratic reaction and replacement of the liberalizing leadership with standpatter leaders. In Greece, George Papadopoulos attempted to shift from a standpatter to a liberalizing stance; this led to the Polytechnic student demonstration and its bloody suppression; a reaction followed and the liberalizing Papadopoulos was replaced by the hard-line Dimitrios Ioannidis. In Argentina General Roberto Viola succeeded the hard-line General Jorge Videla as president and began to liberalize. This produced a reaction in the military, Viola's ouster, and his replacement by hard-line General Leopoldo Galtieri. In China ultimate power presumably rested with Deng Xiao-ping. In 1987, however Zhao Ziyang became general secretary of the Communist party and began to open up the political system. This led to the massive student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989, which, in turn, provoked a hard-line reaction, the crushing of the student movement, the ouster of Zhao, and his replacement by Li Peng. In Burma, General Ne Win, who had ruled Burma for twenty-six years, ostensibly retired from office in July 1988 and was replaced by General Sein Lwin, another hard-liner. Mounting protests and violence forced Sein Lwin out within three weeks. He was succeeded by a civilian and presumed moderate, Maung Maung, who proposed elections and attempted to negotiate with opposition groups. Protests continued, however, and in September the army deposed Maung Maung, took control of the government, bloodily suppressed the demonstrations, and ended the movement toward liberalization.

The dilemmas of the liberalizer were reflected in the experiences of P. W. Botha and Mikhail Gorbachev. Both leaders introduced major liberalizing reforms in their societies. Botha came to power in 1978 with the slogan "Adapt or die" and legalized black trade unions, repealed the marriage laws, established mixed trading zones, granted citizenship to urban blacks, permitted blacks to acquire freehold title, substantially reduced petty apartheid, increased significantly investment in black education, abolished the pass laws, provided for elected black township councils, and created houses of parliament representing coloureds and

[22] Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy*, 2d ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 198–206.

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Asians, although not blacks. Gorbachev opened up public discussion, greatly reduced censorship, dramatically challenged the power of the Communist party apparat, and introduced at least modest forms of government responsibility to an elected legislature. Both leaders gave their societies new constitutions incorporating many reforms and also creating new and very powerful posts of president, which they then assumed. It seems probable that neither Botha nor Gorbachev, however, wanted fundamental change in their political systems. Their reforms were designed to improve and to moderate, but also to bolster the existing system and make it more acceptable to their societies. They themselves said as much repeatedly. Botha did not intend to end white power; Gorbachev did not intend to end communist power. As liberal reformers they wanted to change but also to preserve the systems that they led and in whose bureaucracies they had spent their careers.

Botha's liberalizing but not democratizing reforms stimulated intensified demands from South African blacks for their full incorporation into the political system. In September 1984 black townships erupted with protests that led to violence, repression, and the deployment of military forces into the townships. The efforts at reform simultaneously ended, and Botha the reformer was widely viewed as having become Botha the repressor. The reform process only got underway again in 1989 when Botha was replaced by F. W. de Klerk, whose more extensive reforms led to criticisms from Botha and his resignation from the National party. In 1989 and 1990 Gorbachev's liberalizing but not democratizing reforms appeared to be stimulating comparable upheaval, protests, and violence in the Soviet Union. As in South Africa, communal groups fought each other and the central authorities. The dilemma for Gorbachev was clear. Moving forward toward full-scale democratization would mean not only the end of communist power in the Soviet Union but very probably the end of the Soviet Union. Leading a hard-line reaction to the upheavals would mean the end of his efforts at economic reform, his greatly improved relations with the West, and his global image as a creative and humane leader. Andrei Sakharov put the choices squarely to Gorbachev in 1989: "A middle course in situations like these is almost impossible. The country and you personally are at a crossroads—either increase the process of change maximally or try to retain the administrative command system with all its qualities."[23]

Where it was tried, liberalization stimulated the desire for democratization in some groups and the desire for repression in others. The experience of the third wave strongly suggests that liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand.

Backward legitimacy: subduing the standpatters. The achievement of power enabled the reformers to start democratizing but it did not eliminate the ability

[23] Quoted in David Remnick, "The Struggle for Light," *New York Review of Books*, 16 August 1990, 6.

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of the standpatters to challenge the reformers. The standpatter elements of what had been the governing coalition—the Francoist "bunker" in Spain, the military hard-liners in Brazil and other Latin American countires, the Stalinists in Hungary, the mainlander old guard in the KMT, the party bosses and bureaucracy in the PRI, the *Verkrampte* wing of the National party—did not give up easily. In the government, military, and party bureaucracies standpatters worked to stop or slow down the processes of change. In the non-one-party systems—Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala, Nigeria, and Spain—standpatter groups in the military attempted coups d'etat and made other efforts to dislodge the reformers from power. In South Africa and in Hungary, standpatter factions broke away from the dominant parties, charging them with betraying the basic principles on which the parties were based.

Reform governments attempted to neutralize standpatter opposition by weakening, reassuring, and converting the standpatters. Countering standpatter resistance often required a concentration of power in the reform chief executive. Geisel asserted himself as "dictator of the *abertura*" in order to force the Brazilian military out of politics.[24] Juan Carlos exercised his power and prerogatives to the full in moving Spain toward democracy, not least in the surprise selection of Suárez as prime minister. Botha and Gorbachev, as we have seen, created powerful new presidential offices for themselves. Salinas dramatically asserted his powers during his first years as Mexico's president.

The first requirement for reform leaders was to purge the governmental, military, and, where appropriate, party bureaucracies, replacing standpatters in top offices with supporters of reform. This was typically done in selective fashion so as not to provoke a strong reaction and so as to promote fissions within the standpatter ranks. In addition to weakening standpatters, reform leaders also tried to reassure and convert them. In military regimes, the reformers argued that it was time to go back, after a necessary but limited authoritarian interlude, to the democratic principles that were the basis of their country's political system. In this sense, they appealed for a "return to legitimacy." In the nonmilitary authoritarian systems, reformers invoked "backward legitimacy" and stressed elements of continuity with the past.[25] In Spain, for instance, the monarchy was reestablished and Suárez adhered to the provisions of the Franco constitution in abolishing that constitution: no Francoist could claim that there were procedural irregularities. In Mexico and South Africa the reformers in the PRI and National party cast themselves in the traditions of those parties. On Taiwan the KMT reformers appealed to Sun Yat-Sen's three principles.

Backward legitimacy had two appeals and two effects: it legitimated the new

[24] See Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 42–43.

[25] Giuseppe Di Palma highlighted the significance of backward legitimacy in "Founding Coalitions in Southern Europe: Legitimacy and Hegemony," *Government and Opposition* 15 (Spring 1980): 170. See also Nancy Bermeo, "Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and Portugal," *Comparative Politics* 19 (January 1987): 218.

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order because it was a product of the old, and it retrospectively legitimated the old order because it had produced the new. It elicited consensus from all except opposition extremists who had no use for either the old authoritarian regime or the new democratic one. Reformers also appealed to standpatters on the grounds that they were preempting the radical opposition and hence minimizing instability and violence. Suárez, for instance, asked the Spanish army to support him for these reasons and the dominant elements in the army accepted the transition because there "was no illegitimacy, no disorder in the streets, no significant threat of breakdown and subversion." Inevitably, the reformers also found that, as Geisel put it, they could "not advance without some retreats" and that hence, on occasion, as in the 1977 "April package" in Brazil, they had to make concessions to the standpatters.[26]

Coopting the opposition. Once in power the democratic reformers usually moved quickly to begin the process of democratization. This normally involved consultations with leaders of the opposition, the political parties, and major social groups and institutions. In some instances relatively formal negotiations occurred and quite explicit agreements or pacts were reached. In other cases, the consultations and negotiations were more informal. In Ecuador and Nigeria the government appointed commissions to develop plans and policies for the new system. In Spain, Peru, Nigeria, and eventually in Brazil elected assemblies drafted new constitutions. In several instances referenda were held to approve the new constitutional arrangements.

As the reformers alienated standpatters within the governing coalition, they had to reinforce themselves by developing support within the opposition and by expanding the political arena and appealing to the new groups that were becoming politically active as a result of the opening. Skillful reformers used the increased pressure from these groups for democratization to weaken the standpatters, and used the threat of a standpatter coup as well as the attractions of a share in power to strengthen moderate groups in the opposition.

To these ends, reformers in government negotiated with the principal opposition groups and arrived at explicit or tacit agreements with them. In Spain, for instance, the Communist party recognized that it was too weak to follow a "radical *rupturista* policy" and instead went along with a "*ruptura pactada*" even though the pact was "purely tacit." In October 1977 Suárez won the agreement of the Communist and Socialist parties to the *Pactos de la Moncloa* comprising a mixture of fairly severe economic austerity measures and some social reforms. Secret negotiations with Santiago Carrillo, the principal Communist leader, "played on the PCE [Partido Comunista de España] leader's anxiety to be near the levers of power and secured his backing for an austerity package."[27] In Hungary

[26] Stanley G. Payne, "The Role of the Armed Forces in the Spanish Transition" in Clark and Haltzel, eds., *Spain in the 1980s*, 86; Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 36.

[27] Theses presented by the Central Committee, Ninth Congress, Communist Party of Spain, 5–9 April 1978, quoted in Juan J. Linz, "Some Comparative Thoughts on the Transition to Democracy

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explicit negotiations occurred in the fall of 1989 between the Communist party and the Opposition Round Table representing the principal other parties and groups. In Brazil informal understandings developed between the government and the opposition parties, the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB) and the Partido Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB). On Taiwan in 1986 the government and the opposition arrived at an understanding on the parameters within which political change would take place and, in a week-long conference in July 1990, agreed on a full schedule of democratization.

Moderation and cooperation by the democratic opposition—their involvement in the process as junior partners—were essential to successful transformation. In almost all countries, the principal opposition parties—the MDB-PMDB in Brazil, the Socialists and Communists in Spain, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on Taiwan, the Civic Forum in Hungary, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) in Peru, the Christian Democrats in Chile—were led by moderates and followed moderate policies, at times in the face of considerable provocation by standpatter groups in the government.

Thomas E. Skidmore's summary of what occurred in Brazil neatly catches the central relationship involved in transformation processes:

> In the end, liberalization was the product of an intense dialectical relationship between the government and the opposition. The military who favored *abertura* had to proceed cautiously, for fear of arousing the hardliners. Their overtures to the opposition were designed to draw out the "responsible" elements, thereby showing there were moderates ready to cooperate with the government. At the same time, the opposition constantly pressed the government to end its arbitrary excesses, thereby reminding the military that their rule lacked legitimacy. Meanwhile, the opposition moderates had to remind the radicals that they would play into the hands of the hardliners if they pushed too hard. This intricate political relationship functioned successfully because there was a consensus among both military and civilians in favor of a return to an (almost) open political system.[28]

Guidelines for Democratizers 1: Reforming Authoritarian Systems

The principal lessons of the Spanish, Brazilian, and other transformations for democratic reformers in authoritarian governments include the following:

(1) Secure your political base. As quickly as possible place supporters of democratization in key power positions in the government, the party, and the military.

(2) Maintain backward legitimacy, that is, make changes through the established procedures of the nondemocratic regime and reassure standpatter groups

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in Portugal and Spain" in Jorge Braga de Macedo and Simon Serfaty, eds., *Portugal Since the Revolution: Economic and Political Perspectives* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 44; Preston, *Triumph of Democracy in Spain*, 137.

[28] Skidmore, "Brazil's Slow Road" in Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil*, 34.

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with symbolic concessions, following a course of two steps forward, one step backward.

(3) Gradually shift your own constituency so as to reduce your dependence on government groups opposing change and to broaden your constituency in the direction of opposition groups supporting democracy.

(4) Be prepared for the standpatters to take some extreme action to stop change (for example, a coup attempt)—possibly even stimulate them to do so—and then crack down on them ruthlessly, isolating and discrediting the more extreme opponents of change.

(5) Seize and keep control of the initiative in the democratization process. Only lead from strength and never introduce democratization measures in response to obvious pressure from more extreme radical opposition groups.

(6) Keep expectations low as to how far change can go; talk in terms of maintaining an ongoing process rather than achieving some fully elaborated democratic utopia.

(7) Encourage development of a responsible, moderate opposition party, which the key groups in society (including the military) will accept as a plausible nonthreatening alternative government.

(8) Create a sense of inevitability about the process of democratization so that it becomes widely accepted as a necessary and natural course of development even if to some people it remains an undesirable one.

REPLACEMENTS

Replacements involve a very different process from transformations. Reformers within the regime are weak or nonexistent. The dominant elements in government are standpatters staunchly opposed to regime change. Democratization consequently results from the opposition gaining strength and the government losing strength until the government collapses or is overthrown. The former opposition groups come to power and the conflict then often enters a new phase as groups in the new government struggle among themselves over the nature of the regime they should institute. Replacement, in short, involves three distinct phases: the struggle to produce the fall, the fall, and the struggle after the fall.

Most third wave democratizations required some cooperation from those in power. Only six replacements had occurred by 1990. Replacements were rare in transitions from one-party systems (one out of eleven) and military regimes (two out of sixteen) and more common in transitions from personal dictatorships (three out of seven). As we have pointed out, with some exceptions (Gandhi, Kenan Evren, Pinochet), leaders who created authoritarian regimes did not end those regimes. Changes of leadership within authoritarian systems were much more likely in military regimes through "second phase" coups or, in one-party systems, through regular succession or the action of constituted party bodies. Personal dictators, however, seldom retired voluntarily, and the nature of their

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power—personal rather than military or organizational—made it difficult for opponents within the regime to oust them and, indeed, made it unlikely that such opponents would exist in any significant numbers or strength. The personal dictator was thus likely to hang on until he died or until the regime itself came to an end. The life of the regime became the life of the dictator. Politically and at times literally (for example, Franco, Ceausescu) the deaths of the dictator and the regime coincided.

Democratic reformers were notably weak in or missing from the authoritarian regimes that disappeared in replacements. In Argentina and Greece, the liberalizing leaders Viola and Papadopoulos were forced out of power and succeeded by military hard-liners. In Portugal Caetano initiated some liberalizing reforms and then backed away from them. In the Philippines, Romania, and East Germany, the entourages of Marcos, Ceausescu, and Erich Honecker contained few if any democrats or even liberals. In all six cases standpatters monopolized power, and the possibility of initiating reform from within was almost totally absent.

An authoritarian system exists because the government is politically stronger than the opposition. It is replaced when the government becomes weaker than the opposition. Hence replacement requires the opposition to wear down the government and shift the balance of power in its favor. When they were initiated, the authoritarian regimes involved in the third wave were almost always popular and widely supported. They usually had the backing of a broad coalition of groups. Over time, however, as with any government, their strength deteriorated. The Greek and Argentine military regimes suffered the humiliation of military defeat. The Portuguese and Philippine regimes were unable to win counterinsurgency wars, and the Philippine regime created a martyr and stole an election. The Romanian regime followed policies that deeply antagonized its people and isolated itself from them; hence it was vulnerable to the cumulative snowballing of the antiauthoritarian movement throughout Eastern Europe. The case of East Germany was more ambiguous. Although the regime was relatively successful in some respects, the inevitable comparison with West Germany was an inherent weakness, and the opening of the transit corridor through Hungary dramatically undermined the regime's authority. The party leadership resigned in early December 1989, and a caretaker government took over. The regime's authority, however, evaporated, and with it the reasons for the East German state.

The erosion of support for the regime sometimes occurred openly, but, given the repressive character of authoritarian regimes, it was more likely to occur covertly. Authoritarian leaders were often unaware of how unpopular they were. Covert disaffection then manifested itself when some triggering event exposed the weakness fo the regime. In Greece and Argentina it was military defeat. In Portugal and East Germany it was the explicit turning against the regime of its ultimate source of power—the army in Portugal, the Soviet Union in East Germany. The actions of the Turks, the British, the Portuguese military, and Gorbachev galvanized and brought into the open the disaffection from the regime of other groups in those societies. In all these cases, only a few weak groups

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rallied to the support of the regime. Many people had become disaffected from the regime but, because it was an authoritarian regime, a triggering event was required to crystalize the disaffection.

Students are the universal opposition; they oppose whatever regime exists in their society. By themselves, however, students do not bring down regimes. Lacking substantial support from other groups in the population, they were gunned down by the military and police in Greece in November 1973, Burma in September 1988, and China in June 1989. The military are the ultimate support of regimes. If they withdraw their support, if they carry out a coup against the regime, or if they refuse to use force against those who threaten to overthrow the regime, the regime falls. In between the perpetual opposition of the students and the necessary support of the military are other groups whose support for or opposition to the regime depends on circumstances. In noncommunist authoritarian systems, such as the Philippines, these groups tended to disaffect in sequence. The disaffection of the students was followed by that of intellectuals in general and then by the leaders of previously existing political parties, many of whom may have supported or acquiesced in the authoritarian takeover. Typically the broader reaches of the middle class—white-collar workers, professionals, small business proprietors—became alienated. In a Catholic country, Church leaders also were early and effective opponents of the regime. If labor unions existed and were not totally controlled by the government, at some point they joined the opposition. So also, and most important, did larger business groups and the bourgeoisie. In due course, the United States or other foreign sources of support became disaffected. Finally and conclusively, the military decided not to support the government or actively to side with the opposition against the government.

In five out of six replacements, consequently, the exception being Argentina, military disaffection was essential to bringing down the regime. In the personal dictatorships in Portugal, the Philippines, and Romania, this military disaffection was promoted by the dictator's policies weakening military professionalism, politicizing and corrupting the officer corps, and creating competing paramilitary and security forces. Opposition to the government normally (Portugal was the only exception) had to be widespread before the military deserted the government. If disaffection was not widespread, it was either because the most probable sources of opposition—the middle class, bourgeoisie, religious groups—were small and weak or because the regime had the support of these groups, usually as a result of successful policies for economic development. In Burma and China the armed forces brutally suppressed protests that were largely student-led. In societies that were more highly developed economically, opposition to authoritarianism commanded a wider range of support. When this opposition took to the streets in the Philippines, East Germany, and Romania, military units did not fire on broadly representative groups of their fellow citizens.

A popular image of democratic transitions is that repressive governments are brought down by "people power," the mass mobilization of outraged citizens

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demanding and eventually forcing a change of regime. Some form of mass action did take place in almost every third wave regime change. Mass demonstrations, protests, and strikes played central roles, however, in only about six transitions completed or underway at the end of the 1980s. These included the replacements in the Philippines, East Germany, and Romania, and the transplacements in Korea, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In Chile frequent mass actions attempted, without success, to alter Pinochet's plan for transformation. In East Germany, uniquely, both "exit" and "voice," in Albert Hirschman's terms, played major roles, with protest taking the form first of massive departure of citizens from the country and then of massive street demonstrations in Leipzig and Berlin.[29]

In the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, and Greece, when the regime collapsed, it collapsed quickly. One day the authoritarian government was in power, the next day it was not. In Argentina and East Germany, the authoritarian regimes were quickly delegitimated but clung to power while attempting to negotiate terms for the change in regime. In Argentina, the successor military government of General Reynaldo Bignone, which took over in July 1982 immediately after the Falklands defeat, was "relatively successful" in maintaining some regime control over the transition for six months. In December 1982, however, mounting public opposition and the development of opposition organizations led to mass protests, a general strike, Bignone's scheduling of elections, and the rejection by the united opposition parties of the terms proposed by the military for the transfer of power. The authority of the lame-duck military regime continued to deteriorate until it was replaced by the Alfonsín government elected in October 1983. "The military government collapsed," one author observed; "it had no influence over the choice of candidates or the election itself, it excluded no one, and reserved neither powers nor veto prerogatives for itself in the future. In addition, it was unable to guarantee either its autonomy in relation to the future constitutional government or the promise of a future military policy, and, even less—given the winning candidate—the basis for an agreement on the ongoing struggle against the guerrillas."[30] In East Germany in early 1990 a somewhat similar situation existed, with a weak and discredited communist government clinging to power, and its prime minister, Hans Modrow, playing the role of Bignone.

The emphasis in transformations on procedural continuity and backward legitimacy was absent from replacements. The institutions, procedures, ideas, and individuals connected with the previous regime were instead considered tainted and the emphasis was on a sharp, clean break with the past. Those who succeeded the authoritarian rulers based their rule on "forward legitimacy," what they would bring about in the future, and their lack of involvement in or connection with the previous regime.

[29] Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[30] Virgilio R. Beltran, "Political Transition in Argentina: 1982 to 1985," *Armed Forces and Society* 13 (Winter 1987): 217; Scott Mainwaring and Eduardo J. Viola, "Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s," *Journal of International Affairs* 38 (Winter 1985): 206–9.

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In transformations and transplacements the leaders of the authoritarian regimes usually left politics and went back to the barracks or private life quietly and with some respect and dignity. Authoritarian leaders who lost power through replacements, in contrast, suffered unhappy fates. Marcos and Caetano were forced into exile. Ceausescu was summarily executed. The military officers who ran Greece and Argentina were tried and imprisoned. In East Germany punishments were threatened against Honecker and other former leaders in notable contrast to the absence of such action in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The dictators removed by foreign intervention in Grenada and Panama were similarly subjected to prosecution and punishment.

The peaceful collapse of an authoritarian regime usually produced a glorious if brief moment of public euphoria, of carnations and champagne, absent from transformations. The collapse also created a potential vacuum of authority absent from transformations. In Greece and the Philippines, the vacuum was quickly filled by the accession to power of Constantine Karamanlis and Corazon C. Aquino, popular political leaders who guided their countires to democracy. In Iran the authority vacuum was filled by the ayatollah, who guided Iran elsewhere. In Argentina and East Germany the Bignone and Modrow governments weakly filled the interim between the collapse of the authoritarian regimes and the election of democratic governments.

Before the fall, opposition groups are united by their desire to bring about the fall. After the fall, divisions appear among them and they struggle over the distribution of power and the nature of the new regime that must be established. The fate of democracy was determined by the relative power of democratic moderates and antidemocratic radicals. In Argentina and Greece, the authoritarian regimes had not been in power for long, political parties quickly reappeared, and an overwhelming consensus existed among political leaders and groups on the need quickly to reestablish democratic institutions. In the Philippines overt opposition to democracy, apart from the NPA insurgency, also was minimal.

In Nicaragua, Iran, Portugal, and Romania the abrupt collapse of the dictatorships led to struggles among the former opposition groups and parties as to who would exercise power and what sort of regime would be created. In Nicaragua and Iran the democratic moderates lost out. In Portugal, a state of revolutionary ferment existed between April 1974 and November 1975. A consolidation of power by the antidemocratic Marxist-Leninist coalition of the Communist party and left-wing military officers was entirely possible. In the end, after intense struggles between military factions, mass mobilizations, demonstrations, and strikes, the military action by António Ramalho Eanes settled Portugal on a democratic course. "What started as a coup," as Robert Harvey observed, "became a revolution which was stopped by a reaction before it became an anarchy. Out of the tumult a democracy was born."[31]

[31] Robert Harvey, *Portugal: Birth of a Democracy* (London: Macmillan, 1978), 2.

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The choices in Portugal were between bourgeois democracy and Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. The choices in Romania in 1990 were less clear, but democracy also was not inevitable. The lack of effectively organized opposition parties and groups, the absence of previous experience with democracy, the violence involved in the overthrow of Ceausescu, the deep desire for revenge against people associated with the dictatorship combined with the widespread involvement of much of the population with the dictatorship, the many leaders of the new government who had been part of the old regime—all did not augur well for the emergence of democracy. At the end of 1989 some Romanians enthusiastically compared what was happening in their country to what had happened two hundred years earlier in France. They might also have noted that the French Revolution ended in a military dictatorship.

Guidelines for Democratizers 2: Overthrowing Authoritarian Regimes

The history of replacements suggests the following guidelines for opposition democratic moderates attempting to overthrow an authoritarian regime:[32]

(1) Focus attention on the illegitimacy or dubious legitimacy of the authoritarian regime; that is its most vulnerable point. Attack the regime on general issues that are of widespread concern, such as corruption and brutality. If the regime is performing successfully (particularly economically) these attacks will not be effective. Once its performance falters (as it must), highlighting its illegitimacy becomes the single most important lever for dislodging it from power.

(2) Like democratic rulers, authoritarian rulers over time alienate erstwhile supporters. Encourage these disaffected groups to support democracy as the necessary alternative to the current system. Make particular efforts to enlist business leaders, middle-class professionals, religious figures, and political party leaders, most of whom probably supported creation of the authoritarian system. The more "respectable" and "responsible" the opposition appears, the easier it is to win more supporters.

(3) Cultivate generals. In the last analysis, whether the regime collapses or not depends on whether they support the regime, join you in opposition to it, or stand by on the sidelines. Support from the military could be helpful when the crisis comes, but all you really need is military unwillingness to defend the regime.

(4) Practice and preach nonviolence. Among other things, this will make it

[32] Myron Weiner has formulated a similar and more concise set of recommendations: "For those who seek democratization the lessons are these: mobilize large-scale non-violent opposition to the regime, seek support from the center and, if necessary, from the conservative right, restrain the left and keep them from dominating the agenda of the movement, woo sections of the military, seek sympathetic coverage from the western media, and press the United States for support." "Empirical Democratic Theory and the Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy," *PS* 20 (Fall 1987): 866.

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easier for you to win over the security forces: soldiers do not tend to be sympathetic to people who have been hurling Molotov cocktails at them.

(5) Seize every opportunity to express opposition to the regime, including participation in elections it organizes.

(6) Develop contacts with the global media, foreign human rights organizations, and transnational organizations such as churches. In particular, mobilize supporters in the United States. American congressmembers are always looking for moral causes to get publicity for themselves and to use against the American administration. Dramatize your cause to them and provide them with material for TV photo opportunities and headline-making speeches.

(7) Promote unity among opposition groups. Attempt to create comprehensive umbrella organizations that will facilitate cooperation among such groups. This will be difficult and, as the examples of the Philippines, Chile, Korea, and South Africa show, authoritarian rulers are often expert in promoting opposition disunity. One test of your qualifications to become a democratic leader of your country is your ability to overcome these obstacles and secure some measure of opposition unity. Remember Gabriel Almond's truth: "Great leaders are great coalition builders."[33]

(8) When the authoritarian regime falls, be prepared quickly to fill the vacuum of authority that results. This can be done by: pushing to the fore a popular, charismatic, democratically inclined leader; promptly organizing elections to provide popular legitimacy to a new government; and building international legitimacy by getting support of foreign and transnational actors (international organizations, the United States, the European Community, the Catholic Church). Recognize that some of your former coalition partners will want to establish a new dictatorship of their own and quietly organize the supporters of democracy to counter this effort if it materializes.

TRANSPLACEMENTS

In transplacements democratization is produced by the combined actions of government and opposition. Within the government the balance between standpatters and reformers is such that the government is willing to negotiate a change of regime—unlike the situation of standpatter dominance that leads to replacement—but it is unwilling to initiate a change of regime. It has to be pushed and/or pulled into formal or informal negotiations with the opposition. Within the opposition democratic moderates are strong enough to prevail over antidemocratic radicals, but they are not strong enough to overthrow the government. Hence they too see virtues in negotiation.

[33] Gabriel A. Almond, "Approaches to Developmental Causation" in Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, eds., *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 32.

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Approximately eleven of thirty-five liberalizations and democratizations that occurred or began in the 1970s and 1980s approximated the transplacement model. The most notable ones were in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay, and Korea; the regime changes in Bolivia, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua also involved significant elements of transplacement. In El Salvador and Honduras the negotiations were in part with the United States government, acting as a surrogate for democratic moderates. In 1989 and 1990, South Africa began a transplacement process, and Mongolia and Nepal appeared to be moving in that direction. Some features of transplacement were also present in Chile. The Pinochet regime was strong enough, however, to resist opposition pressure to negotiate democratization and stubbornly adhered to the schedule for regime change that it laid down in 1980.

In successful transplacements, the dominant groups in both government and opposition recognized that they were incapable of unilaterally determining the nature of the future political system in their society. Government and opposition leaders often developed these views after testing each other's strength and resolve in a political dialectic. Initially, the opposition usually believed that it would be able to bring about the downfall of the government at some point in the not too distant future. This belief was on occasion wildly unrealistic, but so long as opposition leaders held to it, serious negotiations with the government were impossible. In contrast, the government usually initially believed that it could effectively contain and suppress the opposition without incurring unacceptable costs. Transplacements occurred when the beliefs of both changed. The opposition realized that it was not strong enough to overthrow the government. The government realized that the opposition was strong enough to increase significantly the costs of nonnegotiation in terms of increased repression leading to further alienation of groups from the government, intensified divisions within the ruling coalition, increased possibility of a hard-line takeover of the government, and significant losses in international legitimacy.

The transplacement dialectic often involved a distinct sequence of steps. First, the government engaged in some liberalization and began to lose power and authority. Second, the opposition exploited this loosening by and weakening of the government to expand its support and intensify its activities with the hope and expectation it would shortly be able to bring down the government. Third, the government reacted forcefully to contain and suppress the mobilization of political power by the opposition. Fourth, government and opposition leaders perceived a standoff emerging and began to explore the possibilities of a negotiated transition. This fourth step was not, however, inevitable. Conceivably, the government, perhaps after a change of leadership, could brutally use its military and police forces to restore its power, at least temporarily. Or the opposition could continue to develop its strength, further eroding the power of the government and eventually bringing about its downfall. Transplacements thus required some rough equality of strength between government and opposition as well as uncertainty on each side as to who would prevail in a major test of strength. In

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these circumstances, the risks of negotiation and compromise appeared less than the risks of confrontation and catastrophe.

The political process leading to transplacement was thus often marked by a seesawing back and forth of strikes, protests, and demonstrations, on the one hand, and repression, jailings, police violence, states of siege, and martial law, on the other. Cycles of protest and repression in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay, Korea, and Chile eventually led to negotiated agreements between government and opposition in all cases except that of Chile.

In Uruguay, for instance, mounting protests and demonstrations in the fall of 1983 stimulated the negotiations leading to the military withdrawal from power. In Bolivia in 1978 "a series of conflicts and protest movements" preceded the military's agreeing to a timetable for elections.[34] In Korea as in Uruguay, the military regime had earlier forcefully suppressed protests. In the spring of 1987, however, the demonstrations became more massive and broad-based and increasingly involved the middle class. The government first reacted in its usual fashion but then shifted, agreed to negotiate, and accepted the central demands of the opposition. In Poland the 1988 strikes had a similar impact. As one commentator explained, "The strikes made the round table not only possible, but necessary—for both sides. Paradoxically, the strikes were strong enough to compel the communists to go to the round table, yet too weak to allow Solidarity's leaders to refuse negotiations. That's why the round table talks took place."[35]

In transplacements, the eyeball-to eyeball confrontation in the central square of the capital between massed protesters and serried ranks of police revealed each side's strengths and weaknesses. The opposition could mobilize massive support; the government could contain and withstand opposition pressure.

Politics in South Africa in the 1980s also evolved along the lines of the four-step model. In the late 1970s P. W. Botha began the process of liberalizing reform, arousing black expectations and then frustrating them when the 1983 constitution denied blacks a national political role. This led to uprisings in the black townships in 1984 and 1985, which stimulated black hopes that the collapse of the Afrikaner-dominated regime was imminent. The government's forceful and effective suppression of black and white dissent then compelled the opposition drastically to revise their hopes. At the same time, the uprisings attracted international attention, stimulated condemnation of both the apartheid system and the government's tactics, and led the United States and European governments to intensify economic sanctions against South Africa. As the hopes for revolution of the African National Congress (ANC) radicals declined, the worries of the National

[34] *Washington Post*, 7 October 1983; Laurence Whitehead, "Bolivia's Failed Democratization, 1977–1980" in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 59.

[35] "Leoplitax" (identified as a "political commentator in the Polish underground press"), *Uncaptive Minds* 2 (May–June–July 1989): 5.

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party government about international legitimacy and the economic future increased. In the mid-1970s, Joe Slovo, head of the South African Communist party and the ANC's military organization, argued that the ANC could overthrow the government and win power through sustained guerrilla warfare and revolution. In the late 1980s he remained committed to the use of violence, but saw negotiations as the more likely route for achieving ANC goals. After becoming president of South Africa in 1989, F. W. de Klerk also emphasized the importance of negotiations. The lesson of Rhodesia, he said, was that "When the opportunity was there for real, constructive negotiation, it was not grasped. . . . It went wrong because in the reality of their circumstances they waited too long before engaging in fundamental negotiation and dialogue. We must not make that mistake, and we are determined not to repeat that mistake."[36] The two political leaders were learning from their own experience and that of others.

In Chile, in contrast, the government was willing and able to avoid negotiation. Major strikes erupted in the spring of 1983, but a national general strike was suppressed by the government. Beginning in May 1983 the opposition organized massive monthly demonstrations on "Days of National Protest." These were broken up by the police, usually with several people being killed. Economic problems and the opposition protests forced the Pinochet government to initiate a dialogue with the opposition. The economy then began to recover, however, and the middle classes became alarmed at the breakdown of law and order. A national strike in October 1984 was put down with considerable bloodshed. Shortly thereafter the government reimposed the state of siege that had been cancelled in 1979. The opposition efforts thus failed to overthrow the government or to induce it to engage in meaningful negotiations. The opposition had "overestimated its strength and underestimated the government's."[37] It had also underestimated Pinochet's tenacity and political skill and the willingness of Chilean security forces to shoot unarmed civilian demonstrators.

Transplacements required leaders on both sides willing to risk negotiations. Divisions of opinion over negotiations usually existed within governing elites. At times, the top leaders had to be pressured by their colleagues and by circumstances to negotiate with the opposition. In 1989, for instance, Adam Michnik argued that Poland, like Hungary, was following "the Spanish way to democracy." At one level, he was right in that both the Spanish and Polish transitions were basically peaceful. At a more particular level, however, the Spanish analogy did not hold for Poland because Wojciech Jaruzelski was not a Juan Carlos or Suárez (whereas Imre Pozsgay in Hungary in considerable measure was). Jaruzelski was a reluctant democrat who had to be pushed by the deterioration of his country and his regime into negotiations with Solidarity.[38] In Uruguay the president,

[36] Steven Mufson, "Uncle Joe," *New Republic*, 28 September 1987, 22-23; *Washington Post National Weekly*, 19-25 February 1990, 7.

[37] Edgardo Boeniger, "The Chilean Road to Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Spring 1986): 821.

[38] Anna Husarska, "A Talk with Adam Michnik," *New Leader*, 3-17 April 1989, 10; Marcin Sulkowski, "The Dispute About the General," *Uncaptive Minds* 3 (March-April 1990): 7-9.

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General Gregorio Alvarez, wanted to prolong his power and postpone democratization and had to be forced by the other members of the military junta to move ahead with the regime change. In Chile, General Pinochet was somewhat similarly under pressure from other junta members, especially the air force commander, General Fernando Matthei, to be more forthcoming in dealing with the opposition, but Pinochet successfully resisted this pressure.

In other countries changes occurred in the top leadership before serious negotiations with the opposition began. In Korea the government of General Chun Doo Hwan followed a staunch standpatter policy of stonewalling opposition demands and suppressing opposition activity. In 1987, however, the governing party designated Roh Tae Woo as its candidate to succeed Chun. Roh dramatically reversed Chun's policies, announced a political opening, and entered into negotiations with the opposition leader.[39] In Czechoslovakia the long-in-power standpatter Communist party general secretary, Gustav Husak, was succeeded by the mildly reformist Milos Jakes in December 1987. Once the opposition became mobilized in the fall of 1989, however, Jakes was replaced by the reformer Karel Urbanek. Urbanek and the reformist prime minister, Ladislav Adamec, then negotiated arrangements for the transition to democracy with Vaclav Havel and the other leaders of the opposition Civic Forum. In South Africa, de Klerk moved beyond his predecessor's aborted transformation process from above to transplacement-type negotiations with black opposition leaders. Uncertainty, ambiguity, and division of opinion over democratization thus tended to characterize the ruling circles in transplacement situations. These regimes were not overwhelmingly committed either to holding on to power ruthlessly or to moving decisively toward democracy.

Disagreement and uncertainty existed not only on the government side in transplacements. In fact, the one group more likely to be divided against itself than the leaders of a decaying authoritarian government are the opposition leaders who aspire to replace them. In replacement situations the government suppresses the opposition and the opposition has an overriding common interest in bringing down the government. As the Philippine and Nicaraguan examples indicate, even under these conditions securing unity among opposition leaders and parties may be extremely difficult, and the unity achieved is often tenuous and fragile. In transplacements, where it is a question not of overthrowing the government but of negotiating with it, opposition unity is even more difficult to achieve. It was not achieved in Korea, and hence the governmental candidate, Roh Tae Woo, was elected president with a minority of the vote, as the two opposition candidates split the antigovernment majority by opposing each other. In Uruguay, because its leader was still imprisoned, one opposition party—the National party—rejected the agreement reached between the two other parties and the military. In

[39] See James Cotton, "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea," *Political Studies* 37 (June 1989): 252–53.

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South Africa a major obstacle to democratic reform was the many divisions within the opposition between parliamentary and nonparliamentary groups, Afrikaner and English, black and white, and among black ideological and tribal groups. At no time before the 1990s did the South African government confront anything but a bewildering multiplicity of opposition groups whose differences among themselves were often as great as their differences with the government.

In Chile the opposition was seriously divided into a large number of parties, factions, and coalitions. In 1983, the moderate centrist opposition parties were able to join together in the Democratic Alliance. In August 1985 a broader group of a dozen parties joined in the National Accord calling for a transition to democracy. Yet conflicts over leadership and tactics continued. In 1986 the Chilean opposition mobilized massive protests, hoping to duplicate in Santiago what had just happened in Manila. The opposition, however, was divided and its militancy frightened conservatives. The problem, as one observer put it at the time, was that "the general is not being challenged by a moderate opposition movement that has got itself together under the leadership of a respected figure. There is no Chilean Cory."[40] In Poland, on the other hand, things were different. Lech Walesa was a Polish Cory, and Solidarity dominated the opposition for most of a decade. In Czechoslovakia the transplacement occurred so quickly that differences among opposition political groups did not have time to materialize.

In transplacements democratic moderates have to be sufficiently strong within the opposition to be credible negotiating partners with the government. Almost always some groups within the opposition reject negotiations with the government. They fear that negotiations will produce undesirable compromises and they hope that continued opposition pressure will bring about the collapse or the overthrow of the government. In Poland in 1988–89, right-wing opposition groups urged a boycott of the Round Table talks. In Chile left-wing opposition groups carried out terrorist attacks that undermined the efforts of the moderate opposition to negotiate with the government. Similarly, in Korea radicals rejected the agreement on elections reached by the government and the leading opposition groups. In Uruguay, the opposition was dominated by leaders of moderate political parties and extremists were less of a problem.

For negotiations to occur each party had to concede some degree of legitimacy to the other. The opposition had to recognize the government as a worthy partner in change and implicitly if not explicitly acquiesce in its current right to rule. The government, in turn, had to accept the opposition groups as legitimate representatives of significant segments of society. The government could do this more easily if the opposition groups had not engaged in violence. Negotiations were also easier if the opposition groups, such as political parties under a military regime, had previously been legitimate participants in the political process. It was

[40] *Economist*, 10 May 1986, 39; Alfred Stepan, "The Last Days of Pinochet?" *New York Review of Books*, 2 June 1988, 34.

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easier for the opposition to negotiate if the government had used only limited violence against it and if there were some democratic reformers in the government whom it had reason to believe shared its goals.

In transplacements, unlike transformations and replacements, government leaders often negotiated the basic terms of the regime change with opposition leaders they had previously had under arrest: Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, Jorge Batlle Ibanez, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela. There were good reasons for this. Opposition leaders who have been in prison have not been fighting the government, violently or nonviolently; they have been living with it. They have also experienced the reality of government power. Governmental leaders who released their captives were usually interested in reform, and those released were usually moderate enough to be willing to negotiate with their former captors. Imprisonment also enhanced the moral authority of the former prisoners. This helped them to unite the opposition groups, at least temporarily, and to hold out the prospect to the government that they could secure the acquiescence of their followers to whatever agreement was reached.

At one point in the Brazilian transition, General Golbery reportedly told an opposition leader, "You get your radicals under control and we will control ours."[41] Getting radicals under control often requires the cooperation of the other side. In transplacement negotiations, each party has an interest in strengthening the other party so that he can deal more effectively with the extremists on his side. In June 1990, for instance, Nelson Mandela commented on the problems F. W. de Klerk was having with white hard-liners and said that the ANC had appealed "to whites to assist de Klerk. We are also trying to address the problems of white opposition to him. Discussions have already been started with influential sectors in the right wing." At the same time, Mandela said that his own desire to meet with Chief Mengosuthu Buthelezi had been vetoed by militants within the ANC and that he had to accept that decision because he was "a loyal and disciplined member of the A.N.C."[42] De Klerk obviously had an interest in strengthening Mandela and helping him deal with his militant left-wing opposition.

Negotiations for regime change were at times preceded by "prenegotiations" about the conditions for entering into negotiations. In South Africa, the government precondition was that the ANC renounce violence. ANC preconditions were that the government unban opposition groups and release political prisoners. In

[41] Quoted by Weffort, "Why Democracy" in Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil*, 345, and by Thomas G. Sanders, "Decompression" in Howard Handelman and Thomas G. Sanders, eds., *Military Government and the Movement Toward Democracy in South America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 157. As Weffort points out, this advice was somewhat beside the point in Brazil. Before starting its transformation process the Brazilian military regime had physically eliminated most of the serious radicals. The aide's advice is much more relevant in transplacement situations.

[42] *Time*, 25 June 1990, 21.

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some cases prenegotiations concerned which opposition individuals and groups would be involved in the negotiations.

Negotiations were sometimes lengthy and sometimes brief. They often were interrupted as one party or the other broke them off. As the negotiations continued, however, the political future of each of the parties became more engaged with their success. If the negotiations failed, standpatters within the governing coalition and radicals in the opposition stood ready to capitalize on that failure and to bring down the leaders who had engaged in negotiations. A common interest emerged and the sense of common fate. "[I]n a way," Nelson Mandela observed in August 1990, "there is an alliance now" between the ANC and the National party. "We are on one boat, one ship," agreed National Party leader P. W. Botha, "and the sharks to the left and the sharks to the right are not going to distinguish between us when we fall overboard."[43] Consequently, as negotiations continued, the parties became more willing to compromise in order to reach an agreement.

The agreements they reached often generated attacks from others in government and opposition who thought the negotiators had conceded too much. The specific agreements reflected, of course, issues peculiar to their countries. Of central importance in almost all negotiations, however, was the exchange of guarantees. In transformations former officials of the authoritarian regime were almost never punished; in replacements they almost always were. In transplacements this was often an issue to be negotiated; the military leaders in Uruguay and Korea, for instance, demanded guarantees against prosecution and punishment for any human rights violations. In other situations, negotiated guarantees involved arrangements for the sharing of power or for changes in power through elections. In Poland each side was guaranteed an explicit share of the seats in the legislature. In Czechoslovakia positions in the cabinet were divided between the two parties. In both these countries coalition governments reassured communists and the opposition that their interests would be protected during the transition. In Korea the governing party agreed to a direct, open election for the presidency on the assumption, and possibly the understanding, that at least two major opposition candidates would run, thereby making highly probable victory for the government party's candidate.

The risks of confrontation and of losing thus impel government and opposition to negotiate with each other; and guarantees that neither will lose everything become the basis for agreement. Both get the opportunity to share in power or to compete for power. Opposition leaders know they will not be sent back to prison; government leaders know they will not have to flee into exile. Mutual reduction in risk prompts reformers and moderates to cooperate in establishing democracy.

[43] Mandela quoted in Pauline H. Baker, "A Turbulent Transition," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Fall 1990): 17; Botha quoted in *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 14–20 May 1990, 17.

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Guidelines for Democratizers 3:
Negotiating Regime Changes

For democratic reformers in government. (1) Following the guidelines for transforming authoritarian systems, first isolate and weaken your standpatter opposition and consolidate your hold on the government and political machinery.

(2) Also following those guidelines, seize the initiative and surprise both opposition and standpatters with the concessions you are willing to make, but never make concessions under obvious opposition pressure.

(3) Secure endorsement of the concept of negotiations from leading generals or other top officials in the security establishment.

(4) Do what you can to enhance the stature, authority, and moderation of your principal opposition negotiating partner.

(5) Establish confidential and reliable back-channels for negotiating key central questions with opposition leaders.

(6) If the negotiation succeeds, you very probably will be in the opposition. Your prime concern, consequently, should be securing guarantees and safeguards for the rights of the opposition and of groups that have been associated with your government (e.g., the military). Everything else is negotiable.

For democratic moderates in the opposition. (1) Be prepared to mobilize your supporters for demonstrations when these will weaken the standpatters in the government. Too many marches and protests, however, are likely to strengthen them, weaken your negotiating partner, and arouse middle-class concern about law and order.

(2) Be moderate; appear statesmanlike.

(3) Be prepared to negotiate and, if necessary, make concessions on all issues except the holding of free and fair elections.

(4) Recognize the high probability that you will win those elections and do not take actions that will seriously complicate your governing your country.

For both government and opposition democratizers. (1) The political conditions favorable to a negotiated transition will not last indefinitely. Seize the opportunity they present and move quickly to resolve the central issues.

(2) Recognize that your political future and that of your partner depend on your success in reaching agreement on the transition to democracy.

(3) Resist the demands of leaders and groups on your side that either delay the negotiating process or threaten the core interest of your negotiating partner.

(4) Recognize that that agreement you reach will be the only alternative; radicals and standpatters may denounce it, but they will not be able to produce an alternative that commands broad support.

(5) When in doubt, compromise.

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The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox

PAUL E. PETERSON

The urban underclass is at once a characterization of a fragment of American society, a statement about the interconnections among diverse social problems, and an attempt to theorize about the paradox of poverty in an affluent society. The term is powerful because it calls attention to the conjunction between the characters of individuals and the impersonal forces of the larger social and political order. "Class" is the least interesting half of the word. Although it implies a relationship between one social group and another, the terms of that relationship are left undefined until combined with the familiar word "under." This transformation of a preposition into an adjective has none of the sturdiness of "working," the banality of "middle," or the remoteness of "upper." Instead, "under" suggests the lowly, passive, and submissive, yet at the same time the disreputable, dangerous, disruptive, dark, evil, and even hellish. And apart from these personal attributes, it suggests subjection, subordination, and deprivation. All these meanings are perhaps best brought together in Richard Wagner's *The Ring of the Nibelung*. Wotan goes under the earth to wrest the ring from the malicious Alberich, who had used it to enslave a vile and debased subhuman population.

Because of these diverse meanings, underclass is a word that can be used by conservatives, liberals, and radicals alike. It is a fitting term for conservatives who wish to identify those people who are unable to care for themselves or

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their families or are prone to antisocial behavior. But underclass, like lumpen proletariat, is also a suitable concept for those who, like Karl Marx, want to identify a group shaped and dominated by a society's economic and political forces but who have no productive role. And underclass is acceptable to some liberals who somewhat ambiguously refuse to choose between these contrasting images but who nonetheless wish to distinguish between the mainstream of working-class and middle-class America and those who seem separate from or marginal to that society. But, above all, the concept has been called back into the social science lexicon because it offers an explanation for the paradox of poverty in an otherwise affluent society that seems to have made strenuous efforts to eradicate this problem.

Two recent analyses of the urban underclass, Charles Murray's *Losing Ground* (1984) and William Wilson's *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987), have generated the most vigorous research effort on the poverty paradox since the proliferation of urban studies spawned by the civil rights movement during the 1960s. Indeed, this renaissance of social science investigation into the connection between the urban underclass and the paradox of poverty in the late 1980s is, on the whole, simply a picking up of the intellectual pieces that were left scattered in the early 1970s by the acrimonious debate over the existence and nature of the culture of poverty, Daniel Moynihan's study of *The Negro Family* issued by the Labor Department, and the Nixon administration's family assistance plan.[1] The objectivity of research, the effect on scholarship of the racial background of social science investigators, and the hidden agendas of protagonists in the debates all became a matter of considerable disputation. Amidst this turmoil, college students and younger scholars turned their attention elsewhere, foundation and government agencies reoriented their research priorities, and universities closed down their urban studies programs. The research and analysis commented upon in this article is just one sign among many that at least for the moment the urban studies tide has begun to flow back in.

The Paradox of Continuing Poverty

When Lyndon Johnson declared the War on Poverty in 1964, he had good reason to believe that the federal government could succeed in ridding itself of the paradox of widespread poverty in the world's wealthiest country. The poverty rate in the United States had been declining steadily since 1940 even without any self-declared government effort to address it. In 1940 some 34 percent of the

[1] Charles A. Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–80* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Office of Policy Planning and Research, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (Washington, DC: Department of Labor, 1965); on the controversy, see Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancy, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967).

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population was living in poverty; by 1960 this had decreased to 15 percent and by 1970 to 11 percent. Among black Americans the decrease had been even steeper: from 71 to 32 percent. Among Hispanics the rate fell from 55 to 23 percent.[2]

The specific battle plan drawn up by the Johnson administration for the War on Poverty failed to match the rhetorical artillery the president employed. The effort was little more than a call for citizen participation combined with a hodgepodge of hastily designed educational, job training, and neighborhood service programs that had little internal coherence and only limited financial backing. It was more important as a vehicle for involving blacks and other minorities in local political processes than as a mechanism for redistributing wealth. When the Office of Economic Opportunity, the high command for the official poverty war, was finally disbanded in the early 1970s, few noticed the difference.[3]

But a focus on the conduct of the official War on Poverty is misleading. If the war effort is understood instead as the sum total of Great Society programs enacted and enhanced during the Johnson and Nixon administrations, then the transformation of a broad range of social welfare programs in the late 1960s and early 1970s can, in comparison with previous government efforts, truly be declared a full-scale war. The elderly, for whom the poverty risk in 1960 was higher than one in three, obtained easy access to low-cost medical services and greatly improved retirement benefits. Cash assistance to the blind, deaf, and disabled was increased, funded more completely by the federal government, and indexed to changes in the cost of living. Eligibility restrictions were relaxed on aid given to needy families with dependent children, and food stamps and medical assistance were added as supplements to the cash assistance these families received. Special education programs for the disadvantaged and the handicapped were enacted. Head Start was provided to very young children, and job training programs were offered to those entering the labor market. The amount and variety of housing subsidies available to qualifying families also increased.

The most conservative way of estimating the growth of these programs is to consider the percentage of the nation's gross national product used to fund them. This estimate controls not only for inflation but also for any change in the size

[2] James P. Smith, "Poverty and the Family" in Gary D. Sandefur and Marta Tienda, eds., *Divided Opportunities: Minorities, Poverty, and Social Policy* (New York: Plenum, 1988), 143. Smith's measure of poverty is not quite the same as the measure used by the Bureau of the Census. It is a measure that instead weights absolute and relative definitions of poverty equally. Absolute measures would show a steeper downward trend before 1960.

[3] On the politics of the war on poverty, see James L. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1968), 111–154; Daniel P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty* (New York: Free Press, 1969); and Paul E. Peterson and J. David Greenstone, "Racial Change and Citizen Participation: The Mobilization of Low-Income Communities through Community Action" in Robert H. Haveman, ed., *A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs: Achievements, Failures, and Lessons* (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

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of the economy that occurs as a function of growth in the size of the labor force or improved economic productivity. By this conservative measure the nation doubled its social welfare effort in the fifteen years between 1965 and 1980, increasing the share of GNP allocated to social security, welfare assistance, medical services, and food stamps from 5 to 10 percent.[4] Nor did the conservative climate and fiscal crises of the 1980s cut deeply into the size and scope of these programs. As Robert Greenstein has pointed out, the Reagan administration's efforts to cut back the welfare state was frequently checked by strong congressional supporters of existing programs.[5] Thus it might be said that as a result of its war on poverty, the nation now seems finally committed to meeting the biblical requirement that a tenth of income be set aside for those in need.

This war on poverty did not fail in any absolute sense. Although the poverty rate no longer continued to decline, it remained fairly stable at the level it had reached in the late 1960s. Among whites the official rate leveled off at about one-eighth of the population; among blacks the proportion of poor remained about one-third.[6] The poverty rate among older Americans continued to decline. Whereas one-quarter of those aged sixty-five or older had an income below the poverty line in 1970, only one-eighth did in 1987. Social security programs had been extended to include virtually all workers, benefit levels had been increased and indexed at a new, higher level, and medicare insured against most poverty-inducing illnesses. For this group at least, the effort to eradicate poverty had been a resounding success.

Yet in recent years there has been a gnawing sense that poverty, instead of disappearing, has become worse. Not only has the poverty rate for the population as a whole stabilized at around 13 percent, but the risk of becoming poor has increased in disconcerting ways. First, the official poverty rate among Hispanics increased from 28 to 39 percent between 1972 and 1987. It is not clear, however, how much of this apparent change actually occurred. The Bureau of the Census broadened its definition of Hispanic during this period, making comparisons over time suspect. In addition, it is not clear whether any increases that have occurred have been caused by changes that have taken place within the states. Both the legal and illegal immigration of many low-income Latinos from Mexico, Puerto Rico, the Caribbean, Central America, and South America may have contributed to the increased rate. However, increases in Hispanic poverty before 1980 were as large among longer-term residents as among recent immigrants.[7]

[4] Paul E. Peterson and Mark Rom, "Lower Taxes, More Spending, and Budget Deficits" in Charles O. Jones, ed., *The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1988), 217.

[5] Robert Greenstein, "Universal and Targeted Approaches to Relieving Poverty: An Alternative View" in Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991).

[6] For whites it was 9.9 percent in 1970, 10.2 percent in 1980, and 10.5 percent in 1987; for blacks the percentages were 33.5, 32.5, and 33.1.

[7] Proceedings from the National Council of La Raza's Poverty Project Roundtable, *Hispanic*

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TABLE 1

Households with Incomes below the Poverty Line, Selected Years, 1960–87 (Percent)

Year	*Central City*	*Suburb*	*Nonmetropolitan*
1960	13.7	9.6	28.2
1970	9.8	5.3	14.8
1980	14.0	6.5	12.1
1987	15.4	6.5	13.8

Sources: Bureau of the Census, "Characteristics of the Low Income Population, 1971," Series P-60, no. 86 (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 1972); Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1982–83* (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 1982); Bureau of the Census, "Poverty in the United States, 1987," Series P-60, no. 163 (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 1989).

Whether that remained the case in the 1980s, when the number of immigrants increased sharply, is not yet clear. It is thus not certain to what extent the poverty rate has increased among Hispanics who are not recent immigrants to the United States.

Young families have also experienced a steadily increasing chance of being poor. Although the poverty rate among the elderly was cut by one-half between 1970 and 1986, the probability that a child under the age of eighteen would be living in a poor family increased from 15 to 20 percent.

The heightened risk of poverty has shifted from people in rural areas to those living in central cities. In 1960 about 28 percent of the rural households were poor, as compared with 14 percent in the nation's central cities and 10 percent in the suburbs. By 1987 the rate in rural America had fallen to 14 percent, while in the central cities it had climbed sharply from its low of 10 percent in 1970 to 15 percent (see Table 1). This change, it should be stressed, was not the result of any movement in the overall population from rural America to the central cities. In fact, the percentage of the nation's nonpoor population living in central cities was smaller in the late 1980s than in 1960.

Finally, the poor today are living in female-headed families more often than ever before. Whereas 25 percent of the poor were living in female-headed families in 1960, by 1980 about 35 percent were, and by 1987 perhaps 40 percent were. That female-headed families were somewhat more likely to be poor in 1987 than they were in 1970 (an increase from 50 to 55 percent) provides part of the explanation. But more important was the increase in the percentage of all families that were headed by women. As Christopher Jencks has reported, the percentage of female-headed families has increased rapidly among all racial and occupational groups.[8] Between 1970 and 1987 the percentage among whites increased from 8 to 13 percent and among blacks from 28 to 42 percent.

Poverty: How Much Does Immigration Explain? (Washington, DC: National Council of La Raza, 1989).

[8] Christopher Jencks, "Is the American Underclass Growing?" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*.

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In short, the poverty paradox continues even after a major increase in the government's commitment to the welfare state. And not only has the overall poverty rate refused to fall in the 1970s and 1980s in the way that it had in earlier decades, but the risk of poverty grew greater among Hispanics, children, residents of urban areas, and those living in female-headed families (itself a growing percentage of the population).

Nor is it just the recent trends in poverty rates that are disconcerting. The poverty paradox is even more apparent when the United States is compared with other industrial societies. With the U.S. government's official measure of poverty as a standard, comparative data were collected for eight industrial countries—Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany—for 1979–82. Australia had a slightly higher poverty rate than the United States, while the United Kingdom's rate was 1 percentage point less. But the average poverty rate in the other countries was 5 points lower. The differences were even more dramatic when the rates of children in poverty were calculated: the United States scored higher (that is, worse) than did any other country. Its rate was only slightly higher than Australia's, but it was more than 6 percentage points higher than the rate in the United Kingdom and 10 percentage points higher than the average of the other five countries. Only among the elderly did the poverty rate in the United States not appear exceptional; it ranked fourth after the United Kingdom, Australia, and Norway, and was only slightly higher than the rate in West Germany. In other words, cross-national comparisons reinforce the impression one obtains by examining changes in the incidence of poverty within the United States over time. The poverty rate in this affluent society seems exceptionally high, and young people are especially at risk.[9]

The Underclass-Poverty Connection

The relationship between this poverty paradox and the urban underclass has been a subject of considerable debate. Many poor people are clearly not members of any underclass. The elderly poor, widows, orphans, the severely sick and disabled, and the simply unlucky can find themselves suddenly plunged into poverty without warning. Similarly, many people who engage in activities said to be characteristic of the underclass are hardly poor. Indeed, some of the most celebrated instances of an underclass style of life—laziness, unreliability, unrestrained attachment to fancy clothes and high fashion, episodic romantic attachments, drug addiction, and alcohol abuse—are to be found among the very rich.

[9] Timothy Smeeding, Barbara Boyle Torrey, and Martin Rein, "Patterns of Income and Poverty: The Economic Status of Children and the Elderly in Eight Countries" in John L. Palmer, Timothy Smeeding, and Barbara Boyle Torrey, eds., *The Vulnerables* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1988), 96–97. International comparisons of poverty levels are not easily made. I report here the indicators of absolute, not relative, poverty. If relative measures were used, the United States would look even worse.

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Indeed, for some analysts the poverty paradox is only one manifestation of a much more general deterioration in American society and culture. The major problem is the way in which a spreading underclass culture is undermining the country's productive capacity, family life, social integration, and, ultimately, its political stability.[10] Other analysts see virtually no relationship between the poverty paradox and the existence of an urban underclass. Often they object to using the word underclass, and if they accept the concept, they argue that an underclass, to the extent that one exists, is small, heterogeneous, and not growing. They argue that it constitutes no more than a minor portion of the low-income population, and that overall poverty levels have little to do with the activities of this segment of the population.[11]

From these varying views on the urban underclass, one can differentiate four quite separate explanations for the poverty paradox: the incomplete extension of the welfare state, the culture of poverty, the perverse incentives provided by welfare assistance, and the disproportionate effects of changes in the international economy on the core areas of cities. Each explanation implicitly or explicitly addresses the way in which the urban underclass has contributed to a poverty paradox, and each offers policy recommendations designed to resolve that paradox.

An Inadequate Welfare State

The standard interpretation, at least in liberal intellectual circles, is that the United States has always been an inegalitarian society in which the myth of equal opportunity has obscured a reality of submerged class conflict, racial discrimination, and tolerance of economic inequality. Compared with European societies, the United States has never had a strong labor movement, a vigorous socialist

[10] On these themes, see Lawrence M. Mead, *Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship* (New York: Free Press, 1986); Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); and Charles A. Murray, *In Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). Earlier versions of these themes can be found in Emile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951); Daniel Bell, ed., *The Radical Right: The New American Right*, expanded and updated (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963); William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959); David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1953).

[11] Various estimates of the size of the underclass population have emphasized that it is much smaller than the poverty population taken as a whole. See Erol R. Ricketts and Isabel V. Sawhill, "Defining and Measuring the Underclass," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 7 (Winter 1988): 316–325; Robert D. Reischauer, "The Size and Characteristics of the Underclass" (Paper prepared for the Research Conference of the American Public Policy and Management Association, 1987); Terry K. Adams, Greg J. Duncan, and Willard L. Rodgers, "The Persistence of Poverty" in Fred R. Harris and Roger W. Wilkins, eds., *Quiet Riots: Race and Poverty in the United States* (New York: Pantheon, 1988).

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party, or a coherent set of national bureaucratic institutions that could administer an integrated welfare state.[12] Americans have instead relied on great natural resources, a decentralized governmental system, a large internal private market, and dynamic economic growth to resolve their social tensions. Extremes of wealth and poverty have emerged side by side, and although some efforts to ameliorate these extremes developed in the wake of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the civil disorders of the 1960s, the country is too committed to individual liberty, too suspicious of big government, and too divided by race and ethnicity to redistribute wealth in such a way as to meet the needs of the poor adequately.

Although the United States made greater progress toward creating a welfare state during the Great Society years than at any other time in its history, the argument continues, the result is still a patchwork of programs and institutions that fails to provide for the needs of the poor in a comprehensive manner. The most elaborate and expensive of Great Society innovations were the elaboration of the social security program and the institution of medicare, both of which addressed the economic and social needs of the elderly. Not surprisingly, it is precisely this group for which the appellation poverty paradox seems no longer appropriate. Theda Skocpol has pointed out that social innovation was much more modest for other demographic groups.[13] Although the "deserving" poor—the blind, deaf, and disabled—were placed within a new, nationally funded program that materially improved their welfare, the government was still reluctant to address the needs of the "undeserving" poor—those who many people thought could and should earn a living for themselves. Aid to families with dependent children remained a program administered by the states. When the federal government supplemented this cash assistance with food stamps, the cash assistance provided by state governments declined, leaving poor families no better off than they had been.[14] "Undeserving" men and women in households without dependent children were eligible only for state general assistance programs, which varied greatly from one part of the country to the next and in most places provided only the most token assistance. The amount of this assistance also declined in value

[12] Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Martin Shefter, "Party Bureaucracy and Political Change in the United States" in Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper, eds., *Political Parties: Development and Decay* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978); Seymour Martin Lipset, "Why No Socialism in the United States?" in Seweryn Bialer and Sophia Sluzar, eds., *Sources of Contemporary Radicalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977): Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955); Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[13] Theda Skocpol, "Targeting within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in the United States" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass.*

[14] Paul E. Peterson and Mark Rom, *Welfare Magnets: A New Case for a National Standard* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990).

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when federally funded food stamps became available.[15] Admittedly, medicaid helped reduce the extreme disparity in medical services between the middle class and the poor, but housing subsidies reached only a small minority, and increased educational services were too marginal and too fragmented to have much effect.

For the most part the liberal view attributes the poverty paradox to the inadequate development of the welfare state rather than to any changes in society or to specific characteristics of an urban underclass. But there is one strand of thinking within the liberal tradition that at least has implications for understanding the urban class phenomenon—the discussion of social rights and citizenship that has evolved out of the writings of the British social theorist, T. H. Marshall. From this perspective, the United States has a larger, more threatening underclass than most European countries because it has done so little to incorporate marginal groups into the social and political mainstream. The United States has a dual economy, a social world divided along racial and ethnic lines, and large numbers of people who are politically apathetic and uninvolved. Any society that does not treat all its citizens as valued members of the political community encourages marginal citizens to think of themselves as political outsiders who share in neither the benefits nor the responsibilities of the social and political community. If an underclass exists, it is because the state has created a group of outcasts that are denied their social and political rights.

There are at least three major pieces of evidence that support the liberal view: the welfare state in the United States is much less uniform and comprehensive than it is in many European countries; the elderly have done much better in the past two decades than have other social groups; and the changes in public policy wrought by the Great Society have been less significant than has often been claimed. But if these pieces of evidence support the liberal interpretation, another points in another direction. Poverty in the United States had been declining steadily between 1940 and 1960, two decades in which the welfare state expanded hardly at all. Yet when the welfare state expanded in the 1970s, progress toward eliminating poverty came to a halt. What is more, poverty increased among young families and inner-city residents.

The Culture of Poverty

The cultural explanation, perhaps the classic statement of the relationship between the underclass and the poverty paradox, holds that the style of life to which the urban poor has become attached is self-perpetuating. Street life in the ghetto is exhilarating—at least in the short run. In a world where jobs are dull, arduous, or difficult to obtain and hold, it is more fun to hang out, make love, listen to and tell exaggerated stories of love and danger, plan parties and escapades, and

[15] Peter H. Rossi, *Down and Out in America: The Origins of Homelessness* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 190–194.

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exhibit one's latest purchases or conquests. Gangs provide young people thrills, protection, mutual support, friendship, prestige, and enough income to allow them to buy fashionable clothes, alcohol, and drugs. When men cannot earn enough to support their families adequately, they avoid enduring relationships with their female companions. Women respond by becoming self-reliant, domineering, and mutually supportive. But without an adult male figure in the household, they are unable to protect their children from the alluring street life that promises short-term excitement, if not much hope for a prosperous future.[16]

There is little consensus on the origins of the culture of poverty in American society. Some theorists have attributed it to the inequalities of economic power in the larger society, others to processes of urbanization that undermined the mutual interdependence of family members characteristic of traditional societies. John Ogbu has recently used an imaginative reconstruction of the cultural thesis to account for the contrasting experiences of various ethnic groups in American society.[17] Those groups—American blacks being the extreme case—who were compelled to come to or were forcefully incorporated into the United States and, once there, were subjected to poverty, discrimination, and slavery, constructed for themselves a conflictual understanding of the country's social and political institutions. Members of these forcefully incorporated groups explained personal disappointments and affronts as the product of broad social forces—class dominance, racial prejudice and discrimination, cultural exclusiveness—over which they, as individuals, had little control. It was hopeless to fight the system; instead, one might as well rip off and enjoy as big a piece of it as one could. As New Yorkers would say, "Take a bite of the Big Apple." But this explanation of their experiences, Ogbu suggests, would often become self-fulfilling—both for the individual minority member and the group as a whole. The more one rejects the system, the less one is willing to study or work and the more one is rejected by the societal mainstream.

Voluntary immigrants to America experienced many of the same disappointments, affronts, and rejections, but when they compared their experience in the United States with their experience in their homeland, they found opportunity much greater in the United States. They thus explained their limited success as

[16] This summary of the anthropological descriptions of poverty draws on Ulf Hannerz, *Soulside: Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Oscar Lewis, *The Children of Sanchez: Autobiography of a Mexican Family* (New York: Random House, 1961); Oscar Lewis, *La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty—San Juan and New York* (New York: Random House, 1966); Elliot Liebow, *Tally's Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); and Lee Rainwater, *Behind Ghetto Walls: Black Families in a Federal Slum* (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1970).

[17] John U. Ogbu, *Minority Education and Caste: The American System in Cross-Cultural Perspective* (New York: Academic Press, 1978); Ogbu, "Diversity and Equity in Public Education: Community Forces and Minority School Adjustment and Performance" in Roy Haskins and Duncan MacRae, eds., *Policies for America's Public Schools: Teachers, Equity, and Indicators* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1988).

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a function of their own shortcomings, and they believed that if their children acquired the advantages of language and education they could succeed in the new world. These voluntary immigrants worked hard, told their children to take advantage of the opportunities available to them, and, once again, often found their prophecy self-fulfilling.

Whatever the causes of ghetto social practices, anthropological studies of the culture of poverty continue to provide troubling accounts of urban underclass life. Elijah Anderson shows the processes by which teenage girls decide to keep their babies to term and raise them, the joys a young child brings to a single parent, and the sorrows and troubles that later emerge. David Greenstone discusses the ways in which these commitments to street life can be understood both as a rational response to immediate circumstances and as a product of a distinctive cultural milieu. He then suggests, along lines similar to those developed by Ogbu, that only by reducing the distance and conflict between mainstream institutions and ghetto culture can policy makers find the mechanisms for transforming it.[18]

If the emphasis on a cultural milieu helps explain immediate choices in poor urban neighborhoods, it is by itself too static a concept to be a satisfactory explanation for the poverty paradox. Indeed, many of those who describe the culture of poverty locate its origins in social relationships in the wider society, whether these be characterized in terms of class conflict, racial discrimination, cultural distance, or social dislocation. At its best, the explanation warns against expecting rapid change in urban neighborhoods in response to broader economic and political change. At its worst it blames the victims for their problems. In all cases, it is most satisfying when linked to other, more structural interpretations.

Perverse Government Incentives

The third interpretation of the relationship between the underclass and poverty, propounded most compellingly by Charles Murray, identifies the Great Society programs as the most important structural factor affecting inner-city culture. While accepting the description of ghetto life elaborated by cultural anthropologists, Murray claims that members of the urban underclass, far from being irrationally bound by a cultural milieu that is as self-debilitating as it is unchangeable, are quite rational in the way they live their lives. He attributes the increase in male unemployment and female-headed households not to a spreading underclass culture but, ironically enough, to the Great Society programs that were expected to eliminate the poverty paradox.[19] Murray argues that the increasing size and

[18] Elijah Anderson, "Neighborhood Effects on Teenage Pregnancy" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*; J. David Greenstone, "Culture, Rationality, and the Underclass" in ibid.

[19] Murray, *Losing Ground*. I am using Murray's argument as shorthand for a broader literature advancing a similar line of interpretation. See Mead, *Beyond Entitlement*; Nathan Glazer, *The Limits of Social Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Edward C. Banfield, "Welfare: A Crisis without 'Solutions,'" *Public Interest* 16 (Summer 1969): 89–101; Leslie Lenkowsky, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare Reform: The Failure of the Negative Income Tax in Britain and the United*

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availability of cash assistance, disability insurance, food stamps, medicaid insurance, housing subsidies, and other government aids to the poor inadvertently created a new set of incentives for marginal members of American society. It was no longer necessary to work in order to survive; indeed, full-time employment in an unpleasant, entry-level position at times yielded less after-tax, take-home pay than the income one could receive in benefits from a multiplicity of government programs. And marriage could be economically painful. The old shibboleth that two could live more cheaply than one no longer held. Instead, a single woman with children could receive more from the government than from the earnings of her potential husband. It was better—and more fun—for both if they lived apart; she could share her welfare check with him, and he could earn through episodic or part-time employment enough to sustain an adventurous street life. The result was an increase in the poverty rate in the later years of the 1970s.

Murray's explanation resonated well with the political climate of the early 1980s. Americans were suspicious of big government, the welfare state, and the political demands made by minority spokespersons. Murray's analysis blamed government for the rising percentages of children born out of wedlock, the rising percentages of unemployed young males, the seemingly pervasive crime, drugs, and violence in cities, and the continuing sharp racial tensions in American life. If most Americans were unwilling to dismantle the welfare state altogether, they certainly accepted limits on its further expansion.

Murray's critique has nonetheless been subjected to relentless criticism.[20] Some have argued that the work ethic is deeply ingrained in all parts of American society and that the dignity that comes from an earned income is something most people strongly prefer to welfare assistance. They have pointed out that most studies shown little, if any, effect of welfare assistance on willingness to work. Neither do they show much effect of welfare benefit levels on the incidence of out-of-wedlock births.[21] Others have argued that inasmuch as cash assistance to welfare recipients was diminishing in terms of real dollars throughout the 1970s, it was peculiar for Murray to argue that increases in these benefits could be

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States (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1986); Martin Anderson, *Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978).

[20] See Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk, "The Poverty of Losing Ground," *Challenge* 28 (May–June 1985): 32–38; and David T. Ellwood and Lawrence H. Summers, "Is Welfare Really the Problem?" *Public Interest* 83 (Spring 1986): 57–78

[21] Sara McLanahan, Irwin Garfinkel, and Dorothy Watson, "Family Structure, Poverty, and the Underclass" in Michael G. H. McGeary and Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., eds., *Urban Change and Poverty* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988); David T. Ellwood and Mary Jo Bane, "The Impact of AFDC on Family Structure and Living Arrangements" in Ronald G. Ehrenberg, ed., *Research in Labor Economics* 7 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985), 137–207; Kristin Moore, *Policy Determinants of Teenage Childbearing* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1980); but see Robert D. Plotnick, "Welfare and Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing: Evidence from the 1980s" (Paper prepared for the Conference on the Urban Underclass, Northwestern University, 1989).

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causing poverty to increase. As Greg Duncan and Saul Hoffman show, the income loss to a young woman who has a child out of wedlock or does not finish high school has actually increased in recent years.[22] Still others have taken issue with the finding that the poverty rate was in fact increasing, noting that the apparent increases could be accounted for by errors in the way changes in the cost of living were being measured.

In defending his interpretation against these criticisms, Murray has pointed out that whatever the measurement problems are, it is certainly clear that the poverty paradox is not withering away. He has argued, moreover, that efforts to discredit his analysis are based on studies that focus on small variations in welfare policy from one state to another. More important than minor variations, he has claimed, is the major national increase in the level of welfare provided in the late 1960s as well as the greater ease with which the poor could receive it. If cash assistance diminished after 1975, the loss has been offset by the food stamp program, medicaid, housing assistance, and other benefit programs.[23]

The Inner City in a Changing Economy

It was in this context that a fourth interpretation of the poverty paradox was developed by William Julius Wilson. In a series of essays that resulted in *The Truly Disadvantaged*, he developed an explanation for continuing poverty that accepted the accuracy of anthropological studies of the urban underclass but explained its existence not as the result of government handouts, but as the social by-product of a changing economy whose uneven impact was leaving inner cities with extraordinarily high levels of unemployment.

Wilson's thesis contains the following propositions:

- In the face of increasing competition from foreign countries, the United States has been moving from a unionized, oligopolistic, manufacturing economy to a more competitive, less unionized, service economy in which hourly earnings are falling while skill requirements are rising.
- These changes are having a disproportionate effect on urban minorities because the loss of manufacturing jobs has been greatest within large cities, and most of the new, high-technology service industries are locating in smaller cities or on the fringes of the metropolitan area. Urban minorities do not have ready access to the new jobs because the jobs are difficult to reach and educational requirements are high.
- As a result, the percentage of urban, working-age minority men who are employed in stable, reasonably well paid jobs has fallen dramatically.

[22] Greg J. Duncan and Saul D. Hoffman, "Teenage Underclass Behavior and Subsequent Poverty: Have the Rules Changed?" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*.

[23] Charles A. Murray, "Have the Poor Been 'Losing Ground'?" *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (Fall 1985): 427–445; and Murray, "No, Welfare Isn't Really the Problem," *Public Interest* 84 (Summer 1986): 3–11.

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• Without a decent job, men are undesirable marriage partners, and the number of female-headed households has as a result increased rapidly.

• These changes have been aggravated by the increasing social isolation of the inner-city poor caused by the outward migration of middle-class whites and blacks, who are moving to suburbs in pursuit of jobs, better houses, and more effective schools.

• Thus there are growing concentrations of low-income minorities in the inner cities, within which dysfunctional social behavior becomes contagious. Lacking middle-class adult role models, local places of employment, adequate public services, or community institutions that support traditional family values, these core areas become breeding places for sexual promiscuity, crime, violence, drug addiction, and alcohol abuse. It is here that one finds the people who are properly called the urban underclass, because they are isolated from the mainstream social, occupational, and political institutions of the society.

• To counteract these trends, Wilson advocates policies that will guarantee a full-employment economy; federal policies that provide unemployment insurance, family allowances, and other social services to all citizens; greater race and class desegregation within metropolitan areas; and revitalization of community institutions in the urban core.

RESEARCH RELEVANT TO *THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED*

Recent research and analyses reflect and respond to these diverse explanations for the continuing paradox of poverty. Although implicit and explicit references are made to all four interpretations, the one given the most attention is Wilson's theory of the way the changing U.S. economy has affected those living within the inner cities. The findings reported here and in other recent studies allow scholars to expand and qualify Wilson's hypotheses in a number of ways.

First, as Wilson hypothesized, it is becoming increasingly evident that changes in the U.S. economy are affecting the economic well-being of young black men. The annual earnings of young men between the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine declined by 20 percent between 1973 and 1986. Among blacks the decline was 28 percent. Among those without a high school education the decline was 36 percent.[24] These changes are a function of decreases in both male employment and the hourly earnings paid to young men.

It is unlikely that the cause of this dramatic change in the earnings received by young, less educated minority men is simply that they are no longer as willing and able to work as before. For one thing, the decline in the earnings received by all young men suggests that something more than individual initiative is at

[24] Andrew Sum, Neal Fogg, and Robert Taggart, "Withered Dreams: The Decline in the Economic Fortunes of Young, Non-College Educated Male Adults and Their Families" (Paper prepared for the William T. Grant Foundation Commission on Family, Work, and Citizenship, 1988), 43, B-2.

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issue. And as Marta Tienda and Haya Stier show, most working-age adults in the poorest neighborhoods of Chicago either are working, are seeking work, or say that they would work if they could find a job. Of course, reporting a willingness to work in a survey is different from actually bearing the heavy work, discomforts, and annoyances that typically accompany what is euphemistically called an entry-level position. But as Joleen Kirschenman and Kathryn Neckerman document, many employers hiring people for low-paid positions use racial background, minority status, place of residence, and such other indicators of social class as personal appearance, speech patterns, and family references as cues for predicting job performance.[25]

Yet neither the use of racial cues by employers nor the unpredictability of the work habits of young inner-city men kept unemployment rates from falling dramatically in Boston when the area enjoyed a prolonged economic boom. As Richard Freeman shows, the rates fell faster in the core areas of Boston than they did in the metropolitan area as a whole. And Paul Osterman finds that the poverty rate in these core areas of Boston also fell much below the national average. Similarly, black unemployment decreases at a much faster rate than white unemployment when the national economy is in the boom phase of the business cycle. For example, when the white unemployment rate fell by 4 percentage points between 1983 and 1988, the black unemployment rate fell by nearly 7 points.[26]

The findings on the economic behavior of urban firms and inner-city residents complement one another. Young, poorly educated minority men are the last to be hired, but when the economic situation creates a labor shortage, employers will hire workers from core areas of the city. The corollary, of course, is that minorities are also the first to be fired when the business cycle turns downward. When white unemployment levels climbed 4 points between 1977 and 1983, black rates rose by 8 points.

These sharp short-term fluctuations in the demand for minority workers provide a clue for understanding the decline during the past two decades in the employment rates and national average hourly earnings among young, poorly educated minority men. Very likely, the decline is the result not of changes in the quality of the labor supplied by these people but of the increased competition they face in the labor market. This competition has come from various sources. Foreign workers have become more direct competitors with workers in the United States as international trade flows have increased and companies have the option of expanding operations either in the United States or overseas. Wage levels in

[25] Marta Tienda and Haya Stier, "Joblessness and Shiftlessness: Labor Force Activity in Chicago's Inner City" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass;* Joleen Kirschenman and Kathryn M. Neckerman, "'We'd Love to Hire Them, But . . .': The Meaning of Race for Employers" in ibid.

[26] Richard B. Freeman, "Employment and Earnings of Disadvantaged Young Men in a Labor Shortage Economy" in ibid.; Paul Osterman, "Gains from Growth? The Impact of Full Employment on Poverty in Boston" in ibid.

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developing countries are much lower than those in the United States, dampening the price business is willing to pay American workers. Other sources of increased competition have been internal to the United States: the rising number of legal and illegal immigrants, the increasing percentage of women participating in the labor force, and the particularly large size of the age cohort entering the labor market in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Ascertaining the exact impact of these internal sources of competition is complicated because the new workers also became new consumers who increase the demand for goods and services. But among all three groups the supply of entry-level workers increased more rapidly than the supply of more skilled, better educated, and more experienced workers. Under these circumstances the competition for beginning positions was particularly intense, depressing earnings and opportunities at the lower end of the occupational spectrum.

Had productivity rates increased as rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s as they did in the 1950s and 1960s, the increase in the labor supply might have been easier to absorb without an adverse effect on unemployment rates and worker earnings. As it was, the impact of the larger labor supply was felt keenly by young men. Women made gains because they were remaining in the labor market longer and because their relative position had been so inferior. Older workers were protected by seniority privileges and union agreements designed when labor competition was less intense. The most highly skilled workers enjoyed strong demand for their services because the economy was growing fastest in the technologically sophisticated sectors. The losers were young, poorly educated minority men.

The change in their earnings prospects may well have affected the marriage prospects of inner-city minority men. Unemployment rates are always lower for married than for unmarried men, whether because married men feel they need to work or because working men are more likely to marry.[27] Although it is probably a little of both, the weight to be attributed to each cause is not easily ascertained. Robert Mare and Christopher Winship nonetheless show that the decline in male earnings is the most important identifiable factor adversely affecting marriage rates.[28]

But although the changing earning prospects of young men compromise their marriageability, one should not attempt to explain the increase in the percentage of female-headed households from this development alone. Mare and Winship show that the effects of employment on marriage are only one part of the story. And as Christopher Jencks points out, the increase in female-headed households in the past twenty years is occurring among blacks, whites, and Hispanics, among the middle class as well as the poor. Divorce, single-parent families, and out-of-

[27] In 1989 the unemployment rate among married men was less than 3.5 percent at a time when overall unemployment rates were above 5 percent, "Married and Jobless" (figure), *Wall Street Journal*, 27 April 1990.

[28] Robert D. Mare and Christopher Winship, "Socioeconomic Change and the Decline of Marriage for Blacks and Whites" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*.

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wedlock births are becoming more or less accepted practices in many parts of the United States. The trend leaves too many children with impaired financial support, inadequate adult supervision and instruction, compromised security, fewer alternatives for establishing intergenerational relationships, and fewer adult role models. The most powerful force contributing to the formation of the urban underclass, perversely enough, may be the changing values of mainstream American society, in which the virtues of family stability, mutual support, and religiously based commitment to the marriage vow no longer command the deference they once did.[29]

But however unfortunate some of its consequences, the trend is understandable. Women are becoming more self-sufficient. And the institution of the family seems less necessary because it is being supplemented or replaced by schools, day care centers, social security, health insurance, and the numerous other social services of modern society. Jencks ruminates that the only place a strong two-parent family may be critically important is the inner city, where the family is necessary to offset the powerful allure of the street. But however one assesses this change in American society, one must acknowledge that the socioeconomic forces shaping family life are not limited to the worsening economic position of young men.[30]

Not only is the changing economic and social structure of the United States affecting the urban underclass, but the concentration of poor within the nation's inner cities may also contribute to the problem. Both Jonathan Crane and Susan Mayer provide new data to show that living in a community or attending a school with disproportionate numbers of poor people or minorities increases the chance that an adolescent will drop out or have a child out of wedlock. In both studies this finding holds even after the young person's family background is taken into account. Nor are the ill effects of poverty concentrations limited to teenage years. James Rosenbaum and Susan Popkin show that when poor women move to the suburbs, their job opportunities are better. Because these results reflect the experience of poor families who had little choice in whether they were assigned to inner-city or suburban public housing, the finding that where you live affects your economic opportunities is particularly striking.[31]

But if concentrations of poverty have a detectable economic consequence, the political consequences are less clear. Jeffrey Berry, Kent Portney, and Ken Thomson find that living in a poor neighborhood has little effect on a person's political attitudes and behavior. Poor people living in poor neighborhoods are

[29] Jencks, "Is American Underclass Growing?" in ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Jonathan Crane, "Effects of Neighborhoods on Dropping Out of School and Teenage Childbearing" in ibid.; Susan E. Mayer, "How Much Does a High School's Racial and Socioeconomic Mix Affect Graduation and Teenage Fertility Rates?" in ibid.; James E. Rosenbaum and Susan J. Popkin, "Employment and Earnings of Low-Income Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs" in ibid.

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no more cynical or distrustful or likely to withdraw from the political process than poor living in middle-class neighborhoods.[32]

Whatever the consequences of concentrated poverty, there is little evidence that the poor are any more isolated than they have been in the past. Reynolds Farley's analysis of population changes in metropolitan areas between 1970 and 1980 shows that there has been virtually no change in the degree of income segregation within either the black or the white community in most of them. (There was a slight decrease in the degree of racial segregation.) Other studies have shown that in some large cities—Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, and a few others in the Northeast—the proportion of poor people who live in neighborhoods that are extremely poor has increased. This seems to result, however, mainly from a general increase in poverty levels in these metropolitan areas rather than from any changes in the extent to which residents are segregating themselves by income.[33]

These results do not in any way diminish the seriousness of the problem of an urban underclass, but they suggest that one should be careful in making claims about the extent to which the situation is growing worse. On the contrary, Christopher Jencks shows that according to a number of indicators the underclass is shrinking. A higher percentage of the minority population is receiving high school diplomas, a smaller percentage of teenagers is having babies out of wedlock, both blacks and whites are experiencing fewer crimes committed against them, and the use of drugs is declining. Perhaps it is not so much that the situation is deteriorating as that Americans' social expectations are rising.[34]

In his article in this issue of *Political Science Quarterly*, William Julius Wilson dismisses some of these data as irrelevant to the theory he developed in *The Truly Disadvantaged*. In an important clarification of his theory, Wilson now states that the cause of the urban underclass is the simultaneous presence of economic marginality and extreme social isolation. Poverty within the inner city is debilitating when it is intensely concentrated, a condition particularly prevalent within large cities. Changes in an indicator of class segregation, such as the one used by Reynolds Farley, do not capture changes in the size of the underclass because they do not capture the extent to which extreme isolation is increasing.[35] To bolster his argument, Wilson points out that the numbers of poor people living

[32] Jeffrey M. Berry, Kent E. Portney, and Ken Thomson, "The Political Behavior of Poor People" in ibid.

[33] It may be, however, that poverty became more concentrated after 1980; it will be possible to ascertain this once the 1990 census data are released.

[34] Jencks, "Is American Underclass Growing?" in Jencks and Peterson, *The Urban Underclass*.

[35] Wilson suggests that the degree of isolation among those already socially isolated may increase without any change in the degree of isolation of the median poor person. All the change is occurring among people below the median. Because Farley examined changes only in the median, he missed the changes occurring at the bottom extreme of the distribution. In my view, this is possible but unlikely. See Reynolds Farley, "Residential Segregation of Social and Economic Groups among Blacks, 1970–1980" in ibid.

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in extremely poor neighborhoods—those in which 40 percent or more of the population are poor—increased between 1970 and 1980. The upward trend is especially evident in the largest American cities.

It is precisely the living and working conditions in these extremely isolated neighborhoods that require understanding and analysis, Wilson argues. Tests of the theory in other settings are beside the point. When Berry, Portney, and Thomson did not find significant political differences between the poor living in poor and nonpoor neighborhoods, it was because they were neither studying the largest cities of the industrial belt nor limiting their analysis to extremely impoverished neighborhoods.[36] Jonathan Crane's study is much more persuasive to Wilson, because Crane shows that neighborhood effects on dropping out of high school and experiencing an out-of-wedlock birth are especially powerful when poverty levels escalate above a critical threshold.[37]

Studies that use national samples and examine overall trends are rejected by Wilson as atheoretical, inappropriate efforts to look at an urban underclass defined as economically marginal and extremely isolated socially. If theory is to guide future research, that research must focus its attention on inner-city poverty in the largest cities. To highlight his now even greater emphasis on the conjunction of economic and extreme social factors, Wilson suggests that it may be more appropriate to speak of the ghetto poor rather than the urban underclass. The new term makes clear exactly whom Wilson is speaking about—and, perhaps more important, whom he is not speaking about.

There can be little doubt that Wilson has strengthened his theory by narrowing its focus to those neighborhoods in which poverty is particularly concentrated. Yet there are costs as well as gains to narrowing the explanatory focus this way. At best the reformulated theory applies to only a small portion of the poverty population. Little more than 1 percent of the U.S. population in 1980 lived in metropolitan census tracts in which the population was more than 40 percent poor. The percentage of poor people who lived in such neighborhoods was less than 9 percent; 21 percent of poor blacks and 16 percent of poor Hispanics lived in such neighborhoods. Nor does the reformulated theory account for changes that occurred in the 1970s. The increase in the ghettoization of poor black people living in metropolitan areas was only 1 percent and that of Hispanics decreased by 5 percent.[38] The extent to which ghettoization is occurring varies dramatically

[36] Wilson's methodological criticism of Berry, Portney, and Thomson reveals the way in which his ideas are evolving, for in his own study of a sample of Chicago parents, he included all those living in neighborhoods in which poverty levels were 20 percent or more. (See Tienda and Stier, "Joblessness and Shiftlessness" in Jencks and Peterson, *The Urban Underclass.*) It would seem that Wilson would now want to focus any analysis on more extremely isolated neighborhoods.

[37] Crane, "Effects of Neighborhoods" in Jencks and Peterson, *The Urban Underclass.*

[38] The reader may wonder how these figures can be consistent with the fact that the number of poor people living in extremely poor neighborhoods increased by 30 percent. The answer is twofold. First, because poverty was moving from rural to urban areas, the numbers of poor living in extremely poor urban neighborhoods was rising right along with the number of poor living in less poor neighbor-

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among regions. According to Paul Jargowsky and Mary Jo Bane, the percentages of poor people living in these isolated communities fell in the South and West while increasing in the Northeast and Midwest. Most of the increases in the population living in extremely poor neighborhoods between 1970 and 1980 occurred in just five cities—New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Newark, and Detroit. Such increases seem to be strongly correlated with increases in the overall level of poverty in a specific metropolitan area. Very little, if any, can be attributed to increasing class segregation within the black community. Unless the 1990 census reveals that poverty became much more concentrated in the 1980s than it did in the 1970s, a theory in which increasing class segregation and extreme social isolation play a central role will have limited ability to explain contemporary processes of social change.[39]

Wilson's theory originally promised to provide an explanation for the poverty paradox—the perpetuation of poverty in the 1970s and 1980s when many had expected it would gradually diminish. In its more circumscribed form, the theory may still tell us important things about a very visible, politically significant portion of the population—blacks living in the largest central cities of the rustbelt. As Wilson points out, it is here that racial tensions are the greatest and where the images that help shape national discourse are most readily retrieved. But even if his theory, as clarified, helps account for the behavior of a politically salient segment of the population, it makes only a modest contribution to our understanding of the poverty paradox.

Any theory that promises to explain the connection between the poverty paradox and the urban underclass must apply more widely than just to places where poverty is extremely concentrated. Such a theory, it seems to me, needs to focus on three facets of contemporary life that Wilson and others have identified as critical—the increasing numbers of female-headed households, the declining earnings and labor force participation of young men from minority backgrounds, and the shift in poverty from rural areas to central cities (not the shift within metropolitan areas from neighborhoods that are less poor to ones that are more poor). Wilson's original formulation has stimulated debate and research because it identified connections among these three phenomena. But except under the extreme conditions that Wilson now hypothesizes, these factors may not be as closely linked as his theory has implied. The sources for the changes in the economic opportunities for young black men are not just the decline in the number of jobs within the manufacturing sector. The rise in the percentage of female-headed households is not caused just by the changing employment

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hoods. In other words, it was not so much ghettoization that was occurring as a shift in poverty from rural to urban America (see Table 1). Second, inasmuch as only a small percentage of the poor lived in such neighborhoods in 1970, a large percentage increase between 1970 and 1980 still changed by only a small amount the overall percentage of the metropolitan poor that was socially isolated.

[39] Paul A. Jargowsky and Mary Jo Bane, "Ghetto Poverty in the United States, 1970–1980" in Jencks and Peterson, *The Urban Underclass*.

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opportunities of young men. The shift of poverty from rural to urban settings is not simply the result of the decentralization of industry and commerce. The problem is more complex, more difficult to disentangle, and less susceptible to any one solution.

If there is no single, simple explanation, certain policy conclusions can nonetheless be drawn from the four interpretations I have summarized. Wilson is correct in emphasizing that unless the United States remains strong, growing, and economically competitive, nothing is likely to reduce the poverty rate significantly. But the experience of the 1980s shows that a steadily growing economy will not by itself eliminate the poverty paradox. In addition, as liberal theorists point out, the income transfer system needs to be restructured so that government responds to the needs of working-age adults and families in as humane a way, as it does to the needs of the elderly. As both Theda Skocpol and Robert Greenstein suggest, this will require a much more centralized, comprehensive, and integrated welfare system than the nation currently has.

Adopting such a policy does not entail the rejection of Charles Murray's argument that our present welfare system discourages participation in the mainstream economy. There is something wrong about a health care system that provides assistance to the nonworking indigent but will not help those in low-paid jobs where employers do not provide health insurance. There is also something wrong about a system in which the movement from welfare to work must be abrupt and expensive. An integrated, comprehensive national welfare policy could provide a more flexible public response to those who move in and out of low-skilled, low-paid employment.

Finally, the United States needs a much more flexible and adaptable educational system in the core areas of cities, a system that can enhance the country's human capital, strengthen the institutional position of the family, and reduce the alienation between minority youth and the mainstream institutions of society. The current expensive, bureaucratically controlled, hierarchical, rule-bound, stratified, gang-infested system of urban education needs to be drastically changed. We need to redesign our urban school systems to give families more choice and more control, provide harbors for young people seeking to escape the neighborhood peer culture, and create a learning environment that respects the culture of the low-income, minority community. If the civil rights movement wants to shed its middle-class bias and address the critical problems of the poor that became of increasing concern to Martin Luther King, it should make educational choice for urban residents and an integrated welfare system its most important concerns.*

* This article is adapted and updated from Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991).

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Another Look at *The Truly Disadvantaged*

WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON

In the aftermath of the controversy generated in 1965 by the Moynihan report on the black family, empirical research on inner-city poverty and other social dislocations ground to a halt. In the past few years, however, such research activity has revived as media reports and debates among academics have captured public interest in the growing problems of urban ghettos. Like the 1960s discussions of the causes and consequences of urban poverty that focused on the Moynihan report and on Oscar Lewis's work on the culture of poverty, much of the new discourse is contentious and acrimonious. My book, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, has become a point of reference in this controversy and, as is too often true of controversies, a good deal of the discussion is based on inaccurate interpretations of the arguments set forth.[1]

[1] Office of Policy Planning and Research, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (Washington, DC: Department of Labor, 1965); Oscar Lewis, *The Children of Sanchez: Autobiography of a Mexican Family* (New York: Random House, 1961); Oscar Lewis, *La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty—San Juan and New York* (New York: Random House, 1966); Oscar Lewis, *Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty* (New York: Basic Books, 1959); Oscar Lewis, "The Culture of Poverty" in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ed., *On Understanding Poverty: Perspectives from the Social Sciences* (New York: Basic Books, 1968); William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago:

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A worthy goal of any author is to write so as not to be misunderstood. But even the most carefully phrased statements on the underclass are unlikely to escape misinterpretation because, as Jennifer Hochschild has pointed out, the issues in this instance are "so complicated and politically sensitive that analysts have an apparently almost irresistible tendency to focus on that part of the problem that fits their own preconceptions and to deny or ignore those parts that violate their preconceptions."[2] Because the comments of my critics feature systematic empirical research and thoughtful formulations of concepts, however, my arguments tend to be carefully and accurately discussed. The few misinterpretations are probably caused by the lack of clarity with which my ideas were originally stated. Indeed, these misinterpretations could have been avoided if I had presented a more explicit statement of my theory, the hypotheses embedded in the theory, and the conditions that must be present before they can be tested. Accordingly, to put the rest of my discussion here in proper focus, I will first recapitulate the major arguments advanced in *The Truly Disadvantaged* and present the formal structure of the theoretical framework. I will then assess the empirical, conceptual, and policy arguments that directly or indirectly address the major hypotheses in my book.

A Summary of *The Truly Disadvantaged*

I argue in *The Truly Disadvantaged* that historical discrimination and a migration to large metropolises that kept the urban minority population relatively young created a problem of weak labor force attachment among urban blacks and, especially since 1970, made them particularly vulnerable to the industrial and geographic changes in the economy. The shift from goods-producing to service-producing industries, the increasing polarization of the labor market into low-wage and high-wage sectors, innovations in technology, the relocation of manufacturing industries out of central cities, and periodic recessions have forced up the rate of black joblessness (unemployment and nonparticipation in the labor market), despite the passage of antidiscrimination legislation and the creation of affirmative action programs. The rise in joblessness has in turn helped trigger an increase in the concentrations of poor people, a growing number of poor single-parent families, and an increase in welfare dependency. These problems have been especially evident in the ghetto neighborhoods of large cities, not only because the most impoverished minority populations live there but also because

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University of Chicago Press, 1987). For a comparative discussion of these two controversies, see William Julius Wilson, "The American Underclass: Inner-City Ghettos and the Norms of Citizenship (Godkin lecture, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1988); and Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancy, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967).

[2] Jennifer L. Hochschild, "The Politics of the Estranged Poor," *Ethics* 101 (April 1991): 572.

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the neighborhoods have become less diversified in a way that has severely worsened the impact of the continuing economic changes.

Especially since 1970, inner-city neighborhoods have experienced an outmigration of working- and middle-class families previously confined to them by the restrictive covenants of higher-status city neighborhoods and suburbs. Combined with the increase in the number of poor caused by rising joblessness, this outmigration has sharply concentrated the poverty in inner-city neighborhoods. The number with poverty rates that exceed 40 percent—a threshold definition of "extreme poverty" neighborhoods—has risen precipitously. And the dwindling presence of middle- and working-class households has also removed an important social buffer that once deflected the full impact of the kind of prolonged high levels of joblessness in these neighborhoods that has stemmed from uneven economic growth and periodic recessions.

In earlier decades, not only were most of the adults in ghetto neighborhoods employed, but black working and middle classes brought stability. They invested economic and social resources in the neighborhoods, patronized the churches, stores, banks, and community organizations, sent their children to the local schools, reinforced societal norms and values, and made it meaningful for lower-class blacks in these segregated enclaves to envision the possibility of some upward mobility.

However, today the ghetto features a population, the underclass, whose primary predicament is joblessness reinforced by growing social isolation. Outmigration has decreased the contact between groups of different class and racial backgrounds and thereby concentrated the adverse effects of living in impoverished neighborhoods. These concentration effects, reflected, for example, in the residents' self-limiting social dispositions, are created by inadequate access to jobs and job networks, the lack of involvement in quality schools, the unavailability of suitable marriage partners, and the lack of exposure to informal mainstream social networks and conventional role models.

Accordingly, *The Truly Disadvantaged* argued that the factors associated with the recent increases in social dislocation in the ghetto are complex. They cannot be reduced to the easy explanations of a "culture of poverty" that have been advanced by those on the right, or of racism, posited by those on the left. Although the ghetto is a product of historical discrimination and although present-day discrimination has undoubtedly contributed to the deepening social and economic woes of its residents, to understand the sharp increase in these problems requires the specification of a complex web of other factors, including shifts in the American economy.

The Formal Structure of the Theoretical Framework

This summary of *The Truly Disadvantaged* does not make explicit the fact that social-structural, social-psychological, and cultural variables are integrated into

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my theoretical framework.[3] A more formal statement of this framework is that a structure of inequality has evolved which is linked to contemporary behavior in the inner city by a combination of constraints, opportunities, and social psychology.

The exogenous factors, representing the sources of the racial concentration of urban poverty, include racial discrimination, changes in the economy that have relocated industries and restructured occupations, and political processes (antibias legislation and affirmative action programs) that have had the unanticipated consequence of widening class divisions among urban blacks. The endogenous determinants created by these exogenous factors include such demographic variables as urban migration, age structures, and the pool of marriageable men, and economic factors such as the distribution of employment and income. These variables are important for understanding the experiences of all low-income urban groups, not just the ghetto underclass.

The endogenous determinants further include social isolation, which is unique to the social environment of the underclass. Social isolation deprives residents of inner-city neighborhoods not only of resources and conventional role models, whose former presence buffered the effects of neighborhood joblessness, but also of the kind of cultural learning from mainstream social networks that facilitates social and economic advancement in modern industrial society. The lack of neighborhood material resources, the relative absence of conventional role models, and the circumscribed cultural learning produce outcomes, or concentration effects, that restrict social mobility. Some of these outcomes are structural (lack of labor force attachment and access to informal job networks), and some are social-psychological (negative social dispositions, limited aspirations, and casual work habits).

From the point of view of the accumulation of scientific knowledge, it is important to keep these theoretical issues in mind to establish clearly the empirical, conceptual, and theoretical contributions of the authors who further understanding of the underclass phenomenon.

The Economy and Weak Labor Force Attachment in the Inner City

In my attempt in *The Truly Disadvantaged* to examine empirically the problem of the growing concentration of poverty, I used census tracts as proxies for nonpoverty and inner-city areas. The latter was divided into poverty, high-poverty, and extreme poverty neighborhoods. Most of my analysis of concentrated poverty focused on areas of extreme poverty, that is, those in which at least 40 percent of the people are poor. More recent studies have followed this

[3] In the ensuing discussion in this section, I benefited from the formal explication of *The Truly Disadvantaged* in Morris Zelditch, Jr., "Levels in the Logic of Macro-Historical Explanation" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1989).

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lead by defining ghettos as those areas with poverty rates of at least 40 percent. The ghetto poor are therefore identified as those among the poor in the inner city who reside in these neighborhoods of extreme poverty.[4]

Paul Jargowsky and Mary Jo Bane have shown that the proportion of the poor who reside in ghetto neighborhoods varies dramatically by race. Whereas only 2 percent of the non-Hispanic white poor lived in ghettos in 1980, some 21 percent of black poor and 16 percent of Hispanic poor resided there. And almost a third of all metropolitan blacks lived in a ghetto in 1980. Sixty-five percent of the 2.4 million ghetto poor in the United States are black, 22 percent Hispanic, and 13 percent non-Hispanic and other races. Thus to speak of the ghetto poor in the United States is to refer primarily to blacks and Hispanics. This has both descriptive and theoretical significance.

What is not revealed in *The Truly Disadvantaged* and what is clearly spelled out by Jargowsky and Bane is that the increase of ghetto poverty occurred mainly in only two regions of the country: the Midwest and the Northeast. Moreover, ten cities accounted for three-fourths of the total rise of ghetto poverty during the 1970s. One-third of the increase was accounted for solely by New York City, and one-half by New York and Chicago together. By adding Philadelphia, Newark, and Detroit, two-thirds of the total increase is accounted for. The others in the top ten were Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta; Baltimore; Buffalo; and Paterson, New Jersey. Of the 195 standard metropolitan areas in 1970 that recorded some ghetto poverty, 88 experienced decreases in the number of ghetto poor by 1980. Those with the largest decreases were Texas cities with significant declines in Hispanic ghetto poverty and southern cities with sharp drops in black ghetto poverty.

[4] See Loïc J. D. Wacquant and William Julius Wilson, "Poverty, Joblessness and the Social Transformation of the Inner City" in Phoebe H. Cottingham and David T. Ellwood, eds., *Welfare Policy for the 1990s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); and Paul A. Jargowsky and Mary Jo Bane, "Ghetto Poverty in the United States, 1970–1980" in Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson, *The Urban Underclass* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991). In discussing the correspondence between ghetto neighborhoods and extreme poverty census tracts in Chicago, Wacquant and Wilson state, "Extreme-poverty neighborhoods comprise tracts with at least 40 percent of their residents in poverty in 1980. These tracts make up the historic heart of Chicago's black ghetto: over 82 percent of the respondents in this category inhabit the west and south sides of the city, in areas most of which have been all black for half a century and more, and an additional 13 percent live in immediately adjacent tracts. Thus when we counterpose extreme-poverty areas with low-poverty areas, we are in effect comparing ghetto neighborhoods with other black areas, most of which are moderately poor, that are not part of Chicago's traditional black belt" (p. 16). Jargowsky and Bane use the same rationale on a national level: "Visits to several cities confirmed that the 40 percent criterion came very close to identifying areas that looked like ghettos in terms of their housing conditions. Moreover, the areas selected by the 40 percent criterion corresponded rather closely with the neighborhoods that city officials and local Census Bureau officials considered ghettos." Of course, not all the people who reside in ghettos are poor. In the ten largest American cities as of 1970, the number of Hispanic residents (poor and nonpoor) residing in ghettos areas tripled between 1970 and 1980; the number of blacks doubled.

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The focus of *The Truly Disadvantaged*, however, was on the increase in ghetto poverty. The questions are why did this increase occur and why was most of it confined to the large industrial metropolises of the Northeast and Midwest? Because these two regions experienced massive industrial restructuring and loss of blue-collar jobs. Cities of the frostbelt suffered overall employment decline because "growth in their predominantly information-processing industries could not numerically compensate for substantial losses in their more traditional industrial sectors, especially manufacturing."[5] Cities in the sunbelt experienced job growth in all major sectors of the economy (manufacturing, retail and wholesale, white-collar services, and blue-collar services) between 1970 and 1986.

In *The Truly Disadvantaged* I maintained that one result of these changes for many urban blacks has been a growing mismatch between the location of employment and residence in the inner city. Although studies based on data collected before 1970 did not show consistent or convincing effects on black employment as the result of this spatial mismatch, the employment of inner-city blacks relative to suburban ones has clearly deteriorated since then.[6] Recent research conducted mainly by urban and labor economists strongly shows that the decentralization of employment is continuing and that employment in manufacturing, most of which is already suburbanized, has decreased in central cities, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest. Blacks living in central cities have less access to employment, as measured by the ratio of jobs to people and the average travel time to and from work, than do central-city whites. Unlike most other groups of workers, less educated central-city blacks receive lower wages in the central city than less educated suburban blacks. And the decline in earnings of central-city blacks is positively associated with the extent of metropolitan job decentralization.[7]

But are the differences in employment between city and suburban blacks mainly the result of changes in the location of jobs? It is possible that in recent years the migration of blacks to the suburbs has become much more selective than in earlier years, so much so that the changes attributed to job location are really caused by this selective migration.[8] The pattern of black migration to the suburbs in the 1970s was similar to that of whites during the 1950s and 1960s in the sense that it was concentrated among the more educated and younger city residents.[9]

[5] John D. Kasarda, "Structural Factors Affecting the Location and Timing of Urban Underclass Growth," *Urban Geography* 11 (May–June 1990): 241.

[6] Harry J. Holzer, "The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: What Has the Evidence Shown?" (Paper presented at a conference on *The Truly Disadvantaged*, Northwestern University, October 1990). For a study based on earlier data, see David T. Ellwood, "The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Are there Teenage Jobs Missing in the Ghetto?" in Richard B. Freeman and Harry J. Holzer, eds., *The Black Youth Employment Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

[7] Holzer, "Spacial Mismatch Hypothesis."

[8] Christopher Jencks and Susan E. Mayer, "Residential Segregation, Job Proximity, and Black Job Opportunities: The Impirical Status of the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis" (Working paper for Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, Northwestern University, 1989).

[9] William Frey, "Mover Destination Selectivity and the Changing Suburbanization of Whites and

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However, in the 1970s this was even more true for blacks, creating a situation in which the education and income gaps between city and suburban blacks seemed to expand and that between city and suburban whites seemed to contract.[10] Accordingly, if one were to control for personal and family characteristics, how much of the employment gap between city and suburbs would remain?

This question was addressed in the study by James E. Rosenbaum and Susan J. Popkin of the Gautreaux program in Chicago.[11] The design of the program permitted them to contrast systematically the employment experiences of a group of low-income blacks who had been assigned private apartments in the suburbs with the experiences of a control group with similar demographic characteristics and employment histories who had been assigned private apartments in the city. The authors' findings support the spatial mismatch hypothesis. After controlling for personal characteristics (including family background, family circumstances, human capital, motivation, and length of time since the respondent first moved to the Gautreaux program—all before the move—and education after moving), they found that those who moved to apartments in the suburbs were significantly more likely than those moving to apartments in the city to have a job after the move. When asked what makes it easier to obtain employment in the suburbs, nearly all the respondents mentioned the availability of jobs.

The occupational advancement of the more disadvantaged urban minority members has also been severely curtailed by industrial restructuring. John Kasarda's research demonstrates that "the bottom fell out in urban industrial demand for poorly educated blacks," particularly in the goods-producing industries, in northeastern and midwestern cities.[12] And data collected from the Chicago Urban Poverty and Family Life Survey show that efforts by out-of-school inner-city black men to obtain blue-collar jobs in the industries in which their fathers had been employed have been hampered by industrial restructuring. "The most common occupation reported by the cohort of respondents at ages 19 to 28 changed from operative and assembler jobs among the oldest cohorts to service jobs (waiters and janitors) among the youngest cohort."[13]

Finally, a recent study shows that although black employment in New York City declined by 84,000 in durable and nondurable goods manufacturing—industries whose workers have lower levels of education—from 1970 to 1987, black employment increased by 104,000 in public administration and professional ser-

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Blacks," *Demography* 22 (May 1985): 223–243; Eunice S. Grier and George Grier, "Minorities in Suburbia: A Mid-1980s Update" (Report prepared for the Urban Institute Symposium on Residential Mobility and Minority Incomes, April 1988).

[10] Holzer, "Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis."

[11] James E. Rosenbaum and Susan J. Popkin, "Employment and Earnings of Low-Income Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*.

[12] John D. Kasarda, "Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 501 (January 1989): 35

[13] Mark Testa and Marilyn Krogh, "The Effect of Employment on Marriage among Black Males in Inner-City Chicago" (Unpublished ms., University of Chicago, 1989).

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vices—industries whose workers are more highly educated.[14] Thus, if industrial restructuring has reduced opportunities for the least educated blacks, it may have improved opportunities for those more highly educated.

As I pointed out in *The Truly Disadvantaged*, manufacturing industries have been a major source of black employment in the twentieth century. Unfortunately, these industries are particularly sensitive to a slack economy, and blacks lost a considerable number of jobs during the recession-plagued decade of the 1970s.[15] A unique test of my argument that many of the employment problems among disadvantaged inner-city youths are the direct result of job losses in local labor markets was provided by Richard Freeman.[16] Examining the employment situation of disadvantaged black youths from 1983 to 1987 in metropolitan areas that had achieved the tightest labor markets by 1987, Freeman found that despite the social problems that beset these youths and "despite the 1980s twist in the American labor market against the less skilled, tight labor markets substantially improved the economic position of these workers." Although jobless rates remain high among disadvantaged minority youths, dramatic progress occurred during the economic recovery of the late 1980s in the metropolitan areas with the tightest labor markets.

If a tight labor market reduces joblessness among the disadvantaged, it also effectively reduces poverty, as Paul Osterman clearly shows.[17] When Boston experienced full employment in the 1980s, not only was there a significant drop in poverty, but a high percentage of the poor had jobs. However, the strong economy did not significantly affect the prevalence of single-parent families. Was the period that Osterman observed (1980 to 1988) of sufficient length to allow for changes in family formation as a response to changes in the economy to emerge? Changes in employment and poverty are likely to appear much sooner following changes in the economy than changes in family formation, because the latter not only represents a more indirect relationship to the economy but a more complex and subtle process of human experience as well.

The relationship between employment and marriage received more detailed attention from Robert Mare and Christopher Winship.[18] They found only modest support for the hypothesis, emphasized in *The Truly Disadvantaged*, that associates the sharp rise in poor single-parent families with the declining employment status of young black men. "Changes in the employment of young black men,"

[14] Thomas Bailey, "Black Employment Opportunities" in Charles Brecher and Raymond D. Horton, eds., *Setting Municipal Priorities, 1990* (New York: New York University Press, 1989).

[15] For a good discussion of this problem, see Frank Levy, *Dollars and Dreams: The Changing American Income Distribution* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987).

[16] Richard B. Freeman, "Employment and Earnings of Disadvantaged Men in a Labor Shortage Economy" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*.

[17] Paul Osterman, "Gains from Growth? The Impact of Full Employment on Poverty in Boston" in ibid.

[18] Robert D. Mare and Christopher Winship, "Socioeconomic Change and the Decline of Marriage for Blacks and Whites" in ibid.

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they concluded, "explain approximately 20 percent of the decline in their marriage rates since 1960." Their results are based on national surveys. But unlike *The Truly Disadvantaged*, their writing makes no effort to examine regional differences that may reflect the impact of changes in the industrial economies in the Northeast and Midwest.

The data that would be most relevant for understanding the relationship between employment and marriage among the underclass are those collected from inner cities. Since the publication of *The Truly Disadvantaged*, this relationship has been examined more closely with data from the inner-city neighborhoods of Chicago as a part of the Urban Poverty and Family Life Study. A recent paper by Mark Testa based on these data shows that black men in inner-city Chicago who have stable work are twice as likely to marry as black men who are jobless and are not in school or in the military.[19]

However, Testa's study also shows that the decline in marriage among inner-city blacks is not simply a function of the proportion of jobless men. Because the disparity in marriage rates between employed and jobless black men was smaller for older cohorts, it is reasonable to consider the effects of weaker social strictures against out-of-wedlock births. "In earlier years," he comments, "the social stigma of illegitimacy counterbalanced economic considerations in the decision to marry. As the norms of legitimacy weakened, marriage rates dropped precipitously among chronically jobless men as couples no longer felt obliged to legitimate the birth of a child for social reasons."[20]

In *The Truly Disadvantaged* I related the increasing jobless rate among black men to geographic, industrial, and other shifts in the economy. This hypothesis has drawn criticism because some observers believed that the focus on impersonal economic forces overlooked willful acts of employment discrimination against racial minorities.[21] Although empirical research on such discrimination is scarce, data from the Chicago Urban Poverty and Family Life Study's survey of employers, as reported by Joleen Kirschenman and Kathryn Neckerman, suggest that inner-city blacks, particularly black men, do indeed face negative attitudes from employers. They report that many employers consider inner-city workers, especially young black men, to be uneducated, uncooperative, and unstable. Accordingly, employers may practice what economists call statistical discrimination, making judgments about an applicant's productivity, which are often too difficult or too expensive to measure, on the basis of his or her race, ethnic, or class background.[22] Although only a few employers explicitly expressed racist

[19] Mark Testa, "Joblessness and Absent Fatherhood in the Inner City" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1990).

[20] Ibid., 22.

[21] Bailey, "Black Employment Opportunities"; and Hochschild, "Politics of Estranged Poor."

[22] See also Kathryn M. Neckerman and Joleen Kirschenman, "Statistical Discrimination and Inner-City Workers: An Investigation of Employers' Hiring Decisions" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1990).

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attitudes or a categorical loathing of blacks, many did in fact practice statistical discrimination by screening out black job applicants because of their social class, public school education, and inner-city residence. These factors also served as proxies for judgments about productivity.

As the research of Richard Freeman suggests, however, the practice of statistical discrimination will vary according to the tightness of the labor market.[23] It therefore ought not be analyzed without reference to the overall state of the local or national economy. In a tight labor market, job vacancies are more prevalent, unemployment is of shorter duration, and wages are higher. The pool of potential workers expands because an increase in job opportunities not only lowers unemployment but also draws into the labor force those workers who respond to fading job prospects in slack markets by dropping out of the labor force altogether. Accordingly, the status of disadvantaged minorities improves in a tight labor market because unemployment is reduced, better jobs are available, and wages are higher. In contrast, in a slack labor market employers are—indeed, can afford to be—more selective in recruiting and in granting promotions. They inflate job prerequisites and the importance of experience. In such an economic climate, the level of employer discrimination rises and disadvantaged minorities suffer disproportionately.[24]

Although basic economic transformations and changes in labor markets are important for understanding the life experiences of the urban minority poor, *The Truly Disadvantaged* also argued that the out-migration of higher-income residents from certain parts of the inner city resulted in a higher concentration of residents in ghetto neighborhoods. This contention has been controversial. Douglas Massey and Mitchell Eggers, for instance, have found that the increase of segregation among black social classes during the 1970s was not sufficient to account for the rise in concentrated urban black poverty. They argue that because of persisting segregation, higher-income blacks have been less able than the privileged of other groups to separate themselves from the poor.[25] Accordingly, an increase in the poverty rate of a highly segregated group will be automatically accompanied by an increase in the concentration of poverty. Reynolds Farley reaches the same conclusion. "Wilson's conclusion that poor blacks in Chicago lived in proportionally more impoverished neighborhoods in 1980 than in 1970 . . . is accurate . . . but the situation occurred because of overall increases in black poverty rather than because of higher levels of social class residential segregation or a new outmigration of prosperous blacks.[26] However, Paul Jargowsky and

[23] Freeman, "Employment and Earnings of Disadvantaged Men" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*.

[24] James Tobin, "On Improving the Economic Status of the Negro," *Daedalus* 94 (1965): 878–898.

[25] Douglas S. Massey and Mitchell L. Eggers, "The Ecology of Inequality: Minorities and the Concentration of Poverty, 1970–1980," *American Journal of Sociology* 95 (March 1990): 1153–88.

[26] Reynolds Farley, "Residential Segregation of Social and Economic Groups among Blacks, 1970–1980" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*.

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Mary Jo Bane turn down the argument that changes in poverty rates alone explain changes in ghetto poverty.[27]

The conflicting findings and conclusions correspond with different measures of concentrated poverty. Massey and Eggers and Farley use an index of segregation to calculate the probability of intraclass contact among groups in metropolitan areas.[28] Although this measure provides a unique description of the overall level of concentrated poverty in standard metropolitan statistical areas [SMSAs], it does not identify particular neighborhoods that are ghettos and others that are not. Focusing on Philadelphia, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Memphis, they designate ghetto and nonghetto neighborhoods and report a significant geographic spreading of ghetto neighborhoods from 1970 to 1980. Areas that had become ghettos by 1980 had been mixed-income tracts in 1970, although they were contiguous to areas identified as ghettos. These results support the hypothesis that a major factor in the growth of ghetto poverty has been the exodus of the nonpoor from mixed income areas: "the poor were leaving as well, but the nonpoor left faster, leaving behind a group of people in 1980 that was poorer than in 1970."[29]

These results also contradict Paul Peterson's argument that "very little, if any [of the increase in the number of poor people living in extremely poor neighborhoods] can be attributed to increasing class segregation within the black community."[30] On the contrary, the data suggest that the increase of segregation among black social classes was one of several major factors that accounted for the growth of ghetto poverty. As Jargowsky and Bane point out, "In none [of the four cities] was the process a simple matter of the poor moving into ghetto areas or the nonpoor moving out. Nor can the situation in any city be described as one in which people basically stayed put but that changes in the poverty rate caused more areas to be pushed over the 40 percent line. Instead there was a general pattern of dispersion—probably part of a longer historical trend—interacting with changes in the poverty rate and continuing high levels of racial segregation." As the population spread out from areas of mixed income, Jargowsky and Bane go on to state, the next ring, mostly areas that were white and nonpoor, became the home of a "larger proportion of the black and poor population. The white nonpoor left these areas, which also lost population overall."[31] Thus the black middle-class out-migration was not followed by a significant rise of black interclass segregation in neighborhoods where the middle class relocated.

Unfortunately, the geographic spread of ghetto poverty cannot be captured in

[27] Jargowsky and Bane, "Ghetto Poverty in the United States, 1970–1980" in ibid.

[28] Massey and Eggers, "Ecology of Inequality"; Farley, Residential Segregation" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*.

[29] Jargowsky and Bane, "Ghetto Poverty" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*.

[30] Paul E. Peterson, "The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox" in ibid.

[31] Jargowsky and Bane, "Ghetto Poverty" in ibid. For a comprehensive study that presents similar findings, see Claudia J. Coulton, Julian Chow, and Shanta Pandey, *An Analysis of Poverty and Related Conditions in Cleveland Area Neighborhoods* (Cleveland: Center for Urban Poverty and Social Change, Case Western Reserve University, 1990).

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studies that focus on the concentration of poverty in SMSAs based on a segregation index. Although the studies by Farley and Massey and Eggers are important for understanding the significance of racial segregation in accounting for changes in the concentration of metropolitan poverty, they do not provide an appropriate test of the hypothesis that associates the increase of ghetto poverty with the out-migration of higher-income blacks from certain inner-city neighborhoods.

Social Environment and Labor Force Attachment in the Inner City

The exodus of higher-income blacks was not only a factor in the growth of ghetto poverty. It also deprived these neighborhoods of structural resources, such as social buffers to minimize the effects of growing joblessness, and cultural resources, such as conventional role models for neighborhood children, therefore further contributing to the economic marginality of the underclass.

In *The Truly Disadvantaged* I argued that the central problem of the underclass is joblessness reinforced by increasing social isolation in impoverished neighborhoods, as reflected, for example, in the residents' declining access to job information network systems. Martha Van Haitsma, in important conceptual writing, has more sharply delineated the relationship between the social environment and experiences in the labor market by distinguishing those persons with weak attachment to the labor force whose social context "tends to maintain or further weaken this attachment."[32] I would like to include this more explicit notion in my framework by equating the social context with the neighborhood.

Unlike the usage of Marta Tienda and Haya Stier, the term weak labor force attachment as used here does not imply a willingness or desire to work.[33] Rather, I view weak labor force attachment as a structural concept set in a theoretical framework that explains the vulnerability of certain groups to joblessness. In other words, the concept signifies the marginal position of some people in the labor force because of limited job opportunities or limited access to the informal job network systems. From a theoretical standpoint there are two major sources of weak labor force attachment: macrostructural processes in the larger society, particularly the economy, and the individual's social environment. The former has been discussed; let me now briefly focus on the latter.

To understand the unique position of the underclass, it is important to understand the association between attachment to the labor force and the neighborhood

[32] Martha Van Haitsma, "A Contextual Definition of the Underclass," *Focus* 12 (Spring–Summer 1989): 28.

[33] Marta Tienda and Haya Stier, "Joblessness and Shiftlessness: Labor Force Activity in Chicago's Inner City" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*. The concept of weak labor force attachment initially received systematic attention in the work of Sara McLanahan and Irwin Garfinkle, "Single Mothers, the Underclass, and Social Policy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 501 (January 1989): 92–104.

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context. As Martha Van Haitsma points out, "environments with few opportunities for stable and legitimate employment and many opportunities for other types of income-generating activities, particularly those which are incompatible with regular employment," perpetuate weak labor force attachment.[34] Poor people who reside in neighborhoods that foster or support strong labor force attachment are in a much different social context than those with similar educations and occupational skills living in neighborhoods that promote or reinforce weak labor force attachment. Thus neighborhoods that have few legitimate employment opportunities, inadequate job information networks, and poor schools not only give rise to weak labor force attachment but also raise the likelihood that people will turn to illegal or deviant activities for income, thereby further weakening their attachment to the legitimate labor market. A jobless family in such a neighborhood is influenced by the behavior, beliefs, orientations, and social perceptions of other disadvantaged families disproportionately concentrated in the neighborhood. To capture this process I used the term "concentration effects," that is, the effects of living in an overwhelmingly impoverished environment.

Four recent papers address the hypothesis on concentration effects. Elijah Anderson's research in a ghetto neighborhood of Philadelphia provides ethnographic support by showing how a young woman's proximity to and degree of integration with certain neighborhood peer groups can significantly increase her chances of becoming pregnant.[35] Jonathan Crane, relying on evidence from a unique data set (the neighborhood characteristics file from the 1970 Public Use Microdata Sample), provides quantitative support for the hypothesis by showing that neighborhood influence on teenage childbearing and dropping out among both blacks and whites was substantial in inner cities.[36] Consistent with the arguments developed in *The Truly Disadvantaged*, Crane found that "neighborhood effects are much larger at the bottom of the neighborhood distribution than elsewhere." And Susan Mayer supports the hypothesis with data from the High School and Beyond Survey. She finds that teenagers attending schools of low socioeconomic status are more likely to give birth out of wedlock than those with the same socioeconomic background who attend schools of higher socioeconomic status.[37]

In their paper on the political behavior of poor people, Jeffrey Berry, Kent Portney, and Ken Thomson present evidence that does not support the concentration-effects hypothesis.[38] It is important to note, however, that the cities they

[34] Van Haitsma, "Contextual Definition of Underclass," 29.

[35] Elijah Anderson, "Neighborhood Effects on Teenage Pregnancy" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*.

[36] Jonathan Crane, "Effects of Neighborhoods on Dropping Out of School and Teenage Childbearing" in ibid.

[37] Susan E. Mayer, "How Much Does a High School's Racial and Socioeconomic Mix Affect Graduation and Teenage Fertility Rates?" in ibid.

[38] Jeffrey M. Berry, Kent E. Portney, and Ken Thomson, "The Political Behavior of Poor People" in ibid.

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selected for analysis included virtually no neighborhoods with a poverty level of 40 percent or more. Although their study used a poverty line below that of the official poverty line, the absence of extreme poverty or ghetto neighborhoods qualifies their conclusion that the concentration of poor blacks does not lead to distinctive patterns of political behavior.

It would also be interesting and important to replicate the study by Greg Duncan and Saul Hoffman in areas of extreme poverty.[39] On the basis of national data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they found that raising welfare benefit levels increased slightly the chances that a teenager would have a child out of wedlock and would receive AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children). Nonwelfare opportunities decreased the chances, and the effect was much stronger. The teenagers most likely to bear a child, they find, are those with the least to lose. This view is supported in Anderson's study: "Those who cannot go on to college, who lack an outlook, who fail to find a husband with whom they can pursue the dream and become upwardly mobile, appear to adapt to the situation of closed mobility they see before them." And as Crane's research demonstrates, this is far more likely to happen in an impoverished inner-city neighborhood than in one that is less poor. That is one of many reasons why the neighborhood environment is crucial to my definition of the underclass.[40]

Social Theory and the Concept of the Underclass

In my formulation the concept of underclass derives its meaning from a theoretical framework that links structural, social-psychological, and cultural arguments. David Greenstone has thus misinterpreted the theoretical discussion in *The Truly Disadvantaged* when he argues that my analysis settles on one fundamental opposition: underclass behavior must be attributed either to responses to an economic predicament or to the cultural commitments to dysfunctional and irrational values.[41] Simplistic either-or notions of culture and social structure impede the development of a broader theoretical context in which to examine questions recently raised by the ongoing debate on the underclass.

In early studies of the inner city, some observers argued that ghetto-specific behaviors were unique adaptations to the restricted opportunities of the disadvantaged in American society, not a different system of values.[42] Although they

[39] Greg J. Duncan and Saul D. Hoffman, "Teenage Underclass Behavior and Subsequent Poverty: Have the Rules Changed?" in ibid.

[40] Crane, "Effects of Neighborhoods on Dropping Out" in ibid.

[41] J. David Greenstone, "Culture, Rationality, and the Underclass" in ibid.

[42] Kenneth B. Clark, *Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); Lee Rainwater, "Crucible of Identity: The Negro Lower-Class Family," *Daedalus* 95 (Winter 1966): 176–216; Rainwater, *Behind Ghetto Walls: Black Families in a Federal Slum* (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1967); Ulf Hannerz, *Soulside: Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

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discussed the influence of culture—that is, the extent to which people follow their inclinations as they have been developed by learning from other members of the community—they did not argue that the influence takes on a life of its own or is autonomous in the ghetto. In other words, these authors demonstrated the possibility of seeing the importance of macrostructural constraints (that is, of avoiding the extreme assumption of a culture of poverty) while still recognizing the value of a more subtle cultural analysis of life in poverty. The question Ulf Hannerz raised twenty years ago remains an important research hypothesis today. Is there a fundamental difference between "a person who is alone in being exposed to certain macrostructural constraints" and a person "who is influenced both by these constraints and by the behavior of others who are affected by them."[43]

What distinguishes members of the underclass from those of other economically disadvantaged groups is that their marginal economic position or weak attachment to the labor force is uniquely reinforced by the neighborhood or social milieu. For this reason Christopher Jencks's discussion of the concept of the underclass is not relevant.[44] Although he has elegantly and impressively laid out the various ways that one can view the underclass, his typology has no underlying theoretical significance. He argues that what we now call the underclass bears a striking resemblance to what sociologists used to call the lower class. This is not true for the formulation developed in *The Truly Disadvantaged* and further elaborated here. Indeed, I know of no previous studies that attempted to define lower class in terms of the dual problem of marginal economic position and social isolation in highly concentrated poverty areas, an important distinction that cannot be captured by using the standard designation "lower class." In America the problems this definition of the underclass connotes are more likely to be found in the inner-city ghettos.

Jencks argues that my definition of the underclass also turns out to mean a largely nonwhite population because I emphasize location. However, in my usage, the concept can be theoretically applied not only to all racial and ethnic groups, but also to different societies. In the United States the concept will more often refer to minorities because the white poor seldom live in extreme poverty or ghetto areas. However, there is nothing in the definition that restricts its application to nonwhites. Moreover, in other societies the combination of weak labor force attachment and social isolation may exist in certain urban environments without the same level of concentrated poverty inherent in American ghettos. For example, there is evidence that the long-term jobless in inner cities in the Netherlands have experienced sharply decreasing contact with conventional groups and institutions in the larger society despite levels of class and ethnic segregation far lower than those of American inner cities. This development has prompted some Dutch social scientists to discuss the formation of an underclass

[43] Hannerz, *Soulside*, 184.

[44] Christopher Jencks, "Is the American Underclass Growing?" in Jencks and Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass*.

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in the Netherlands in precisely the theoretical terms I outlined in *The Truly Disadvantaged*.[45]

Unless the concept of underclass is defined as a part of a theoretical framework, as I have done, its meaning will become hopelessly polluted and, as Herbert Gans has warned, will be used increasingly to discredit the urban minority poor.[46] Indeed, one of my concerns is that because of the atheoretical way that the concept is often defined by scholars and nonscholars alike, its use has become exceedingly controversial, so much so that the debate has often obscured the important theoretical and empirical issues outlined here.[47] The crucial question is whether a theoretically defined concept of underclass, which is by its very nature complex, will be overshadowed in the long run by nonsystematic, arbitrary, and atheoretical usages that often end up as code words or ideological slogans, particularly in journalistic descriptions of inner-city behavior. If this proves true, research scholars ought to give serious consideration to dropping the term and carefully selecting another that also allows one to describe and highlight the important theoretical linkage between a disadvantaged group's position in the labor market and its social environment.

The Underclass and Public Policy

The growing concentration of poverty and social isolation of the inner cities has implications not only for the quality of life and patterns of social interaction in impoverished urban neighborhoods, but for the larger urban environment as well. None of these cities can escape the deleterious consequences of the social transformation of the inner city and the growth of an underclass.

The problem is not simply the fiscal burden created by the sharp deterioration of aggregate family income or the erosion of the municipal tax base caused by the growth in the number of "high-cost" citizens at the very time that large and increasing numbers of higher-income families have abandoned the cities. The deterioration of ghetto neighborhoods has also sapped the vitality of local busi-

[45] See, for example, Kees Schuyt, "The New Emerging Underclass in Europe: The Experience of Long-Term Unemployment in Dutch Inner Cities" (Paper presented at the Leiden Workshop on Modern Poverty, Unemployment, and the Emergence of a Dutch Underclass, University of Leiden, Netherlands, August 1990); Robert C. Kloosterman, "The Making of the Dutch Underclass? A Labour Market View" (Paper presented at ibid.); Godfried Engbersen, "Modern Poverty in the Netherlands" (Paper presented at ibid.); also see Godfried Engbersen, Kees Schuyt, and Jaap Timmer, "Cultures of Unemployment: Long-Term Unemployment in Dutch Inner Cities" (Paper presented at ibid.).

[46] Herbert J. Gans, "Deconstructing the Underclass: The Term's Danger as a Planning Concept," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 56 (Summer 1990): 271–349.

[47] See also William Julius Wilson, "Social Theory and Public-Agenda Research: The Challenge of Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations" (Presidential address, annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1990).

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nesses and other institutions, and it has led to fewer and shabbier movie theaters, bowling alleys, restaurants, public parks and playgrounds, and other recreational facilities. Residents of inner-city neighborhoods are therefore often compelled to seek leisure activity in other areas of the city, where they come into brief contact with citizens of different racial, ethnic, or class backgrounds. Sharp differences in cultural style and patterns of interaction that reflect the social isolation of neighborhood networks often lead to clashes. Both the white and minority classes have complained bitterly about how certain conveniently located areas of the central city have deteriorated following the influx of inner-city residents. The complaints have inevitably come to be directed at the underclass itself.

Meanwhile, racial tensions between poor blacks and working-class whites reflect an even more serious consequence of the social transformation of the inner city. Working-class whites, like inner-city minorities, have felt the full impact of the urban fiscal crisis in the United States. Unlike middle-class whites, they have been forced by financial exigencies to remain in the poorer parts of the cities and suffer the strains of crime, poorer services, and higher taxes. Unlike the more affluent whites who choose to remain in the wealthier sections of the cities, they cannot easily escape the problems of deteriorating public schools by sending their children to private schools, a problem made worse by the sharp decrease in the numbers of urban parochial schools. Thus, in recent years, the racial struggle for power and privilege in the cities has been essentially a struggle between the have-nots over access to and control of decent housing and decent neighborhoods.

Working-class whites are more likely than middle-class whites to express their hostility in blatantly racist terms and behavior, sometimes manifested in acts of violence such as the recent killing of a young black man in the white ethnic neighborhood of Bensonhurst in New York City, and they are less likely to distinguish between the middle-class and disadvantaged minorities. Middle-class whites are more subtle in their expressions of hostility and are more likely to direct their racial antagonisms specifically toward poor minorities.

The increasing antagonism has been further aggravated by a conservative political atmosphere, particularly during the Reagan presidency, that has not only reinforced the dominant American belief system that poverty is a reflection of individual inadequacy but has discouraged efforts for new and stronger social programs to address the growing problems of urban inequality.

These changes in the racial and political climate in America have profound implications for the way to address the problems of race and class in the inner cities. I am therefore reminded of the words of the late black economist, Vivian Henderson, who wrote, "The economic future of blacks in the United States is bound up with that of the rest of the nation. Policies, programs, and politics designed in the future to cope with the problems of the poor and victimized will also yield benefits to blacks. In contrast, any efforts to treat blacks separately from the rest of the nation are likely to lead to frustration, heightened racial

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animosities, and a waste of the country's resources and the precious resources of black people."[48]

I agree with Henderson. In the coming years the best political strategy for those committed to racial justice is to place more emphasis on race-neutral programs that would not only address the plight of the disadvantaged among minorities but would apply to all groups in America. After all, Americans across racial and class lines continue to be concerned about increased unemployment, decreased job security, deteriorating real wages, poorer public education, escalating medical and hospital costs, the lack of good child care, and more crime and drug trafficking in their neighborhoods. Because these problems are more highly concentrated in the inner cities as a result of cumulative effects of decades of racial subjugation, programs that aggressively address them will disproportionately benefit the underclass.

Theda Skocpol and Robert Greenstein ought to be considered in this context.[49] The issue is not simply the degree to which universal or targeted programs can sustain political support. The important question is whether costly programs perceived to be targeted to minorities can be generated and adequately supported in the present climate of budgetary constraint and racial antagonism. Although many social programs did indeed survive the Reagan budget cuts, they are hardly sufficient to address the manifold problems gripping the ghetto. We must generate new initiatives if we are indeed to move significant numbers of American citizens out of the underclass. Whether we follow Skocpol's program of targeting within universalism or Greenstein's argument that a mixture of universal and targeted approaches will likely be necessary to achieve a significant impact, the real challenge is to develop programs that not only meaningfully address the problems of the underclass but that draw broad support.

This was my concern when I wrote *The Truly Disadvantaged* and argued for improving the life chances of truly disadvantaged groups such as the ghetto underclass by emphasizing programs to which the more advantaged groups of all races and class backgrounds can positively relate. I now believe that this is best achieved not simply through a combination of targeted and universal initiatives, but through targeted and universal initiatives that are clearly race neutral.*

[48] Vivian Henderson, "Race, Economics, and Public Policy," *Crisis* 82 (Fall 1975): 50–55.

[49] Theda Skocpol, "Targeting within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in the United States" in Jencks and Peterson, *The Urban Underclass*; Robert Greenstein, "Universal and Targeted Approaches to Relieving Poverty: An Alternative View" in ibid.

* This article is adapted and updated from Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *The Urban Underclass* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991).

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International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second-Best Solution

ETHAN BARNABY KAPSTEIN

Why do states collaborate in the production of advanced weaponry? Under what conditions do such collaborative arrangements succeed? These are questions of both theoretical importance and policy relevance. From a theoretical perspective, the issue of interstate collaboration is among the most prominent concerns of research in international political economy.[1] In the policy realm, the costs and benefits associated with armaments collaboration have been widely debated, as exemplified by the recent controversy over the FSX, a Japanese jet fighter that will be built using technology and systems integration techniques purchased from the American firm, General Dynamics.[2]

In this article I argue that collaborative arrangements for the production of complex weapons systems represent a second-best solution to the problem of defense acquisition. Such arrangements reflect the desire of states to maintain domestic military-industrial capacity on the one hand, while incorporating capital and technology from abroad on the other. In short, collaboration represents a

[1] For a classic article on collaboration, see Ernst Hass, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics* 32 (April 1980): 357–405; for a recent treatment of theoretical issues, see Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[2] For a review of the political debate over armaments collaboration, see Office of Technology Assessment, *Arming the Allies* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1990).

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form of protectionism. As a policy instrument, collaboration seeks to resolve the underlying tension between nationalistic conceptions of security and the globalization of advanced industries.

The case study on which the analysis is based is the NATO arms market. The general framework developed here, however, may be profitably extended to studies of other collaborative arrangements, such as those now prominent in Western Europe.[3] Although I have not done so, it would also be of value to extend the work to commercial economic ventures in which international collaboration has become widespread.

In practice, however, not all collaborative arrangements to produce weapons have succeeded. Over time, either the states that are parties to the agreement or the firms that are responsible for research, development, and production have often found it impossible to live with the contractual terms originally set for the project. I argue that the impediments to international collaboration are not difficult to understand; success depends upon persistent state commitment to a weapons project that may take ten years or more to complete, coupled with the ability of the industrial partners involved to execute the tasks assigned to them. These practical difficulties notwithstanding, systemic pressures will continue to favor collaborative ventures.

Beyond providing insights into the weapons marketplace, the story told here has broader implications for our understanding of some of the enduring tensions in the international political economy. Throughout the postwar era, the western allies have advanced the spread of a liberal international economy based on the principles of free trade, currency convertibility, and direct investment flows.[4] The advancement of these objectives, however, has come into conflict with the particular politico-military interests of the alliance partners. Few states in the international system have allowed the division of labor to determine the structure of their high technology and defense-related industries.[5] Viewed as a heuristic case study, the article raises the hypothesis that corporate alliances will emerge as a prominent feature of the global marketplace, since this corporate form addresses national demands for military and economic security without exclusion from the international economy.

The Structure of Armaments Production

The world's defense industries sit on the cusp of economics and national security. In nearly all industrial states and in a growing number of developing countries,

[3] See Jonathan Tucker, "Partners and Rivals: A Model of International Colloboration in Defense Technology," *International Organization* 45 (Winter 1991): 83–120.

[4] See, for example, Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

[5] See Phillip Taylor, "Weapons Standardization in NATO: Collaborative Security or Economic Competition?" *International Organization* 36 (Winter 1982): 95–112.

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FIGURE 1

State Strategies for Acquiring Weapons



public officials have used protectionist measures to maintain and stimulate indigenous defense firms and to ensure that some military-industrial capability rests on national soil. At the same time, the defense industries, like their high-technology counterparts on the commercial side, have formed complex global networks through joint-ventures, corporate alliances, and offset purchase arrangements. These networks enable defense firms to access foreign markets, technologies, and capital.[6]

National solutions to the problem of acquiring costly, high-technology defense goods depend upon the availability of two key resources: technological and financial assets. The matrix diagram presented in Figure 1 provides a static view of state opportunities to acquire defense products; the dynamic element introduced by state and corporate policies over time may be deduced by the diagonal movement (southwest to northeast) from coproduction to codevelopment.

The matrix suggests that when states have both technological and financial resources, they will opt for autonomous solutions to weapons acquisition; the French Rafale aircraft program or the British Harrier provide examples. But few alliance members outside the United States have the ability to mobilize the assets necessary for weapons production, as exemplified by the growing debate in France over the costs associated with the Rafale program.[7] Moving to the southwest, when states possess financial resources to invest in an industrial infrastructure but lack technological know-how, they will be limited to assembling foreign weapons under licensing or coproduction arrangements; the F-16 program in Western Europe and Turkey provides a notable example. Next, when neither financial nor technological resources are available, states will have no choice but to import needed defense goods. Finally, when states have achieved a certain level of technological capability but lack financial resources to develop and market

[6] See Theodore Moran, "The Globalization of America's Defense Industries," *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990); see also Ethan B. Kapstein, "Losing Control: National Security and the Global Economy," *The National Interest* (Winter 1989/90): 85–90.

[7] See, for example, "Dassault: Le Plan Serge," *Le Nouvel Economiste*, 15 July 1988, 28–34.

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the technology, or when they seek to spread the risks associated with weapons development, they may opt for collaborative codevelopment projects. Codevelopment, which involves a commitment by two or more states to share in all aspects of a weapons project from basic research and development (R&D) to final production, requires substantial up-front investment in system development.[8] The Nunn Amendment programs (named after Senator Sam Nunn), which were initiated by the United States in 1985 and provide government funding for new weapons systems that are being codeveloped by two or more alliance partners, fit into this latter category.

Below the matrix, I provide an ordering of state acquisition preferences. Other things being equal, states would always prefer to be autonomous in weapons research, development, and production; they are impeded from doing so by their inability to mobilize technological and/or financial assets. Codevelopment and coproduction are second-best solutions; they enable the state to maintain a domestic defense-industrial base and to share the financial and technical risks of weapons development with alliance partners. Reliance on imports, while economically cost effective, is the least desirable political option, as attested to empirically by the large number of alliance states that have sought, at a minimum, coproduction agreements (including such small states as Belgium and the Netherlands) and the growing number of states in the developing world that are engaged in defense production.[9]

State preferences in the defense industry are clearly at odds with free market dictates. Pubic officials have rejected competition and comparative advantage as the basis for military industrialization, even within the NATO orbit; and they have been unwilling to permit indigenous defense capabilities to vanish. As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye felicitously argue, statesmen often seek to avoid the "efficiency trap" as they fashion policy alternatives; they recognize the political need for "second-best," nonmarket solutions.[10]

Despite a propensity for states that lack sufficient internal resources to engage in collaboration, weapons codevelopment programs (as exemplified by the Nunn amendment) have proved difficult to execute in practice. Codevelopment requires that firms divide the labor involved in a weapons project and produce their share of the project on time and within a specified budget. It further requires a state-level commitment to procure the jointly-produced weapons system. It may take ten years or more, however, to go from basic research and development to

[8] Jacques Gansler, *Affording Defense* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 215.

[9] On state preferences, see Jonathan Tucker,"Shifting Advantage: A Game-Theoretic Model of International Collaboration in Advanced Technology" (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990); on the growing number of weapons producers, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1989* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[10] Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, "International Interdependence and Integration" in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 6 (Andover, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 400.

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prototype construction.[11] Over this prolonged time frame, economic and strategic variables may change on the firm and/or state levels; firms may be unable to deliver the goods, while changes in state strategy can end the commitment to a given weapons system. The possibilities for unraveling, of course, are multiplied as the numbers of states and firms involved in a project increase. These changes in strategy and capability can undermine the rationale for a collaborative project or make it less attractive to public officials. Thus, while Nunn amendment programs enjoy a compelling logic and tremendous political and economic appeal, it has proven difficult to engage in collaborative codevelopment in practice.

Change in the Alliance Arms Market

Since its inception in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has sought to transform its national collection of troops and weapons into a united force capable of coalition warfare. The terms of that transformation, however, have changed with shifts in the relative capabilities of the alliance partners. During the early postwar years, NATO's effort to create an arsenal characterized by the rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) of weapons systems was based on European imports of U.S. defense goods. Such imports were often financed through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) assistance program. But as Western Europe recovered from the war and rebuilt its domestic arms industries, this approach to RSI was no longer acceptable.

The growing capabilities of European defense firms are mirrored in the data on U.S. arms exports to its NATO partners. Following the early postwar boom, weapons sales dropped precipitously, from a high-water mark in 1953 of $15 billion to a level in 1962 of only $3 billion (see Table 1).[12] In response to these market developments, the Kennedy administration launched a new program entitled "Win the Game in Europe by Managing Problems, Organizing Sales Effort." An aggressive U.S. sales campaign—as opposed to unilateral military aid—became the basis for NATO acquisition policy.[13]

In order to win sales in an increasingly competitive market, U.S. firms promised coproduction (but not codevelopment) of weapons systems with their European counterparts. During the first years of this effort, the Hawk (1958), Sidewinder (1959), and Bullpup missiles (1962), the F-104G fighter (1960), the Mark 44 torpedo (1960), and the M-72 light antitank weapon (1963) were built in collaboration with European manufacturers.[14] As a result of this policy, U.S. dominance in NATO weapons markets was maintained, even as the United States was sharing technology and production techniques with potential competitors.

Indeed, the German decision to purchase the Starfighter over a competing

[11] Ibid.
[12] Paul Ferrari et al., *U.S. Arms Exports* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), 95.
[13] Taylor, "Weapons Standardization," 99.
[14] Keith Hartley, *NATO Arms Cooperation*, (London: Allen and Univen, 1983), 34.

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TABLE 1

U.S. Arms Exports to NATO-Europe, 1950–1964 (in Thousands of 1986 Dollars)

Fiscal Year	*NATO-Europe Imports*
1950	$ 470,602
1951	5,326,963
1952	6,934,724
1953	15,316,117
1954	13,532,406
1955	9,133,364
1956	10,327,070
1957	7,873,933
1958	6,589,474
1959	4,657,500
1960	4,822,043
1961	3,083,550
1962	3,035,576
1963	5,471,253
1964	3,355,656

Source: Paul Ferrari, et al., *U.S. Arms Exports* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), 95.

French design from Dassault was made at least in part because of the "generous licensed-production offer" Lockheed made to German industry. Jonathan Tucker argues that "Lockheed was willing to make an aggressive offer because it desperately needed a major contract to ensure its economic survival." The deal included substantial technology transfer and, of course, joint production of the aircraft. In Tucker's words, "the Starfighter program proved to be a windfall for the German aeronautics industry."[15]

By the time the Starfighter program began to wind down in the mid-1960s, "West Germany had achieved the capacity to manufacture (but not to develop) high performance aircraft at the same level as the French and British industries."[16] For the French, however, the German decision to produce an American fighter had been a major disappointment. Joint production by France and Germany of a French plane would have gone a long way toward keeping the French aeronautics industry competitive against the United States. This setback prevented France from achieving the economies of scale deemed necessary to remain an effective competitor, given the rapidly increasing costs associated with weapons research, development, and procurement.

In the face of renewed American competition owing to defense coproduction agreements, Britain and France became increasingly concerned with the problem of maintaining their national aerospace industries. Each country continued to have independent strategic interests outside the NATO orbit, and both viewed a

[15] Tucker, *Shifting Advantage*, 148.
[16] Ibid., 151.

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TABLE 2

Selected European Collaborative Arms Projects

Project	*System*	*Start Date*	*Countries*
Jaguar	Aircraft	1965	GB, France
Lynx	Helicopter	1967	GB, France
Tornado	Aircraft	1968	GB, FRG, Italy
Alpha Jet	Aircraft	1969	France, FRG
Otomat	Missile	1969	France, Italy
RITA	Communications	1973	France, Belgium

Sources: Tucker, *Shifting Advantage*; Kolodziej, *Making and Marketing Arms*; Hartley, *NATO Arms Cooperation*.

vibrant defense industry as critical to overall technological and industrial development. Accordingly, both countries sought to find partners who would cooperate in the production and procurement of major weapons systems in order to spread the financial and technical risks and the acquisition costs.

One manifestation of European efforts to maintain autonomous arms capabilities was the British initiative in 1968 to launch Eurogroup, consisting of ten NATO-Europe countries. France, which withdrew from the NATO unified command structure in 1966, did not join Eurogroup; but in 1976 it and the Eurogroup members founded the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) to effect broader European cooperation. Eurogroup "marked the real beginning of a European response to US dominance and the imbalance in transatlantic arms transfers. . . ." While the ten members made some progress in launching cooperative development programs in the absence of France, especially in the area of land armaments, French participation since 1976 has greatly extended the range and scope of collaborative programs.[17]

Over the past twenty-five years, collaboration has emerged as the principal European response to the dual problem of rising weapons costs and ensuring the maintenance of some national defense capabilities in the face of U.S. competition and technical superiority. Although this is not the place to describe in detail European defense teaming—a large literature on this topic already exists—by the late 1960s collaboration had become widespread and involved a variety of weapons systems, as shown in Table 2.[18] Consistent with strategic trade theory, European governments used subsidization of research and development, discrimination in procurement policies, and provision of capital to defense contractors

[17] See Paul Hammond, et al., *The Reluctant Supplier* (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983), 210–219.

[18] On the politics, see, inter alia, Tucker, "Shifting Advantage"; Eduard Koldziej, *Making and Marketing Arms* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Hartley, *NATO*; Mary Jo Morris, *Multinational Teaming in the Defense Industry* (MIT-Japan Science and Technology Program, 1989); William Walker and Philip Gummet, "Britian and the European Armaments Market," *International Affairs* 65 (Summer 1989): 419–442; and Pauline Creasey and Simon May, eds., *The European Arms Market and Procurement Cooperation* (London: Macmillan, 1988).

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on favorable terms as techniques for expanding the market for "national champions."[19]

From the perspective of NATO's collective security, the proliferation of armaments programs in the United States and Western Europe had both positive and negative elements. To be sure, the United States hailed the increase in the West's defense industrial base and consequently the enlarged mobilization capacity that would certainly be needed in the event of a prolonged conflict with the Soviet Union. But conversely, the overlap in weapons programs and the lack of NATO standardization resulted in a tremendous waste of financial resources and military inefficiency that could prove fatal on the battlefield. An influential report by Thomas Callaghan of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 1974 asserted that rationalization and standardization of NATO armaments could lead to alliance-wide acquisition savings of over $10 billion per year.[20]

From the perspective of the U.S. prime defense contractors, the growing sophistication of the European armaments industry spelled declining export markets. This became especially troublesome in the early 1970s, as the Vietnam war was winding down. During the Vietnam conflict, American firms had already lost some Third World markets to European competitors because of the U.S. government's refusal to approve sales of systems that were needed in the war zone, such as the A-4 Skyhawk. Traditionally, the industry had looked to export markets to make up for part of the cyclical decline in domestic procurement; now, the industry was being squeezed both at home and abroad.[21]

In response to these changes in the NATO marketplace, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger launched a new weapons policy initiative in the summer of 1975 that came to be known as the "two-way street." This represented an effort to balance the U.S./NATO-Europe trade balance through innovative weapons procurement arrangements while maintaining open markets for U.S. defense contractors. According to consultant Thomas Callaghan, Schlesinger *"harbored many reservations about . . . a cartelized Europe. . . ."* By July the two-way street had been adopted by Congress in the Culver-Nunn Amendment (the first Nunn amendment), which "declared it to be *national policy* that weapons and equipment . . . shall be standardized or at least interoperable with the equipment of its NATO allies. . . ."[22] Schlesinger told Congress that the objectives of the two-way street were to enhance NATO standardization; encourage American and European technological and industrial strength; encourage independent,

[19] Taylor, "Weapons Standardization," 100.

[20] See Gardiner Tucker, *Toward Rationalizing Allied Weapons Production* (Paris: The Atlantic Institute, 1976); Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr., *U.S./European Economic Cooperation in Military and Civil Technologies* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 1974).

[21] See Andrew Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).

[22] Thomas Callaghan, *Pooling Allied and American Resources* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 1988), 125. (Emphasis added.)

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competitive, national weapons programs; increase U.S. purchases of European military hardware; and increase European purchases of U.S. hardware on the basis of coproduction.[23]

At the same time as the two-way street was being declared official policy, it was being translated into practice by American and European defense firms. In the summer of 1975 General Dynamics (GD) and four European Participating Governments (EPGs—Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway) announced the "deal of the century": coproduction of the F-16 lightweight fighter aircraft that had been recently adopted by the U.S. Air Force. The F-16 program gave the EPGs access to F-16 advanced technology, the construction of two assembly lines in Europe (in Belgium and the Netherlands), an opening to American and foreign defense markets through offset arrangements, and numerous benefits to European subcontractors.[24] According to a prominent GD official, the coproduction deal led to "a number of innovative international business arrangements, which . . . include direct and indirect offsets, development of foreign suppliers, creation of joint ventures, and licensed production. . . ."[25]

The F-16 program effectively segmented NATO's jet aircraft market into three groups: the EPGs that purchased the plane; the French, who remained autonomous; and the major Eurogroup countries (Britain, West Germany, and Italy) that pursued the development of a multirole combat aircraft (MRCA), named Tornado. Cynical European observers deemed that this is exactly what the United States wanted to do: divide and conquer. By engaging at least some NATO countries in attractive coproduction deals, the United States could weaken major competitors and maintain its Western European market share.[26]

The F-16 came to be seen in the eyes of many European industrialists and public officials (particularly in France) as a Trojan horse wheeled in under the banner of the two-way street.[27] To be sure, the United States had purchased the French-designed ROLAND missile, but even this program raised suspicions; it appeared that the American licensees, Hughes and Boeing, sought to improve the French model and then export the redesigned missile back to NATO countries. (Ultimately the U.S. canceled the ROLAND program.) It soon became apparent to American officials that their approach to the two-way street—based on competitive R&D and licensing arrangements—had failed to provide the basis for an enduring NATO armaments policy.[28]

[23] Adapted from Tucker, *Allied Weapons Production*, 21–22.

[24] I wish to thank an industry source for emphasizing these points.

[25] R.H. Trice, "International Cooperation in Military Aircraft Programs," (Paper presented to the workshop on International Arms Collaboration, Harvard University, 8 November 1989).

[26] Virginia Lopez, *The U.S. Aerospace Industry and the Trend Toward Internationalization* (Washington, DC: Aerospace Research Center, March 1988), 54.

[27] On the French reception to the F-16, see Kolodziej, *Making and Marketing Arms*, 337–338; and Hammond, *Reluctant Supplier*, 218–219.

[28] Daniel K. Malone, *Roland: A Case for or against NATO Standardization* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, May 1980); interview with Sam Nunn, *Jane's Defence Weekly*,

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On 2 February 1976, France joined the Eurogroup members in their collaborative activities, forming the IEPG. This "marked the beginning of strong French participation in continuing Western European efforts to cooperate closely in arms procurement and production." The objectives of IEPG were to strengthen European armaments industries; increase American purchases of European equipment; and promote standardization of equipment among the IEPG member states.[29] The creation of the IEPG demonstrated a European commitment to the maintenance of national defense industries based on collaborative as opposed to competitive defense projects.[30]

With the founding of the IEPG, the American hegemon recognized that its preferred NATO armaments policy—based on competitive R&D and competitive procurement—faced mortal opposition in Europe. In the words of a French public official, the U.S. approach to RSI was "dead in the water."[31] The Europeans were now capable of producing a wide array of weapons, even if these systems were generally based on second-generation technology. For American firms, growing European capabilities meant that business based on off-the-shelf exports and licensed coproduction was coming to an end; in 1982, arms sales to NATO-Europe totaled only $2.1 billion.[32] Western Europe had engaged in significant profit shifting away from American defense firms since the end of World War II.

But European efforts to develop innovative defense technology were less successful. Given the size of the U.S. domestic procurement market, the experience of American defense contractors in the manufacture of high-technology defense products, and the scale of U.S. defense spending, it was unlikely that European firms would be able to develop comparable advanced technology and compete with their American counterparts for NATO-wide contracts (including U.S. defense contracts) at any time in the near future.[33] The United States far outstripped NATO-Europe in the area of defense R&D; in 1984 the big three of Western Europe (Britain, France, and West Germany) spent $6.5 billion on defense research, whereas the United States invested $29.3 billion.[34] If Western European firms were to participate in the larger NATO weapons market, they would have

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11 April 1987, 641; Michael Klare, *American Arms Supermarket* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 170–172.

[29] Hammond, *Reluctant Supplier*, 212.

[30] Kolodziej, *Making and Marketing Arms*, 164.

[31] Quoted in David M. Abshire; "Arms Cooperation in NATO," *Armed Forces Journal International*, December 1985, 67.

[32] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers: 1988* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1989), 122.

[33] See Andrew Moravscik, "1992 and the Future of the European Armaments Industry," (Working Paper OIWP-90-001, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, November 1989).

[34] Francois Heisbourg, "Public Policy and the Creation of a European Arms Market" in Creasey and May, *European Arms Market*, 68.

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to find some way to participate in the development of leading-edge defense technology.

Collaboration As Policy[35]

In 1983 the president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, David Abshire, was appointed by President Ronald Reagan to the post of U.S. permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council. Abshire came to government with strong views regarding alliance industrial cooperation; ten years earlier he had supported the writing of the Callaghan Report, which had generated widespread interest in the problem of NATO RSI; in 1976 he had established the CSIS Transatlantic Policy Panel, composed of leading American and European public officials (including Senator Sam Nunn) and business executives, many of whom came from defense firms. Abshire, in short, was at the hub of a transnational policy network dedicated to enhancing arms cooperation within the NATO orbit.[36]

Once in Brussels, the new representative went to work building political support for armaments cooperation. But rather than separate the defense industrial issues from broader political-military ones, he purposely melded them. His strategy was to address the issue of RSI in the context of the contemporary debate over NATO's conventional force structure. The U.S. mission produced an analysis that pointed to Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces and concluded that "given limited resources to achieve improved conventional defense, a key mechanism had to be significantly enhanced armaments cooperation."[37]

Abshire called for a NATO "resources strategy" that would be an intrinsic part of the West's "grand strategy." The objective would be to make more efficient use of the "West's superior resources to bear on the problem of improving conventional forces at affordable costs. . . . It demands improved industrial and armaments cooperation across the Atlantic. . . ."[38] Under Abshire's guidance, RSI was transformed from an acquisition problem into a strategic imperative.

Nonetheless, the ambassador recognized the need for economic analysis in support of his conclusion that armaments cooperation was a good thing. In this regard, consultant Thomas Callaghan played a vital role. In an article that proved to be widely influential, he warned of "the structural disarmament of NATO." NATO nations, he said, were squeezed between rising weapons costs and de-

[35] In addition to the cited documents, this section is based on interviews with U.S. public officials and defense industry executives.

[36] See Abshire, "Arms Cooperation in NATO."

[37] Ibid.

[38] See David M. Abshire, "Refitting NATO Strategy for the Future," *Wall Street Journal*, 12 September 1984; Abshire, "European Security—Old Realities, New Ideas," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* (Summer 1985): 131–142; Abshire, "Challenges to NATO in the 1990s," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* (Fall 1987): 278–287.

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creasing procurement dollars. As a result of these trends, the member states would find themselves at a growing disadvantage to the Warsaw Pact's superior conventional forces. NATO efficiency was further reduced by the ragtag collection of systems that weren't interoperable. The only way to solve this problem was to promote collaborative research and development and collaborative procurement.[39]

Senator Sam Nunn found the Callaghan prognosis correct and alarming. He recalled:

> I talked many times with defense consultant Tom Callaghan . . . I read his articles. I talked with David Abshire . . . and Dennis Kloske [a Department of Defense official] and they brought the idea [of the Nunn Amendment] up to me. I liked it. I thought it was a very good idea so I came back and got to work on it.[40]

The Callaghan approach to arms collaboration was also attractive because it played upon a growing problem in defense budgeting, namely, the costs associated with basic research. A modern weapons system like the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) could absorb hundreds of millions of dollars in "paper studies" before prototypes were even built.[41] R&D in the defense area was expensive and highly risky; the chances that a given scientific investigation would translate into a weapon that was ultimately procured by the armed forces was slim.[42] During the 1950s, the up-front R&D costs associated with weapons acquisition comprised only 5 percent of the cost of the system; by the 1980s this had risen to over 50 percent.[43] Accordingly, public officials and defense industry executives were seeking new ways to spread the financial and technical risks associated with the weapons acquisition process. In short, Callaghan's analysis made an alliance virtue out of an alleged economic necessity.

For the U.S. defense industry, however, collaboration based on codevelopment with NATO-Europe involved a Faustian bargain: an exchange of technology for market access. One industry organization stated that the interest in a NATO RSI policy based on codevelopment reflected "a buyers' market where purchasers can demand concessions. . . . For the U.S., though, the stakes can be high-market access in exchange for development and production work and, often, technology."[44] Indeed, in a 1983 report the Defense Science Board, a Pentagon advisory group composed of defense industry executives had warned that codevelopment projects involved a "trade-off . . . between the strengthened alliance that increased technology sharing may help establish and the inevitably increased

[39] Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr., "The Structual Disarmament of NATO," *NATO Review* (June 1984): 1–6.

[40] Interview with Sam Nunn, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 April 1987, 641.

[41] Richard Stevenson, "New Jet Fighter: Risks Are High," *New York Times*, 27 December 1989.

[42] Jacques Gansler, *Affording Defense* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 215–238.

[43] Gansler, *Affording Defense*, 215.

[44] Quoted in Office of Management and Budget, *Offsets in Military Exports*, December 1988, 3.

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competition for U.S. industry that it will also create."[45] For the firms, codevelopment was a second-best solution to the problem of marketing arms; their preference would have been to perform R&D autonomously and then export or coproduce end-items.[46]

But industry recognized that the second-best solution helped it to overcome two important problems: first, access to European markets; second, growing R&D costs. This incipient industrial interest was articulated by Nunn in an interview with *Jane's Defence Weekly*. Nunn stated that industry "liked the idea" of cooperative research and development. Given the up-front costs of performing defense R&D, they welcomed the creation of a new pool of research funds. Knowing that firms wished to remain active in European markets, he reported that executives wanted to get "involved" in arms cooperation "at the R&D stage, at the very outset of development so the system could grow up in an environment of cooperation from the beginning."[47]

In March 1985, Dennis Kloske, the Department of Defense's (DoD) special adviser for armaments, prepared a concept paper entitled "Creation of a Funding Source for US Participation in NATO Co-Development Programs." Kloske argued that the establishment of a "general fund" upon which the services could draw to support NATO cooperative programs would have several significant advantages in meeting the Pentagon's political and economic objectives. These objectives included encouragement of armaments cooperation, easing of financial burdens on the United States for weapons development, standardization of weapons, and a desire "to keep American industry involved with European counterparts during Europe's industrial 'realignment' and period of introspection."[48]

On 22 May 1985, Senator Sam Nunn introduced an amendment to the Fiscal Year (FY) 1986 Department of Defense Authorization Act, which was cosponsored by a bipartisan group of senators including William Roth, John Warner, John Glenn, and Barry Goldwater. This amendment encouraged arms collaboration between the United States and its NATO allies through collaborative research and development programs. According to one journalist who has followed the Nunn Amendment since its inception:

> The term "NATO cooperative research and development projects" was specifically defined. . . . It refers to a project involving joint participation by the United States and one or more other member nations of NATO . . . to carry out a joint research and development program. . . . These programs are required to fall into one of the following

[45] Defense Science Board, *Industry-to-Industry International Armaments Cooperation: Phase I-NATO Europe*, June 1983.

[46] This analysis has been corroborated through interviews with executives from the prime U.S. defense contractors.

[47] Interview with Sam Nunn, *Jane's Defence Weekly*.

[48] Dennis Kloske, "Creation of a Funding Source for US Participation in NATO Codevelopment Programs," March 1985, mimeographed.

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> categories . . . (a) to develop new conventional defense equipment and munitions; or (b) to modify existing military equipment to meet United States military requirements.[49]

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger signaled his commitment to the Nunn Amendment in a letter to the service secretaries dated 6 June 1985. He urged the secretaries to ensure that acquisition programs be designed with broad NATO objectives, including armaments cooperation, in mind. Historically, the services had procured weapons based on their narrow self-interest, and indeed interservice procurement had been no more successful than international collaboration![50] The Nunn Amendment would only succeed if the services cooperated with their NATO counterparts.[51]

The Nunn Amendment represented a major shift in U.S. preferences in the area of NATO arms procurement. For a decade, U.S. policy had been based on the concept of competitive research and development among member states, and competitive procurement of end-items.[52] Competition in weapons production and procurement would promote an economically efficient alliance division of labor in the building of weaponry; in the language of economic theory, it was a first-best policy.[53] With the Nunn Amendment, the United States adopted a new approach to NATO rationalization, standardization, and interoperability. It now encouraged collaborative programs among alliance member states from the research and development stages to the ultimate procurement and fielding of systems.

The Nunn Amendment provides several incentives to American defense firms to ensure their participation in collaborative codevelopment. First, it offers a pool of research funds for cash-starved defense industries, so long as they collaborate in weapons R&D. Second, by promoting collaboration, the amendment helps maintain access for U.S. defense firms to the European market, it advances RSI, and it encourages the spread of economic and technological risks inherent in weapons development. Finally, by subsidizing research, it reduces the up-front expenditures that companies must commit to a new weapons program. In sum, the amendment appears to serve prominent state and industry objectives.

Implementing Cooperative Programs

Following the enactment of the Nunn Amendment and congressional appropriations of $100 million for NATO cooperative R&D projects, Deputy Secretary

[49] David J. Kuckelman, "NATO Finally Tries Cooperation," *Defense and Foreign Affairs* (December 1987): 10.

[50] Jacques Gansler, "International Arms Collaboration," address to the workshop on Internatinal Arms Collaboration, Harvard University, 8 November 1989.

[51] Caspar Weinberger, Memorandum to Service Secretaries, 6 June 1985, mimeographed.

[52] See Philip Taylor, "Weapons Standardization in NATO: Collaborative Security or Economic Competition?" *International Organization* 36 (Winter 1982): 95–112.

[53] Anne Hessing Cahn and Joseph Kurzel, "Arms Trade in the 1980s" in Cahn et al., *Controlling Future Arms Trade* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), 72.

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of Defense William Taft directed the military services to nominate prospective systems for funding. The DoD implementation process was outlined by armaments adviser Dennis Kloske in a June 1986 memorandum.[54] Under Kloske's direction,

> two criteria have evolved in determining the suitability of a project for Nunn Amendment funding: the project must address a priority military requirement identified by one of the . . . major NATO commanders. . . . in addition, the nominating military service must be prepared to fund the project after the permissible two years of Nunn Amendment funding.[55]

These two criteria reflect the department's concern that dog programs (projects of marginal value to the armed forces) not be offered for funding. The services must provide a military justification for each project they nominate, and they must be willing to finance the program after the two-year Nunn Amendment seed money is gone. Once these two criteria are met, the DoD then signs Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the NATO allies involved in joint weapons development.

The U.S. armed forces identified four candidates for Nunn funding in FY86, while the IEPG in Europe proposed six weapons programs. Four of these ten programs ultimately received funding: a precision guided munitions project; the NATO frigate; a friend-or-foe identification system; and a system involving target acquisition.[56]

During the initial two years of its existence, the amendment generated, in the words of Senator Nunn, tremendous "excitement" on both sides of the Atlantic.[57] By 1989, the United States had launched twenty-seven programs involving cooperative research and development. As of June 1989, the Pentagon was projecting an investment of $3 billion in these programs over the five-year period FY90-FY95; the NATO Europe contribution was expected to be almost double that amount.[58]

But by the autumn of 1989, the feeling of optimism regarding cooperative programs was collapsing. Suddenly, NATO members were "canceling billions of dollars in weapons-standardization programs because of simultaneous declines in perceptions of the Soviet threat and in Western defense budgets." Britain, France, and Italy withdrew from the most visible Nunn project, the NATO frigate, while the United States and Britain quit an air-to-ground missile program. From the intra-European perspective, the most significant cancellation was Ger-

[54] Kuckelman, "NATO Finally Tries Cooperation," 11.

[55] Frank Cevasco, "The Initiative in Action," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 April 1987, 655–656.

[56] For details, see Frank Cevasco, "The Initiative in Action," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 April 1987, 655–656; see also Robin Beard, "New NATO Approaches to Improved Armaments Cooperation," *NATO's Sixteen Nations* (November 1986): 26–32.

[57] Interview with Sam Nunn, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 642.

[58] James Compton, "Statement on Armaments Cooperation," Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 14 June 1989, mimeographed.

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FIGURE 2

Explaining Maintenance and Cancellation of Collaborative Programs

Change in State Acquisition Policy	Change in Firm Capabilities: Y	Change in Firm Capabilities: N
Y	Cancel MSOW*	Cancel NATO Frigate
N	Cancel Project X**	Maintain NAAWS***

* Modular Standoff Weapon
** A secret NATO program about which further information is unavailable.
*** NATO Anti-Air Warfare System

Source: Adapted from Farr, *Management of International Cooperative Programs.*

many's decision to leave the ASRAAM (advanced short-range air-to-air missile) project; cooperation, a German defense official proclaimed, was "not an end in itself. . . ."[59] With the end of the cold war, NATO leaders perceived the resurgence of "old go-it-alone habits."[60]

But the cancellation of several Nunn Amendment programs should not be associated solely with strategic factors at the systemic level. Variables at the level of the firm would also lead us to predict that many if not most collaborative programs would be canceled.[61] In Figure 2 I suggest that cancellation will likely result from changes in state acquisition policy on the one hand, and/or alterations in firm capabilities on the other. The former may result from some combination of systemic and domestic-level factors; a complete delineation of this variable, of course, would require a separate article. The latter could also be due to systemic and firm-level factors. Economic recession, for example, could make it difficult for a defense firm to attract the capital it needs for fresh investment in a weapons program. At the firm level, managerial incompetence or an inability to retain scientists and engineers could influence the ability of a firm to execute its assigned tasks in a collaborative project.

On the X-axis I have placed changes in firm capabilities, while on the Y-axis I have placed changes in state policy. The matrix suggests that programs can only succeed when firms execute their assigned tasks and when states continue their commitment to a weapons system. The matrix, of course, is not intended to

[59] Giovanni de Briganti, "Germany Questions Cooperative Programs," *Defense News*, 2 October 1989, 1.

[60] Peter Almond, "NATO Nations Cut Joint Projects," *Washington Times*, 16 October 1989; see also John Morrocco, "Tight Budgets, Design Conflicts Undercut NATO Weapons Projects," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 25 September 1989, 18–19.

[61] For a study that seeks to explain success and failure in Nunn Amendment programs, see C. Michael Farr, *The Management of International Cooperative Projects*, Defense Systems Management College, December 1989, mimeograph.

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provide a complete account of program success and failure, but only to introduce two of the major independent variables.[62] Further, the outcomes of "cancel" and "maintain" are parsimonious; programs can also be cut back, stretched out, or altered. Nonetheless, the matrix suggests that the development and fielding of a collaborative weapons system will only succeed when firm capabilities are maintained and state acquisition interests are constant over time.

A detailed DoD-sponsored study of six collaborative programs supports the hypothesis that both state and firm-level factors are responsible for success. The more successful programs were those in which state requirements were maintained over the life of the program and the industrial partners were able to reach mutually beneficial risk-sharing agreements. An example of a successful program is provided by the NATO Anti-Air Warfare System (NAAWS), which has responded to a long-standing NATO need of identifying friends and foes in air combat situations. The failed programs, such as the NATO frigate, most often resulted from a change in state-level military requirements. The inability of industry to staff a program adequately and meet cost and performance schedules has been, according to the DoD study, a secondary factor. But it does explain—again according to the study—the cancellation of a secret NATO program, Project X, about which I have no further information. When neither a state nor a firm-level commitment exists for a program, cancellation must result.[63]

Strategically, changed views of the Soviet threat have clearly influenced NATO armaments directors. The prospect of a wide-ranging Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty raises questions about the scope and type of conventional weapons that will remain in Western Europe, greatly complicating the acquisition process. Further, shrinking defense appropriations in NATO member states are forcing defense ministers to make priorities of programs according to their military and domestic economic contributions. In the United States, the decline in defense spending has coincided with increasing anxiety over the condition of the defense industrial base. Protectionist efforts to restore the base—using such tools as the Buy American Act and the Defense Production Act of 1950—clash with cooperative programs. Indeed, Congress is becoming polarized between the internationalists like Nunn and the fortress Americans like Representative Mary Rose Oakar.[64]

Regarding the firms involved in codevelopment, there is evidence that several programs have simply been poorly implemented and managed. In many cases, the firms have not delivered their share of the promised goods. According to one transnational defense industry lobbying group, "no new administrative proce-

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] See Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Deterrence in Decay* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1989); for a review of the congressional debate, see Ethan B. Kapstein, "Losing Control—National Security and the Global Economy," *The National Interest* 18 (Winter 1989/90).

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dures have been established to govern this [cooperative] process."[65] As suggested at the outset, firms must meet their contractual obligation in a collaborative agreement if the weapons program is to succeed.

In sum, there are severe impediments to the successful fielding of collaborative weapons. Indeed, arms collaboration provides a case study of a policy that may be appealing as an idea, but that in practice is very difficult to execute. Given that successful collaboration depends on firms and states having a consistent commitment to a long-term project, one can predict that only a small percentage of joint projects will ever be acquired by NATO's armed forces.

Yet despite these impediments, "it is very clear that many nations within the Western World want to retain, advance, or develop an advanced [weapons] capability." They view defense industries—and aerospace firms in particular—"in terms of national prestige, in terms of technology competitiveness, in terms of export competitiveness."[66] So long as collaborative programs are viewed as an effective mechanism for achieving these objectives, we can expect them to remain an important element in state acquisition strategies.

Conclusion and Prospects

The Nunn Amendment represents the most recent U.S. response to weapons acquisition in the NATO orbit. By promising cooperation with its allies, the United States has offered advanced military technology in return for continued access to the European market. In short, a Faustian bargain has been struck.

With the exceptional performance of U.S. defense technology in the war with Iraq and with the certain decline in domestic defense spending that will follow the war, it is likely that there will be enormous pressure on the American government by both firms and foreign clients to export its most modern weapons systems. Many critical policy questions will be raised about whether such sales are appropriate. On what terms should future sales be made? Should the United States bow to the inevitable foreign pressures to engage in coproduction and codevelopment of advanced weaponry? Or should it limit future exports to off-the-shelf sales?

In seeking answers to these questions, U.S. policy makers will face classic trade-offs between economics and national security. From an economic perspective, American firms will press their government to permit any deals that enable them to make the sale. They will argue that if the United States refuses to sell advanced technology according to the terms demanded by the purchaser, then the British, French, or Russians will capture the market. But public officials will

[65] American League for Exports and Security Assistance, "Implementing NATO Armaments Cooperation: An Industry Perspective," 24 February 1988, mimeographed.

[66] Dennis Kloske, Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 11 April 1988, 100th Congress, 2nd sess., Senate, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1989* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988), 843.

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rightly fear the global spread of defense industrial capacity that may someday be used for malign purposes.

In making arms sale decisions, U.S. policy makers should recognize the comparative advantage that America possesses in weapons design and manufacture and the size of the domestic marketplace. Exports constitute less than 10 percent of the sales of the prime U.S. defense contractors in almost every case; this contrasts sharply with the problem facing European manufacturers, who are export dependent. Simply stated, American firms can forgo exports without irreparable damage, permitting policy makers to ensure that any sales are made in a manner consistent with national security interests.

Nonetheless, states in the western alliance and elsewhere will continue to wrestle with the dilemma posed by the obligation of ensuring national security while promoting economic efficiency and growth. Since first-best economic solutions (competition and free trade) are unlikely to attract widespread political support when it comes to high-technology and defense-related industries, public officials and firms will have no choice but to seek the second best. In that second-best world, with its considerable excess capacity in defense-industrial sectors, extraordinary acts of political leadership will be required to control the spread of advanced weaponry.*

* I wish to thank Robert Art, Stephen Krasner, Michael Mastanduno, Andrew Moravcsik, Johnathan Tucker, and Raymond Vernon for their comments and the John M. Olin Foundation and Pew Charitable Trusts for their research support.

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Where Have All the Consumers Gone?

LOREE BYKERK
ARDITH MANEY

Despite a promising start, organized consumer activity at the national level was largely neglected as a research topic by political scientists in the 1980s.[1] Recent accounts of public interest group activity mention consumers only in passing and focus instead on governmental reform organizations like Common Cause or environmental organizations.[2] Whether or not the generalizations drawn based on those parts of the public interest community apply to consumer organizations has not been thoroughly explored. The general inattention and the charges of failure made by some accounts would lead an observer to conclude that organized consumer activity has disappeared or become entirely ineffective.[3] At the

[1] Mark V. Nadel, *The Politics of Consumer Protection* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); David Vogel and Mark Nadel, "Who Is a Consumer: An Analysis of the Politics of Consumer Conflict," *American Politics Quarterly* 5 (January 1977): 27–56.

[2] Andrew McFarland, *Common Cause* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1984); Michael W. McCann, *Taking Reform Seriously: Perspectives on Public Interest Liberalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).

[3] Michael Pertschuk, *Revolt Against Regulation: The Rise and Pause of the Consumer Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); McCann, *Taking Reform Seriously*, 209–257.

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same time, there are several general trends which seem to heighten the potential role that might be played by organized consumer voices.

Recent studies of interest groups detect an explosive growth in the number of groups and their activities in Washington.[4] There is general agreement that business interests in particular have mobilized new resources and are more active on the Washington scene.[5] By adapting innovations first developed by public interest groups, business interests have become more influential than before. The 1980s were dominated by business complaints about the costs of government regulation and by efforts to deregulate. Under the rubric of industrial policy and public/private partnerships, corporatist-like relationships have developed that involve a range of explicit government help for business.[6] Ought one to expect a responding upsurge on the part of consumer interests or at least scan the horizon for it?

This general expectation that there will be an organized consumer response parallels the pluralist argument for countervailing power recently revived by prominent political scientists.[7] Their explanations of the complex relationships between government and business argue that cycles of countervailing influences are visible in the long run.

Finally, economists and other observers have raised an audible outcry over the consumption-wild economy of the United States.[8] The acute, widely-shared concerns over the deficit, the debt, the trade imbalance, and the future of the United States in the world economy appear to offer organized consumer groups ample opportunity to wield influence on behalf of the shopper's role in macropolitical issues.

It is the tension between the two sets of messages that leads us to ask expectantly: Where have all the consumers gone? Are advocates for the consumer interest still alive and well in Washington after a decade that observers have generally characterized as sympathetic to the policy agenda of business?

[4] Jeffrey M. Berry, *The Interest Group Society* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 16–45; Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, "More of the Same: Washington Pressure Group Activity in a Decade of Change," *Journal of Politics* 45 (May 1983): 351–377; Robert H. Salisbury, "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions," *American Political Science Review* 78 (March 1984): 64–75.

[5] David Vogel, "The Power of Business in America: A Reappraisal," *British Journal of Political Science* 13 (January 1983): 19–43; Graham Wilson, "American Business and Politics" in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds., *Interest Group Politics*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986), 221–235.

[6] Mark Petracca, "The Reagan Revolution and the Role of Federal Advisory Committees" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1988); Richard A. Harris, "Politicized Management: The Changing Face of Business in American Politics" in Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis, eds., *Remaking American Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 261–286.

[7] Andrew McFarland, "Interest Groups and Theories of Power in America," *British Journal of Political Science* 17 (April 1987): 129–147; Jeffrey M. Berry, "The Post-Reagan Research Agenda for Business-Government Relations" (Roundtable presentation at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1988).

[8] Peter G. Peterson, "The Morning After," *The Atlantic Monthly* 260 (October 1987): 43–69.

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The Nature of the Inquiry

Earlier studies began by defining the universe of people who might under some conditions be organized to pursue the consumer interest before a wide range of national government decision makers.[9] A different approach is taken here; we capture a distinct arena of consumer policy under consideration by government decision makers and then investigate which groups contest for favorable public policy outcomes.

To make the task manageable we chose a time period, roughly 1970–1985, and an arena where we could trace interactions among the various protagonists—congressional committee and subcommittee hearings. Representation by groups and individuals takes a variety of forms on Capitol Hill, many of which have been studied intensively by political scientists. Making political action committee (PAC) contributions, launching letter-writing campaigns, and seeking direct access to members of Congress and their staffs are all well-known examples.[10]

One measure of group activity insufficiently studied is group appearances when committees hold public hearings. There are a number of reasons to believe that this measure of activity deserves more attention. Research into committee activity was useful in pinpointing the decentralization of power and the rise of a generation of policy entrepreneurs, two trends that took place in Congress during the 1970s.[11] More recently, data on committee hearings has been used to show changing workload characteristics of Congress in the 1980s.[12]

Members of Congress hold committee hearings to advance legislation, educate the media and their colleagues about policy problems, investigate and oversee the work of executive branch agencies, and for other reasons.[13] Holding a hearing is a complicated undertaking for legislators; it requires the commitment of staff and other resources, which are then unavailable for other purposes.

Analyzing hearing participation captures as complete a picture of interest group activity as is possible. Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney's Washington Representatives Survey shows that virtually all organizations seeking to exercise influence in Washington present testimony at congressional hearings. That study

[9] Nadel, *Politics of Consumer Protection*, 155–204; Vogel and Nadel, "Who Is a Consumer," 27–30; Joan Lucco, "The Voice of Consumer Groups in White House Policymaking from Kennedy to Reagan" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1987), 3–4.

[10] Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 148–169.

[11] Roger H. Davidson, "Subcommittee Government: New Channels for Policymaking" in Thomas E. Mann and Norman E. Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 99–133; David E. Price, "Policymaking in Congressional Committees: The Impact of 'Environmental' Factors," *American Political Science Review* 72 (June 1978): 548–74.

[12] Roger H. Davidson and Carol Hardy, *Indicators of House of Representatives Workload and Activity*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 87-4295, 8 June 1987.

[13] William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, *The American Legislative Process*, 7th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 181–188.

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showed that presenting testimony led the list of twenty-seven techniques for exercising influence.[14] Also, this activity is on the record and accessible for research, while other common techniques of influence such as contacting officials directly or making informal social contacts are not so accessible.

Finally, undertaking to testify before a congressional committee or subcommittee represents an important commitment of time and resources on the part of the interest group. Thus, evaluation of their involvement in hearings ought to yield important information about interest groups and the policy agendas they are pursuing.

Gone to Congress Every One?

Earlier literature on consumer group activity focused on just a handful of organizations. Later we will present detailed information about groups claiming to represent the consumer's interest that have been active before congressional committees during the period under study here. But first we provide an overview of consumer group activity by using two key organizations identified from earlier studies of consumer interest groups—the Consumer Federation of America (CFA), Consumers Union (CU), and one individual activist, Ralph Nader. For each of the three we cite data in connection with all House and Senate hearings from 1969 to 1985 as indexed by Congressional Information Service (CIS) for 1970–1986.[15] Overall activity totals show that these consumer groups participated as witnesses in 349 Senate hearings and 307 House hearings. Figure 1 reveals an activity peak in the mid-1970s, particularly 1975, with lower levels of activity thereafter. Overall, activity in the Carter and Reagan years is at about the same level as it was in the early 1970s. Figure 1 also suggests a trend of activity shifting more toward the House than the Senate. These consumer activitists directed more attention to House hearings in every year except two. The same general trend of focusing toward the House also holds for the three sets of activists taken separately.

It is also possible to make comparisons between and among these three sets of activists. CFA was cited in the CIS Index in conjunction with 208 hearings during the entire period; CU was mentioned 182 times, and Nader on 166 occasions. But we are, of course, comparing the activities of two organizations to those of one individual!

Figure 2 shows that hearing activity by both CFA and CU peaked in the mid-1970s and has continued at a substantial level. However, Ralph Nader's appearances decreased dramatically. Attention to Nader's charismatic presence and then his relative absence has contributed to the impression that consumer influence has disappeared in Washington. Nevertheless, his record is impressive for both his volume of activity over more than two decades and his success in developing spin-off organizations designed to pursue the consumer interest.

[14] Schlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests*, 150.

[15] The information on hearing participation is from *CIS Indexes and Abstracts*, published annually since 1970.

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Figure 1

HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEE APPEARANCES BY CONSUMER GROUPS 1970–86



—— = House
—— = Senate
Source: CIS Index, 1970–86.
By year of publication in CIS.

While Nader clearly has devoted less of his personal attention to appearing before Congress in recent years, what could be called Ralph Nader, Inc. has taken up some of the slack. The yearly CIS Indexes published from 1970 to 1986 cite various organizations with which Ralph Nader is affiliated. Congressional hearing

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Figure 2

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE APPEARANCES BY CONSUMER GROUPS 1970–86



—— = Nader

—— = Consumer Federation of America

– – – = Consumers Union

Source: CIS Index, 1970–86.

By year of publication in CIS.

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activity for Nader and the most prominent of his affiliated organizations was extensive during this period. Those organizations cited in just the 1986 CIS Index were the Aviation Consumer Action Project, Public Citizen's Congress Watch, Public Citizen Inc., Public Citizen's Health Research Group, Public Citizen's Litigation Group, and the Public Interest Research Group. When the total of the Nader groups' hearing activity is compared with that of the other two consumer organizations during 1986, the results are as follows in Table 1.

In summary, evidence confirms that three of the best known sets of activists and organizations discussed in the earlier literature about consumer policy remain alive and active on Capital Hill. Their activity has shifted more to the House than the Senate, Ralph Nader has been replaced by Nader, Inc., and overall hearing activity has declined from a 1975 peak but continues to be significant.

Congressional Context of Consumer Protection Activity

In order to discover the extent of consumer policy in Congress and ascertain what other organizations are active on these issues, we focus on a definition. Consumer protection policy involves issues of availability, affordability, safety, and efficacy of goods and services to the final user. Hearing activity indexed under the CIS consumer protection topic descriptor, we believe, represents the core of consumer protection hearing activity in Congress. (See Appendix.)

The consumer protection hearings indexed by CIS show that the House outdistanced the Senate in hearings during the period under study here. Some 436 hearings were held by House committees and 404 by their Senate counterparts. The data as displayed in Figure 3 reinforces the earlier finding of a rise in activism by the House beginning in the mid-1970s. The House overtook the Senate in total number of hearings years before Ronald Reagan's election ushered in a more conservative Senate in 1980.

Has anything concrete resulted from this hearing activity? A partial answer lies in a related data set, the totals that CIS kept for legislative enactments. During the period from 1970–1986, CIS indexed forty-five public laws under the same consumer protection descriptor. Figure 3 shows that legislation involving consumers continued to be enacted during this period. Congressional consumer protection activity reached a peak in the mid-1970s, declined somewhat thereafter, and later stabilized.

TABLE 1

Hearing Activity

	House	*Senate*
Consumer Federation of America	18	12
Consumers Union	6	2
Ralph Nader, Inc.	21	20

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Figure 3

CONSUMER PROTECTION HEARINGS AND BILLS PASSED 1970–86



– – – = House
—— = Senate
—— = Bills passed

Source: CIS Index, 1970–86.

By year of publication in CIS.

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What has happened since Reagan's first term in office remains problematical, because the indicators begin to swing back and forth during the period of intense partisan and ideological conflict that characterized the mid-1980s. Why congressional committees take on particular issues such as consumer protection at some times rather than others has not been adequately addressed. But part of the explanation may depend on the role that organized interest groups play.

More Detail about More Groups

Analysis of the organizations testifying at House consumer protection hearings from 1977 through 1987 yields additional information about where all the consumers have gone. Although the literature on this period would lead one to expect that consumer groups have gone away or into hiding, in fact a significant number of consumer organizations appeared to provide testimony. Those groups whose representatives appeared more than ten times are included in Table 2.

Consumer Federation of America and Consumers Union are clearly the workhorses among consumer organizations; each appeared substantially more often than any other organized consumer voice. Public Citizen's Congress Watch is by itself a significant contributor, and if all the other members of Nader, Inc. are added, (the others appear in subsequent tables) the total brings the Nader family up to the status of a peak voice for consumers.

Senior citizens organized in the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), now formally merged with the National Retired Teachers Association, represents a notable share of the consumer presence and one which the population curve is likely to augment in the future. Other organizations representing the elderly or retired appear on consumer issues as well, but none approaches the AARP in frequency of providing testimony. Although there is evidence that organized labor has fallen on hard times recently, this data shows the AFL-CIO to be a frequent player in the consumer protection arena as the peak voice for workers as consumers.

On the producer side, the most frequent participant is the American Bankers Association. The high profile of this organization on consumer protection issues confirms journalistic evidence that credit, lending practices, and regulation of financial services were often on the agenda in the period under study here. The Amer-

TABLE 2

Organizations Appearing More Than 10 Times with Number of Appearances

Consumers Union	33
Consumer Federation of America	32
American Bankers Association	23
American Association of Retired Persons/National Retired Teachers Association	19
AFL-CIO	15
Public Citizen's Congress Watch	11

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TABLE 3

Organizations Appearing 5–10 Times by Type and Number of Appearances

	Appearances
Consumer organizations	
National Consumers League	10
Public Interest Research Group	9
National Consumer Law Center	6
Aviation Consumer Action Project	5
Consumer Energy Council of America	5
National Peoples Action	5
Total appearances	40
State and local agencies and their associations	
National Association of State Regulatory Utility Commissioners	10
National Association of Attorneys General	9
National Association of Insurance Commissioners	9
American Public Power Association	6
Total appearances	34
Producers	
American Medical Association	10
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.	9
National Association of Home Builders	9
National Association of Realtors	9
U.S. League of Savings Associations	9
American Dental Association	8
Small Business Legislative Council	7
American Insurance Association	6
Edison Electric Institute	6
American Bar Association	6
Air Transport Association	5
American Council of Life Insurance	5
American Society of Travel Agents	5
Blue Cross/Blue Shield	5
Consumer Bankers Association	5
Independent Bankers Association of America	5
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety	5
National Association of Manufacturers	5
National Automobile Dealers Association	5
Total appearances	124

ican Bankers Association's twenty-three appearances are more than twice that of any other organization representing producers.

Those organizations that appear less often but roughly once or twice per Congress, that is five to ten times overall, are displayed in Table 3. It includes other components of the extended Nader family of organizations, as well as the National Consumers League, a long-standing, if lower-profile group representing consumer concerns.

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Another substantial voice on consumer protection issues is brought to you by the federal system. Associations of state government officials representing utility regulators, insurance commissioners, and attorneys general often come before Congress on consumer protection issues. Their presence indicates that many consumer protection issues are a lively topic at the state and local level as well as at the national level of government.

Notable by their absence among these organizations are the environmental and government reform groups. The literature has led us to see environmentalists as the muscle, if not the heart, of the public interest movement.[16] Some observers have argued that this segment of the public interest movement has replaced labor as keeper of the liberal vision for America.[17] Although environmental groups may have gained strength by contrast with most of the public interest community during this decade, this data does not show that strength extended in support of consumer issues. Not a single environmental group appears among these most frequent testifiers in spite of the fact that energy consumption issues were on the agenda. This is not to claim that environmental groups are not active during this period in the congressional forum, but that they attend to topics other than consumer protection as defined in this data set.

In Table 3, one can see organizations representing professionals such as doctors, dentists, and lawyers providing testimony. Also visible are the housing block of builders, realtors, and lenders, and the insurance block. Of some curiosity is the relatively low profile here of the business peak associations—the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers—by comparison to the various trade associations and professional organizations.

While Table 2 depicted a dominance of consumer groups, Table 3 reflects a relationship of these groups to producers that is more typical of the whole data set. Here the consumer groups are seriously outnumbered—six consumer organizations provided testimony forty times while nineteen producer groups provided testimony on 124 occasions.

Table 4 includes summary data on organizations that testified four or fewer times in this period before the House. Here it becomes necessary to categorize separately core consumer organizations and other critics of producers. These other critics are usually allied with the consumer groups and one may even argue that they often act as groups of special-focus consumers, particularly in the case of the elderly. However, because the CIS abstracts do not always give adequate information on which to judge alliances among groups, the relationship is evaluated conservatively for categorization purposes. Labor is treated separately because of the possible competition between consumers and producers for its allegiance. State and local officials have separate and potentially independent stakes in the outcome of consumer issues before Congress and also are treated separately.

[16] McCann, *Taking Reform Seriously*, 87–90, 244–257; David Vogel, *Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 104, 260–270, 299.

[17] Vogel, *Fluctuating Fortunes*, 293.

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TABLE 4

Organizations Appearing 1–4 Times

	Number of Groups	*Number of Appearances*
Consumer organizations	82	116
Other critics		
Elderly groups	4	7
Environmental groups	10	19
Government reform groups	3	4
Health groups	14	22
Miscellaneous groups	11	18
Total	42	70
Labor	24	33
State and local agencies and their associations	88	106
Producers	437	580
Miscellaneous	6	6

In Table 4 one sees a large number of core consumer organizations carrying the load on consumer protection issues. Joining them are a wider array of the other public interest groups one might have expected to see making more frequent appearances.

The core consumer organizations included in this level of activity are exemplified by the Center for Auto Safety, Bankcard Holders of America, and the National Insurance Consumer Organization. These organizations are more specialized in their focus and thus less likely to provide testimony as often as the Consumer Federation of America or Consumers Union. Also included are state and local consumer groups who only bring their concerns to national policy makers on occasion.

Among the advocacy groups for the elderly noted here is the National Council of Senior Citizens. The Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Action Foundation, Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra Club appear in the environmental category. Their support here approximates the level predicted by the general wisdom. The American Civil Liberties Union is among the government reform organizations and it makes two appearances. The American Cancer Society, American Heart Association, American Lung Association, Arthritis Foundation, and the National Womens Health Network appear to advocate as health groups. Public Citizen Health Research Group is included here but is categorized as a core consumer group because of its affiliation with the larger Nader network.

Labor is represented here by individual unions such as the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and United Steelworkers of America as well as by state groups such as the Minnesota AFL-CIO. At this point the CIS data offer an example of the role of organized labor

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of Machinists and the International Union of Steelworkers appeared along with auto industry parts suppliers at hearings on automobile bumpers standards. The labor representatives expressed concern over potential job losses as well as concern with the safety impact of the standards.

Prominent again are associations of state and local officials whose responsibilities include some aspects of consumer protection. These include the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National League of Cities, and the National Association of Consumer Agency Administrators. At this level of activity one also sees representatives of individual jurisdictions bringing testimony to the House; these include the New York State Consumer Protection Board, the Minnesota Office of Consumer Services, and the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs.

Outstanding among the 437 producers are trade and professional associations in banking, insurance, and health care. Joining them are small trade associations such as the Peanut Butter Manufacturers and Nut Salters Association and the Wine Grapegrowers of America and many individual banks, insurance companies, pharmaceuticals manufacturers and retailers, general merchandise retailers, investment firms, grocery manufacturers, and funeral directors. These examples merely suggest the wide array of issues on which organized consumer interests may be challenged.

Are the consumer groups outnumbered? Yes, the producer organizations are there in greater numbers. Even if all the nonproducer interests ally together, they are still seriously outnumbered. However, one may also note that Ralph Nader personally appears more often on consumer protection issues than does the Bank of America, Ford, or General Motors.

A final look at the data in aggregated form shown in Table 5 allows one to draw an overall impression of who appeared to present testimony on consumer protec-

TABLE 5

All Organizations, Number and Percentage of Appearances

	Number of Groups	*% of Groups*	*Number of Appearances*	*% of Appearances*
Producers	457	64.0	727	58.5
Consumer groups	91	12.7	232	18.7
State and local agencies and their associations	92	12.9	140	11.3
Labor	25	3.5	48	3.9
Other critics				
Elderly groups	5	.7	26	2.1
Health groups	14	2.0	22	1.8
Environmental groups	10	1.4	19	1.5
Government reform groups	3	.4	4	.3
Miscellaneous groups	11	1.5	18	1.4
Sub-totals	43	6.0	95	7.1
Miscellaneous	6	.8	6	.5
Totals	714	99.9	1,242	100.0

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tion issues during this period. The strongest message is that producer organizations dominate the array of groups appearing in the hearings, which is consistent with other research findings on the rise of business presence in Washington.

The dominance of the core consumer groups compared to other critics of producer interests is clear. They are the ones who carry the load on these issues. Among their probable allies, labor is most visible. Although environmental and government reform groups have come to be treated as the vanguard of the public interest movement and its main survivors against the conservative tide in Washington, that is not what is seen here. If one looks at the percentage of appearances, the health groups and the elderly are the most important sources of consumer interest testimony after that provided by labor. Finally, in comparing the percentages of total groups and the percentages of total appearances, it is clear that the core consumer organizations are the ones most likely to be spread thin in trying to cover all of the House hearings on consumer protection during these years.

The large share of participation claimed by state and local government officials on consumer protection issues before the federal government was not predicted by the literature on consumer policy or interest group activism in the Washington community. State and local government officials assume substantial shares of both the group and appearance totals. Where their considerable weight is thrown on consumer protection issues—as expert witnesses, as claimants for regulatory authority, or for other purposes—is a critical variable.

Findings and Further Questions

The research discussed here leads to several conclusions about the continuing policy agendas pursued by organized consumer interests and other critics of producers in America. Beyond that, questions are raised about the traditional contours of consumer policy and further research is suggested into the role that Congress may play as a countervailing influence to producer interests.

The congressional hearing activity examined here highlights the key role played by the Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, and the family of Nader organizations we have termed Ralph Nader, Inc. All have remained active before Congress throughout the period under study here. That their activism peaked in the mid-1970s is consistent with evidence of a reaction against government in the Carter years.[18] The principal consumer groups responded by digging in and demonstrating considerable staying power since then. That all three have continued to be significant participants on consumer protection issues before the U.S. Congress is evidence that consumer policy has become institutionalized on the margins of the national agenda, rather than disappearing from the agenda.

Organized consumer interests have become more active on the House than the Senate side of Capitol Hill in the past decade. This shift of attention is consistent

[18] Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, *The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind*, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 13–29.

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with evidence from the literature on congressional decision making, which points to House subcommittees catching up with their Senate counterparts as attractive forums for policy activists by the late 1970s. The trend was reinforced when Senate leadership changed hands with the arrival of a Republican majority in 1981.

Activities of the core consumer groups are supplemented by a second category of more specialized consumer groups that also take their cases to Congress on a regular basis. They include groups such as the Consumer Energy Council of America, Bankcard Holders of America, and the National Insurance Consumer Organization. Each of these focuses on the cost, availability, safety, or efficacy of goods or services from a specific industry or economic sector.

These two types of consumer organizations carry most of the load on consumer protection issues, but they have allies as well. Organizations for senior citizens, particularly the AARP, and labor, including the AFL-CIO as well as individual unions, argue the case for their members as consumers. It is reasonable during periods of inflation and recession when their members' buying power is threatened that consumer issues would be important for organizations claiming to speak for low and moderate-income segments of society. By contrast, the roles of environmental groups and government reform groups were much smaller than the literature would lead one to hypothesize.

This study also suggests that more attention be devoted to the complex role of organizations active on health issues. A health block was identified as participating in consumer protection policy before Congress. However, deciding who speaks for producers and who for consumers in this field is a complicated task. Whether organizations fighting heart disease, cancer, and the like should be considered as representing the interests of consumers of health care is an open question.

Representatives of state and local government officials played a more prominent role than we had expected. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the National Association of Attorneys General, and others appear frequently before Congress on consumer protection issues. More research could profitably be directed toward understanding the roles of these and other state government regulatory officials on consumer issues.

Although consumer activists have survived on the national scene, they continue to face a daunting array of producer representatives. From the bankers to the undertakers, the producer voices outnumbered consumers by wide margins. However, this is not to imply that producers always form a unified opposition to consumer interests. Further research needs to be directed toward understanding the complexity of producer interests and the conditions under which producers ally with as well as compete with some consumers.

This research also suggests new questions about why subcommittees hold hearings on consumer policy issues and what the interest groups who attend hope to gain from their participation. There is surprisingly little on these subjects in either the interest group or Congress literature. We see committee hearings as a window on Congress's role in the policy process and plan to explore the varying stakes that participants have in them.

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Consumer protection policy can also be a useful vantage point from which to assess business power. The results of this research suggest that greater attention be given to the role of Congress in theories of interest group power. We hypothesize that consumer advocates have concentrated their energies on Congress (and the House in particular) in response to the strong alliance that developed between the president, executive branch officials, and producers during the past decade, a period when regulatory relief has been the watchword in Washington. Such a strategy would be in keeping with the operation of what Andrew McFarland has called "countervailing power."[19]

Finally, it is important to call attention to the wide-ranging nature of the subjects included in the consumer protection hearings. Among these issues are many of the major domestic policy issues that have been before Congress during the past decade, such as air transportation deregulation, government ethics and reform, financial services regulation, taxation, and trade policy. They shared the agenda with concerns about particular products or services (for example, food additives, tire safety, variable rate mortgages, etc.) that reflect the image consumer policy has had in the past. How these new issues relate to traditional definitions of consumer policy and what this activity says about consumers' stake in complex public policy issues is a topic we intend to take up in future research.*

APPENDIX

In comparing the two ways of estimating consumer group presence (appearances of Nader, Inc., Consumer Federation of America, and Consumers Union and appearances at hearing indexed as consumer protection) we noted a curious discrepancy in the number of hearing appearances. University reference librarians and other information specialists with whom we consulted attested to the high quality of the CIS data base, and we generally agree. However, we decided to explore further. We focused on just one year, the 1986 CIS Index, to compare the two approaches in more detail. In the 1986 CIS Index, the peak groups made a total of 72 appearances while consumer protection was cited as an issue in 33 hearings. Cross-checking hearing titles reveals that only 10 of the hearings indexed as consumer protection feature testimony by one or more of the peak groups. This indicates that none of the peak groups appears at most (23 of 33) of the consumer protection hearings. However, if one is willing to credit what the groups think is important to the topic of consumer protection—a sort of additive definition—this also means that there were an additional 62 hearings (at which one of the peak groups appeared but which were not indexed under the consumer protection descriptor) which may be regarded as part of the topic. It is also notable that the groups tend not to appear at the same hearings, either because they are

[19] McFarland, "Interest Groups and Theories of Power," 141–146.

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spread so thin or because they specialize with different issues. Of the 72 group appearances, only 8 feature more than one group at the same hearing.

It is our sense that the consumer protection descriptor catches the core of the subject. However, including the additional hearings at which the peak organizations testify along with the consumer protection descriptor may capture a wider sense of the consumer agenda.

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Diplomatic History— State Department Style

WILBUR EDEL

Government censorship of the press during the conflict with Iraq, severe even by wartime standards, makes one wonder how the history of U.S.–Iraqi relations will be portrayed by official Washington when that record is published twenty-five or thirty years from now. If reports issued during the 1980s are any guide, the American public will have to look to sources other than the White House or Departments of State and Defense for an accurate account of the diplomatic and military applications of foreign policy during the Reagan and Bush administrations.

The normal tendency of the military to suppress information bearing upon foreign relations is understandable, if not always excusable. More serious is the equally deliberate practice of the State Department in selecting and publishing records of diplomatic history that in some crisis situations grossly misrepresent the government's aims and actions. Examples of such misrepresentation are found in volumes of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*), issued from 1984 to 1989, which purport to chronicle U.S. relations with Iran and Guatemala during the years 1952–1954. This was the period in which the CIA organized and directed revolts that brought down the governments of those two countries.

Not every record can be or need be included in the *Foreign Relations* series. But if the papers that are selected are to provide the public with an accurate picture of U.S. dealings with other nations, they must include all documents that

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are both relevant and significant. When key documents are excluded, the picture becomes distorted and the histories based upon those collections turn out to be at best incomplete and at worst false or misleading.

Official Guidelines

Prior to 1928 no hard and fast rules governed decisions as to what should be included in or excluded from the *Foreign Relations* series. In that year Secretary of State Frank B. Kellog issued a set of ground rules that have since been quoted in every volume of *FRUS*. To insure objectivity in the selection and presentation of material, editors of those publications are enjoined to follow these instructions:

> There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:
> a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
> b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
> c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
> d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
> e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in dispatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

As exceptions "a" to "e" clearly indicate, *FRUS* editors are given considerable latitude in deciding what to omit. Further, as each volume's introduction points out, all documents selected for publication must be submitted to the department's Classification/Declassification Center for clearance. Assuming those in the center decide that a document may safely be declassified, it must still be cleared by "geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as other appropriate agencies of government." The standard explanation of policy goes on to say: "The center, in coordination with the geographic bureaus . . . conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes."

With this number of clearances, each offering another opportunity for someone to object to publication because of an undesirable impact on "current diplomatic negotiations or other business," or the possibility of giving "needless offense," or of destroying the confidence of individuals and foreign governments affected by the documents, it is clear that the published record will never be

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complete. It is equally certain that matters kept under cover are likely to be at least as important as those that are revealed.

Much depends on the attitude of each presidential administration toward public exposure. The greater the tendency toward secrecy, the less the public is likely to learn, even of events that occurred a decade or more before a particular administration came to power. Not only will less information be forthcoming from a secrecy-prone administration, there will be a longer time lapse before *any* information is made public.

The Kellog guidelines were issued at a time when fifteen years was considered a reasonable period for maintaining the confidential nature of diplomatic relations. Thus, the first volume of the 1920 series came out in 1935, and volume 1 for 1929 was issued fourteen years later in 1943. The special importance of decisions taken at the 1945 Yalta Conference between President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Marshal Joseph Stalin, and the criticism leveled at those decisions during the cold war with Stalinist Russia, prompted the State Department to publish the record of that meeting only ten years after it was held. And when it appeared that the communist armies of Mao Zedong would overwhelm those of Chiang Kai-shek, the department reacted to critics of its China policy by issuing in August 1949 a 1,054-page history of *United States Relations with China*, which carried the story down to March of that very same year.

Impact of the Cold War

Thanks in part to the cold war, the more recent tendency in Washington has been to delay for longer and longer periods the release of post-World War II records. This country's more active participation in world affairs and the complications involved in seeking the cooperation of an increasing number of government agencies also add to the time required to complete each project. The interval widened first to twenty years, then twenty-five. With the publication of the 1952–1954 Korean War volumes during the Reagan administration, the lag grew to thirty years. Succeeding volumes report events that had occurred as much as thirty-four years earlier. The thirty-year-plus lag continued throughout Ronald Reagan's tenure and into that of President George Bush, whose State Department records of the 1956 Suez crisis were released in 1990, thirty-four years after the fact.

Delays in reporting are merely frustrating to historians and others with a particular interest in affairs of state. A more important result is an uninformed public. But even delayed publication is not nearly as damaging to the public's understanding of its government's actions as the omission of information that is vital to an accurate accounting of the conduct of foreign affairs. In this respect *Foreign Relations* volumes published in the last ten years show serious distortions of diplomatic history. Most disturbing is the obvious departure from the spirit

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of Kellog's guidelines. This can be traced to a succession of presidential orders aimed not only at widening the surveillance powers of investigative agencies, but tightening restrictions on the release of information to the public. The first step in this direction came from the issuance of Executive Order 12333 shortly before the end of President Reagan's first year in office. Avoiding any reference to the National Security Act of 1947, which declares unequivocally that the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal-security function," the president authorized the CIA to "conduct counterintelligence activities within the United States in coordination with the FBI" and to "conduct special activities approved by the President" plus "services of common concern for the Intelligence Community as directed by the National Security Council."[1] All of these operations were expected to be conducted in complete secrecy.

Executive Order 12356 followed a few months later, altering the system of classifying government information in such a way as to permit more than 7,000 federal officials to use their classifying authority to prevent access to *any* information that any one of them might decide is "related to national security" and could "reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security" if disclosed.[2] This order, which like EO 12333 is still in effect, also permits reclassification of information that either has been declassified or is publicly available without classification. Its obvious purpose is to permit agencies to evade their responsibility to satisfy legitimate requests submitted under the Freedom of Information Act. To insure complete agency protection, the order includes a clause that states, "an agency shall [not "may"] refuse to confirm or deny the existence or nonexistence of requested information whenever the fact of its existence or nonexistence is itself classifiable." Further, if in the mind of the classifier there is any doubt about the level of secrecy a document should carry—or even if it should be classified at all—the Reagan order requires that the decision be in favor of greater restriction, rather than less. This reversed the Carter administration approach, which was to favor a lower classification or none at all where doubt existed as to the need for secrecy.

Both the design and issuance of executive Order 12356 were accomplished as quietly as possible. Although the order was published in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 5 April 1982, President Reagan's accompanying statement that the order was the product of "a coordinated effort involving officials of the executive branch, members of Congress, and representatives of concerned private organizations"[3] was flatly false. As a House committee investigation later revealed, the order evolved in this fashion:

- Revision of President Jimmy Carter's Executive Order 12065 began in February 1981, a month after Reagan assumed office.

[1] *Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1981* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1982), 1128–29.

[2] Ibid., *1982*, 411–20.

[3] Ibid., 421.

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• An intelligence community task force under the direction of the CIA was assembled to write a new order. Successive drafts prepared by this group never circulated outside White House security offices. And unlike the Carter order, proposed revisions were never announced to the public.

• When a near-final draft was sent to a few congressional committee chairmen on 4 February 1982, it was accompanied by a routine slip that read: "The materials are being provided with the understanding that access to them will be limited to committee members and necessary staff personnel."

• Congressional hearings were scheduled for 10 and 11 March, and National Security Adviser William Clark and Attorney General William French Smith were invited to appear or to send representatives to explain the new directive. Both declined the invitation; Clark's assistant wrote that the revised order had been provided to selected congressional committees "on the explicit understanding that Administration witnesses would not appear at hearings while the internal deliberative process was underway." Not only was this false—no such message had ever been sent to the committee—administration witnesses never did appear even after the order was put into final form.

• On March 11, a letter was sent to Reagan requesting that he designate a spokesperson to appear before the committee prior to the issuance of the final order. A month later—and *two weeks after the president had signed Executive Order 12356*—an assistant to the president wrote the committee chairman assuring him that his letter had been "brought to the president's immediate attention" and that the national security staff would provide the committee with "a full response." In its report on this subject, the committee noted that "No response from the national security staff was ever received."[4]

The final phase of Reagan's retreat behind a curtain of secrecy came with the distribution by Attorney General William French Smith of a memorandum to all federal agencies explaining the purpose of a new "Presidential Directive on Safeguarding National security." Known as National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 84, the order advised agency heads that no employee or ex-employee of the executive branch could *ever* reveal anything he or she had learned while in federal service if it was "related to national security" as determined by any of more than 7,000 people having authority to classify government information. The rule is enforced by a lifetime nondisclosure agreement that every federal employee with access to classified material is required to sign.[5]

The idea that every speech, article, memoir, history, novel, or play written by a one-time federal employee has to be submitted to his or her agency for clearance before publication was so shocking that it raised a storm of protest nationwide.

[4] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, *Security Classification Policy and Executive Order 12356*, 12 August 1982, 20–21.

[5] U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Affairs, *National Security Decision Directive 84*, 13 September 1983, 85–90, 123–25.

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Media representatives who had failed to question the White House when Executive Order 12333 was issued and who began to protest only after Executive Order 12356 appeared were thoroughly aroused by NSDD 84.

In an effort to dispel the furor, the White House let it be known that it would suspend implementation of the directive pending a review of the problem. This informal reassurance was accepted at face value, and as late as a year after the March 1983 issuance of NSDD 84 such presumably well informed individuals as columnist William Safire and the dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School were referring to the directive as having been "temporarily withdrawn."[6] Neither they nor any other professional observer of White House affairs has since shown any awareness of a 1984 letter sent by the National Security Council to all agency heads reminding them that except for the explosive lie-detector provision, all other elements of NSDD 84 were still in effect—as they are to this day.[7]

Secrecy Abetted By Mendacity

The effect of Reaganesque restrictions on the release of information can be observed not only in the long delay in publication of *FRUS* volumes mentioned earlier. The editing out of material that would reveal activities of questionable legality or morality, while including messages deliberately designed to convey a false impression, is far more significant than foot dragging. Together, these devious devices lead to an uninformed and misinformed public.

The practice of withholding or falsifying records is not a new one, and it is by no means limited to the State Department. Many of the scandals brewed in Washington have revealed the secret machinations of officials in a variety of federal offices, including War, Navy, and Treasury Departments in the excessively corrupt Ulysses S. Grant administration, the Department of the Interior under President Warren Harding, the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Housing and Urban Development in the Reagan era. Nor did politically motivated editing begin with Reagan's State Department. Many of that agency's records were withheld from public reports of the 1930s and 1940s. And when the first volume on the Korean War came out in 1976, it contained no evidence that, as one independent historian pointed out, General Douglas MacArthur put little stock in the notion that North Korean troops would cross the 38th parallel, and that the Pacific commander "exuded an aura of nonconcern" even after learning that the invasion had begun. Nevertheless, these early records of U.S. relations with Korea, like those dealing with Indochina, provided a fair and comprehensive account of State Department policy. This is also true of the report of the 1954 Geneva Conference, which covered negotiations for the settlement of both the Korean and Indochina conflicts.[8]

[6] *New York Times*, 9 March and 28 December 1984.

[7] "The Secret Life of NSDD 84," *Columbia Journalism Review* (July/August 1984): 22.

[8] U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950* [hereafter *FRUS*] (Wash-

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Serious distortions are found in volumes released between 1981 and 1989. Prime examples of diplomatic history misrepresented by deliberate omission of critically important documents are *Foreign Relations* accounts of the 1953 overthrow of the Mohammad Mossadegh government in Iran and the 1954 toppling of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala. Both were organized, financed, and directed by the CIA with the full knowledge and approval of the secretary of state and the president of the United States. Both were carried on as part of America's cold war strategy, ostensibly to prevent expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East and Central America, but in the face of evidence that the governments undermined by the CIA were profoundly nationalist in origin and purpose and had no intention of becoming Soviet satellites.

A Case in Point: Countercoup in Iran

The first 700-odd pages of the *FRUS* volume purporting to detail U.S. relations with Iran from 1952 to 1954 deal almost exclusively with the dispute between Great Britain and Iran over the action of the Iranian parliament in nationalizing the oil industry. For more than forty years that industry had been dominated by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a private corporation, 52 percent of whose stock was owned by the British government. The United States had been a consistent supporter of the British and had worked closely with London's Foreign Office to devise proposals for a settlement of the dispute. When Iran rejected a 1952 suggestion that the International Court of Justice be asked to determine the compensation to be given the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for nationalization of its property, the United States drafted a compromise solution that in turn was rejected by Great Britain.[9]

By March 1953, messages between the State Department and U.S. Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson had begun to show increasing concern about the power struggle in which the adamantly nationalist Prime Minister Mossadegh was pitted against pro-western Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Henderson reported many conversations with Mossadegh, most of them following a pattern in which the prime minister would request either aid or advice from the United States, and the ambassador would reply that he could give neither. Henderson's sole suggestion was that the "only way for Iran to extricate itself economically and financially would be for it to come to agreement with the United Kingdom re oil."[10]

While attempting to convince Mossadegh of the necessity of accepting British terms for settlement of the oil dispute, Henderson kept in touch with the shah through what he called "confidential channels," provided principally by Minister of Court Hosein Ala. Pretending a neutral position in the contest between the

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ington, DC: GPO, 1976), vol. vii; Joseph C. Goulden, *Korea: The Untold Story of the War* (New York: Times Books, 1982), 52–53; *FRUS*, 1952–1954, vol. xvi.

[9] *FRUS*, 1952–1954, vol. x, 458–60, 488–91.

[10] Ibid., 721–22.

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shah and his prime minister, Henderson told Ala that "the U.S. Government could not be associated with [a] *coup d'etat*. If patriotic Iranians should consider [a] *coup* necessary in order [to] save Iran, they should act on their own responsibility and not expect any foreign power to become involved in such [a] venture."[11] The likelihood that this was an honest opinion by an informed officer of the State Department can be ruled out. For Henderson was one of only eight people who on 25 June attended a Washington meeting at which the joint British-American plan to overthrow Mossadegh was discussed and approved by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.[12]

Just when the CIA entered the picture has never been revealed officially. What is certain is that the British, after failing to cow Mossadegh by their worldwide boycott of Iranian oil, sought the aid of the CIA in a scheme to topple "Old Mossey's" government. Kermit Roosevelt, the American agent who directed the CIA coup, and who later turned out a dime-novel story of his Iranian adventures, wrote in that account: "When I was on my way home from Teheran in November 1952, British Intelligence approached me as I stopped in London. . . . What they had in mind was nothing less than the overthrow of Mossadegh." This must have been subsequent to Dwight D. Eisenhower's election to the presidency, as Roosevelt's initial reaction to the British plan was that it had "no chance to win approval from the outgoing administration of Truman and Acheson," but that "the new Republicans, however, might be quite different."[13]

That the British did not appreciate Roosevelt's revelation of their part in Mossadegh's overthrow is evident from the CIA's second thoughts about the clearance it had given publication of Roosevelt's *Countercoup* in 1978. According to one source, the first edition was withdrawn and revised for publication the following year "after pressure by British Petroleum," successor to the Anglo-American Oil Company.[14]

Roosevelt's assumption that the incoming Republican administration would be more inclined to consider the British proposal proved accurate. The first page of Eisenhower's memoirs is devoted to a listing of the threatening conditions he faced upon entering the White House. Of the eight international problems mentioned, seven were concerned with communism. Two of the seven he saw in these terms: "Iran seemed to be almost ready to fall into Communist hands," and "Communism was striving to establish its first beachhead in the Americas by gaining control in Guatemala."[15] His later description of the Iranian situation

[11] Ibid., 719–21.

[12] Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 1, 7.

[13] Ibid., 107.

[14] Leonard Bushkoff, "Intelligence Memoirs and Scandalous Occasions," *Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene* 3 (October 1984): 6–7. See also Stephen E. Ambrose, *Ike's Spies* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), n. 334.

[15] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 3.

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continues the theme of a communist threat and attributes the country's problems entirely to Mossadegh and "his refusal to work out an agreement with the British."[16] There is not a word about the British-American plot to have the shah remove Mossadegh from office and appoint General Fazlollah Zahedi prime minister. Nor is there any mention of the fact that Eisenhower approved this plan—code named Ajax—on 8 August 1953.[17] Instead, Eisenhower wrote, "suddenly and dramatically, the opposition to Mossadegh and the communists—by those loyal to the Shah—began to work." In a single paragraph he capsuled the course of Mossadegh's downfall, noting only in passing that "[t]hroughout this crisis the United States had done everything it possibly could to back up the Shah."[18]

In similar fashion, the State Department's public record of the upheaval makes no reference to the CIA-staged coup. Between 16 June and 13 July 1953, when Roosevelt was working out the details of his plan and presenting it to a select group of Eisenhower's advisers, which included Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, there is not a single entry in the Iranian volume of *FRUS*.[19] The records of July and August that are included give not the slightest clue to the character of what Eisenhower referred to as "everything possible" in support of the shah. For the first ten days in August, during which Roosevelt had two clandestine meetings with the shah and was otherwise busy buying up supporters of the revolt, not a single message of any kind appears in *FRUS*.[20]

More misleading than omissions are messages that were written in such a way as to suggest complete ignorance of the plot by persons who knew very well what was occurring and why. Most notable in this respect are the reports filed by Ambassador Henderson, who had been present at Kermit Roosevelt's presentation of the plan on 25 June. Henderson was purposely sent to Switzerland while the plot was unfolding but returned to Teheran 17 August, two days before the final blow was struck, and was immediately brought up to date by Roosevelt.[21] The following day, after meeting with Mossadegh, the ambassador wired a lengthy cable to Washington in which he repeated the conversation he had had with Mossadegh, pretending to the prime minister that he knew nothing of the riotous events of the previous week. This report appears in the published record, as does Henderson's message of 20 August in which he described the final overthrow of Mossadegh as a "victory which was achieved with a high degree of spontaneity." The movement to restore the shah to the throne, he said in the abbreviated reporting fashion that omits "a"s and "the"s, "began in small way in bazaar area but initial small flame found amazingly large amount combustible material and was soon roaring blaze which during course of day swept through

[16] Ibid., 162.
[17] Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 112.
[18] Eisenhower, *Mandate,* 164.
[19] *FRUS*, 1952–1954, vol. x, 733–34.
[20] Ibid., 740–41.
[21] Roosevelt, *Countercoup,* 182–85.

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entire city." He continued this falsification of history in a 21 August cable which began: "Unfortunately impression becoming rather widespread that in some way or other this Embassy or at least U.S. Government has contributed with funds and technical assistance to overthrow Mossadegh and establish Zahedi Government." Crediting Iranian communist newspapers and Soviet radio broadcasts with fostering this impression, Henderson assured Washington that he was doing his utmost "discretely to remove this impression" because

> (a) it is not in U.S. interest over long run to be given credit for internal political developments in Iran even if those developments might be to Iran's advantage;
> (b) Zahedi's Government will be somewhat handicapped if impression continues that it [is a] creature [of] foreigners;
> (c) Zahedi's Government like all governments of Iran eventually will become unpopular and at that time U.S. might be blamed for its existence.

Henderson advised against issuing a formal denial of U.S. complicity and suggested that State Department spokesmen look for a "suitable occasion [to] stress in factual way spontaneity of movement in Iran in favor of new Government." Both government and "private American news dissemination channels" should be used, he said, to promote the idea that "victory of Shah was result will of Iranian people."[22]

Incredible as it may seem, this version of the 1953 revolt was published by the State Department in 1989, *ten years after* the entire story of the department-sponsored and CIA-conducted coup had been revealed in a book by Kermit Roosevelt. The effectiveness of the State Department's effort to keep the whole affair under wraps is seen even in a privately researched "documentary history" of Iranian–American relations. In a volume that carries the story down to 26 April 1980, the only reference to the critical events of July–August 1953 was a single-sentence excerpt from a 28 July press conference in which Secretary of State Dulles deplored the "growing activities of the illegal Communist party in Iran." This, despite the fact that CIA sponsorship of the revolt was first exposed in a 1964 book by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, was referred to as one of the CIA's most spectacular successes in a 1976 report of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and was confirmed in great detail by Kim Roosevelt in 1979.[23]

Case 2: The CIA in Guatemala

A similarly distorted record was compiled by the State Department in its selection of documents covering the sequence of events leading to the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala. Like Mossadegh, Arbenz had been chosen chief executive in accordance with his country's constitutional procedure.

[22] *FRUS,* 1952–1954, vol. x, 748–56, 759–60.

[23] Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes, eds., *The United States and Iran: A Documentary History* (Frederick, MD: Aletheia Books, 1980), chap. 4; David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York: Bantam Books, 1964), 116–20; Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-

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And like his Iranian counterpart, he reflected the strong nationalist sentiment of the majority of his country's citizens. But as with Iran, the perceived threat to the United States was a communist takeover.

President Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that Guatemala was "the first of these [Latin American] problems" that were waiting for him when he took office in January 1953. When Arbenz came to power in 1950, Ike said, "his actions soon created the strong impression that he was merely a puppet manipulated by Communists."[24] National security reports found in the 1951 and 1952–1954 volumes of *FRUS* warned of communist influence in Guatemala but did not suggest that Arbenz was a mere puppet of the local communists. A September 1951 CIA analysis said simply, "only in Argentina and Guatemala are there pronounced anti-U.S. attitudes in high official circles." The sources of this antagonism were not mentioned, but the report pointed to "the persistence of isolationist sentiment and unwillingness to make sacrifices in the East-West conflict, which to many Latin-Americans appears primarily as a struggle between the U.S. and U.S.S.R." A month later the National Security Council warned against unidentified "extremist tendencies" in countries from the Philippines in the Far East to Guatemala in Central America, mentioning Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia along the way.[25]

Early in 1952 the State Department renewed the technical cooperation programs already in existence in Guatemala. But when that country requested road-building equipment to improve its transporation system, a State Department official advised representatives of the U.S. Commerce Department, National Production Authority, and Bureau of Public Roads that "our objective should be to see to it that Guatemala obtained as little of this equipment as possible." He went on in this fashion:

> We should receive them with the utmost courtesy and conduct ourselves in such a way as to give the impression that we were trying to be as helpful as possible. We should stress and restress the tight supply situation as the basis for inability to issue licenses or provide priority assistance. At no time during conversations should reference be made to the political situation in Guatemala or to United States-Guatemala relations. If the Guatemalans suspect or conclude among themselves that we are not being fully cooperative, we will have succeeded entirely in our purpose. However, we should never by our actions give them proof that we are not being cooperative.[26]

The "political situation" referred to was outlined in a National Intelligence Estimate of 11 March 1952. Reverting to the revolution of 1944, this paper observed:

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mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report: Foreign and Military Intelligence* (Washington, DC: GPO, 26 April 1976), bk. I, 111.

[24] Eisenhower, *Mandate,* 421.

[25] *FRUS,* 1951, vol. 1, 207, 946.

[26] Ibid., 1952–1954, vol. iv, 1027–30.

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> That Revolution was something more than a routine military coup. From it there has developed a strong national movement to free Guatemala from the military dictatorship, social backwardness, and "economic colonialism" which had been the pattern of the past. These aspirations command the emotional loyalty of most politically conscious Guatemalans, and the administration of President Arbenz derives corresponding strength from its claim to leadership of the continuing national revolution.

Calling Arbenz "an opportunist" who had made "commitments of mutual support with Guatemalan communists," the report said that the country's communists exercised "a political influence far out of proportion to their small numerical strength." Their numbers were subsequently described as "no more than 500 members, of whom perhaps one-third are militants." The report continued with an analysis of "[t]he United Fruit Company Crisis," which must have warmed the hearts of United Fruit's public relations staff.[27]

The relevance of United Fruit operations to Guatemala's political situation went unmentioned in a 1953 world-wide National Intelligence Estimate, which capsuled Latin American problems in two paragraphs. The threat of communist influence over the government of Guatemala was paired with this warning: "Right or left extremism which poses potential threats to U.S. security interests will probably be strongest in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala and possibly Brazil."[28]

Other documents released by the State Department, all classified either Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, reported Argentina dictator Juan Peron as a foe of the common enemy, communism, while recording the complaint of his foreign minister about U.S. press treatment of the Peron government. His lament was that although the American press was "free" [unlike the government-controlled press in Argentina], "it was also true that Tito, a Communist dictator and Franco, a Fascist dictator, were receiving friendly treatment and that there was little or no adverse comment on the dictatorships of Somoza and Trujillo." This he interpreted to mean "that our press was amenable to friendly suggestions" from Washington.[29]

Elsewhere in the 1952–1954 volume on the American republics the trend in Latin America was described as "toward extremely nationalistic regimes based on demagogic appeals to sectors of new political importance—organized labor, white-collar workers, and the lower middle class." Correspondence relating to Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile focused alternately on the threat of communism and the strategic raw materials those countries could provide: tin from Bolivia, monazite from Brazil, and copper from Chile.[30]

Although most reports made the point that Latin American communists joined in promoting nationalist feelings, Eisenhower acknowledged in his memoirs that

[27] Ibid., 1031–37.
[28] Ibid., vol. ii, 561–62.
[29] Ibid., vol. iv, 433.
[30] Ibid., vol. ii, 886, 1029, 1143; v. iv, 542, 752.

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"resentments against the United States were sometimes nurtured by groups other than Communist cells." As an example he cited Guatemala's seizure of half of the 468,000 acres of land that United Fruit left uncultivated,[31] an action supported by the great majority of poverty-stricken Guatemalans who were dependent on the country's few great land owners for their subsistence. Complaining of what he called Guatemala's offer of "woefully inadequate compensation," Eisenhower neglected to mention that the amount offered was "the exact figure at which United Fruit valued its property for Guatemala tax records." Nor did he mention—if, indeed, he knew—that among the many U.S. officials who had a personal interest in the welfare of United Fruit were his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, his assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, John Cabot, his secretary of commerce, Sinclair Weeks, and his special assistant for national security affairs, General Robert Cutler.[32] In the eyes of those friends of United Fruit, a land reform program that was also supported by Guatemalan communists could not be tolerated, even if it would permit thousands of landless peasants to feed themselves by farming otherwise unused acreage.

In his account of the steps taken to control communist influence, the one action of overriding importance that Eisenhower omitted was the covert plan he had approved for the overthrow of Arbenz. As early as 1953 a very few top-level officials began a search for what Assistant Secretary Cabot referred to as "antibodies" that could be used to "repel an intrusion of the communist virus." Over a period of about twelve months the details were worked out by a White House–State Department–CIA team, and Eisenhower himself gave the CIA the order to set the scheme in motion shortly after that agency's successful coup in Iran.[33]

The State Department's version of U.S.–Guatemala relations during this period was published in 1983. It is as bare of the facts of intervention as Eisenhower's memoirs, even though a still-loyal member of the CIA team had exposed the plot in a book issued six years earlier, and a more detailed expose had appeared in 1982.[34]

Taking its cue from Eisenhower's memoirs, the State Department reported that the president's only part in the revolt against Arbenz was to authorize replacement of military aircraft lost by Castillo Armas, leader of the uprising. This statement followed a series of memoranda and reports in which repeated references were made to communist influence in the Arbenz government. One top secret policy paper prepared in August 1953 identified two of five U.S. objectives in Guatemala as:

> Reversal by the Guatemalan Government of its tolerant policy toward communist influence in the country and its present uncooperative attitude toward the United States.

[31] Eisenhower, *Mandate,* 421.

[32] Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 80–81, 124–25; Ambrose, *Eisenhower,* 192.

[33] Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala,* 132–34; Ambrose, *Eisenhower,* 193.

[34] David Atlee Phillips, *The Night Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977), chap. 2; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala.*

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> Prevention of the spread of Communist influence from Guatemala to other countries in the hemisphere.[35]

Arguing against both overt and covert intervention, the paper offered this warning: "Were it to become evident that the United States has tried a Czechoslovakia in reverse in Guatemala, the effects on our relations in this hemisphere, and probably in the world at large, could be disastrous as those produced by open intervention."[36]

The subsequent appointment of John E. Peurifoy as ambassador to Guatemala brought Eisenhower recommendations more to his liking. Convinced that "if President [Arbenz] is not a communist he will certainly do until one comes along," Peurifoy suggested what amounted to an economic boycott of Guatemala—except for United Fruit products which he said should go unmentioned. He acknowledged that the severity of his proposals might cause the Guatemalan government to "swing sharply to the left" and might conceivably "lead to considerable bloodshed." But the possibility of such "unpleasant consequences" should not deter the United States, he said, "since continuance of the present regime would also lead to most of them though at a slower pace and at the convenience of the communists."[37]

Peurifoy's remarks to the State Department and to a congressional committee clearly influenced Eisenhower far more than a 18 May 1954 memorandum from Louis J. Halle, a member of the department's Policy Planning Staff, warning against exaggerating the dangers of the Guatemalan situation and "making a case" in order to get effective action. Conceding that communists would exploit revolutionary impulses in Guatemala as they do everywhere, the memo pointed out that "[t]he international Communist movement is certainly not the cause of the social revolution in Guatemala." Rather, it said, "The revolution in Guatemala is nationalist and anti-Yanqui in its own right. It is, in its own right, a movement for 'social justice' and reform. If the international Communist movement had gained no foothold at all in Guatemala one might expect that the United Fruit Company, the Railways and the Electric Power Company of Guatemala City would still be the victims of persecution in Guatemala." His warning that the publicly expressed fear of Guatemala as a threat to the Panama Canal would present "the spectacle of the elephant shaking with alarm before the mouse" went unheeded.[38]

What triggered U.S. intervention was a report from a CIA agent in Europe that a shipment of arms, which the United States refused to supply the Arbenz government, was being provided by Czechoslovakia. Notwithstanding Halle's advice that these arms would not alter the situation in any material way, Eisenhower decided that "[s]omething had to be done quickly." His later description

[35] *FRUS,* 1952–1954, vol. iv, 1075.
[36] Ibid., 1083.
[37] Ibid., 1093–95.
[38] Ibid., 1139–49.

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of what was done spoke only of "cooperation" with Carlos Castillo Armas, a former colonel in the Guatemalan army who had assembled a revolutionary contingent in Honduras and with support from Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza had invaded Guatemala on 18 June 1954.[39]

Cooperation, according to Eisenhower, amounted only to supplying a modest amount of arms and a few planes. His memoirs give no hint of the meticulous planning that went into the CIA operation, including false radio broadcasts of invading columns and defeated government troops, rebel planes strafing streets and dropping bombs where they would be most likely to create panic.[40] Similarly, the State Department's published record of the critical period from arrival of the Czech arms shipment on 15 May to Arbenz's resignation on 27 June provides no information as to the part it and the CIA played in overturning the Arbenz government. It concentrates instead on U.S. efforts to have the Organization of American States take a stand against Guatemala on the grounds that its military build-up and communist orientation presented a threat to its neighbors. When Britain and France showed sympathy for Guatemala's complaint to the UN Security Council alleging aggression against it by Honduras and Nicaragua, Dulles instructed his ambassador to the UN to convey this thinly veiled threat to the British and French delegates: "if they take an independent line backing Guatemalan move in this matter, it would mean we would feel entirely free [to act] without regard to their position in relation to any such matters as any of their colonial problems in Egypt, Cyprus, etc."[41]

The closest this account comes to suggesting CIA involvement in Guatemalan affairs is found in a memo from Assistant Secretary of State Henry F. Holland to Dulles "vigorously" opposing a statement, drafted by CIA Director Allen Dulles for Eisenhower to use in a press conference. It asserted that Guatemala was on the road to becoming an out-and-out communist dictatorship, and the United States looked to loyal anticommunists to "clean their own house." Such a statement, Holland wrote, would indicate that "[o]n the one hand we would be avowing a laudable determination to forebear from all unilateral action and, on the other hand, through the President of the United States we would be indulging in the most direct unilateral political intervention." Heeding Holland's advice, Eisenhower avoided the house-cleaning suggestion at his next day's press conference. Asked about a report that the Guatemalan army had requested President Arbenz to get rid of communists in government, Eisenhower evaded the question and spoke only of the suspension of constitutional guarantees in Guatemala.[42]

If CIA involvement is totally ignored in *FRUS*, Ambassador Peurifoy's almost daily reports clearly show his personal participation in the attempt to influence Guatemalan military leaders to oust Arbenz and to put Washington's candidate

[39] Eisenhower, *Mandate,* 423–26.
[40] Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala,* chap. 6, 7.
[41] *FRUS,* 1952–1954, vol. iv, 1110–91; Dulles to Lodge, ibid., 1184.
[42] Ibid., 1168–69; *Public Papers to the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954,* 573.

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in his place. In Peurifoy's conversations with these officers he made a point of repeating that he was speaking for himself only, not for his government. Nevertheless, the opinions he expressed were those of President Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and CIA Director Allen Dulles.[43]

For a more complete and honest account of Peurifoy's machinations, Eisenhower's intentions, and the CIA-sponsored revolution, one must rely on sources other than the State Department. The most detailed study is Richard Immerman's *The CIA in Guatemala*, which provides not only a step-by-step chronology of the plan and execution of Arbenz's overthrow but an explanation of both the background and aftermath of the revolt. Less detailed but equally impressive are the narratives of historian Stephen Ambrose and former CIA agent David Atlee Phillips.

The insider's experience described by Phillips supplies the kind of evidence rarely if ever found in official documents: an acknowledgment that the CIA plan was "to begin with the big lie" that the propaganda radio broadcasts that actually would be beamed from one of Guatemala's neighbors were being aired by revolutionists within Guatemala. This was followed by a series of lesser lies in which the rebel army of what Phillips characterizes as "a hundred fifty ragtag recruits" was described on the clandestine radio as "an army of five thousand men." Battles between government and rebel troops along with government casualties were reported for battles that never occurred. This psychological warfare concluded with "a final big lie" that two columns of rebel troops were approaching the capital. As panic spread among the general population, defections among top military staff convinced Arbenz that he must resign. Thus, in a matter of weeks the CIA accomplished its purpose.[44]

Years later, Eisenhower and the State Department wrote their histories of the affair, each distorting the picture in the same way. Both pictured Ambassador Peurifoy as only a "mediator" and made no mention of CIA activities. Eisenhower concluded his account with a storybook ending. The new President Carlos Castillo Armas, he wrote, "proved to be far more than a mere rebel: he was a far-seeing and able statesman [who] enjoyed the devotion of his people." Eisenhower exulted in the belief that his "cooperation" with Armas had freed Latin America of "any fixed outposts of Communism."[45]

This roseate view contrasts sharply with that offered by Phillips, who reported that Armas "was a bad president, tolerating corruption throughout his government and kowtowing to the United Fruit Company more than to his own people." Although convinced that the United States had acted properly in ousting Arbenz, Phillips concluded his analysis with this discouraging postmortem:

> The United States could have prevented this with the vigorous exercise of diplomatic pressure on Castillo Armas to assure that he pursued social reform for the many rather

[43] *FRUS*, 1952–1954, vol. iv, 1180–1208.
[44] Phillips, *Night Watch*, chap. 2.
[45] Eisenhower, *Mandate*, 426-27.

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than venal satisfaction for a few. Instead, Washington breathed a collective sign of relief and turned to other international problems.[46]

A Fundamentally Repugnant Philosophy

Secrecy in the conduct of foreign relations has been traditional in all parts of the world under all kinds of governments. Growing acceptance of democratic principles, including belief in the importance of an informed electorate and a free press, has created demands for knowledge of government operations that make complete secrecy difficult to justify or maintain. Nevertheless, where national security is concerned, even democratic governments are reluctant to release information that might, as Secretary of State Kellog said in 1928, "impede current diplomatic negotiations" or impair relations with other nations. The military would also place restrictions on any information relating to the country's defense or war plans.

In the United States, substantial progress toward an open society was achieved with passage of the Freedom of Information Act. At the same time, one impact of the cold war was to make Washington ever more inclined to black out all information that could conceivably aid the other side in the East-West conflict. In that connection the Reagan administration stands out as one of the most secretive since World War II. But the philosophical basis for the excessive secrecy of the 1980s was established under Eisenhower. Reacting to a resolution that Senator Mike Mansfield introduced to establish a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the American Clandestine Service, Eisenhower appointed his own committee to look into the matter of covert activities. The top secret report submitted to the president by that committee in September 1954 offered this advice.

> As long as it [reliance on covert operations] remains national policy, another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization more effective, more unique, and if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplishment of this mission.
>
> It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, longstanding American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.[47]

[46] Phillips, *Night Watch,* 53.

[47] Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, *Final Report* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), bk. 1, 50. The complete introduction to the report submitted to President Eisenhower,

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The president's adoption of "this fundamentally repugnant philosophy" came to light more than twenty years later when the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities published its *Final Report* in 1976. It was never acknowledged or referred to by Eisenhower or any of his successors. Nevertheless, historian and biographer Stephen Ambrose declares that the quoted statement "was a concise summary of Ike's own views."[48]

When the State Department published the record of U.S. foreign relations from 1952 to 1954, a decade after the Senate report had appeared, it was as careful in avoiding mention of the philosophy behind the covert action programs as it was in omitting any reference to the way in which those programs had been carried out in Iran and Guatemala. The department's refusal to renounce the practice of falsifying diplomatic history led Warren I. Cohen, chairman of the department's Advisory Committee on Diplomatic Documentation, to resign in protest. Cohen's 15 February 1990 letter of resignation put the issue squarely: he had spent over a year negotiating an arrangement with the department that would avoid any repetition of the Iranian coverup, only to have the department renege on the agreement. Outraged at this betrayal, Cohen went public in a series of articles describing "The State Department Historygate" for readers of the *New York Times, Foreign Service Journal,* and *World Monitor*.[49] Calling the 1952–1954 volume on Iran "a fraud, a gross distortion of American activity there," he obtained the support of Senators David L. Boren and Claiborne Pell for legislation that would restore the policy outlined in former Secretary Kellog's guidelines. Approved by the Senate, the bill (S. 3225) still faces an uncertain future, not only in the House but at the hands of President Bush, a former director and firm supporter of the CIA who may not look with favor on any attempt to curtail that agency's prerogative of keeping its activities secret for an indefinite period.[50]

With or without remedial legislation, if the Department of State persists in coloring history to conceal evidence, thirty years from now historians will search in vain for "the whole truth" in the official record of the diplomatic policies and practices of Presidents Reagan and Bush.

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excerpted in the Senate *Final Report,* can be found in William M. Leary, ed., *The Central Intelligence Agency, History and Documents* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1984), 143–44.

[48] Ambrose, *Eisenhower,* 227.

[49] Warren Cohen's three articles were printed in the *Congressional Record* (daily), 19 October 1990, S16296–98.

[50] For the text of S3225, see ibid., S16299–301.

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Book Reviews

The Exemplary Presidency: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Political Tradition *by Philip Abbott. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1990. 233 pages. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $13.95.*

The American presidency is evidently an inexhaustible subject. An office that seems straightforward enough in constitutional design turns out in performance to be prolific in nuance, dimension, and complexity. Scholars now view the presidency from a variety of perspectives: institutional, constitutional, historical, psychological, power-wielding, decision-making, image-forming. Philip Abbott's book offers still another approach. His interest is in the personal tradition of the presidency and above all in the way presidents use previous presidents as exemplars.

The title refers to Franklin Roosevelt's as "the exemplary presidency" not in the sense that FDR should necessarily be the example for all presidents to imitate but rather in the sense that FDR used his predecessors (some of them) as examples and correspondingly supplied examples for his successors. The Roosevelt presidency, in other words, illustrates the way presidents draw on earlier presidents as leadership models to be exploited and often to be reinterpreted as sources for a deeper understanding of the political culture and even as sources for self-understanding.

FDR's presidency, Abbott argues, went through three phases. In the first (1933–1935) the exemplar was Thomas Jefferson. Here FDR combined Jefferson's appeal to national unity ("we are all Republicans, we are all Federalists") with a reinterpretation shifting emphasis from Jeffersonian means to Jeffersonian ends. Then came "the Jacksonian turn" (1935–1938) with its class appeals and FDR's truculent attack on "economic royalists" and entrenched wealth. Finally world war made Abraham Lincoln available as FDR's third exemplar (1939–1945). No presidential discourse save Lincoln's with its "exploration of symbols of redemption and unity" (p. 158) was adequate to a life-and-death crisis for the republic.

At times Abbott's approach seems unduly schematic as a reading of the Roosevelt presidency. Alexander Hamilton does acquire a cameo role as a minor exem-

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plar, but one might have expected larger parts for Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Nor is Abbott's early promise that he is studying the presidency "as a structure for the creation of political philosophy" (p. 7) really fulfilled. Nonetheless, *The Exemplary Presidency* is an interesting and valuable work, argued with subtlety and force. Its emphasis on the way presidents have placed themselves in the long and turbulent flow of experience in the White House gives a new sense of personal continuity and interactive reverberation within the American political tradition.

One wonders, however, to what extent the Abbott thesis still applies. Are contemporary presidents as sensitive to the examples of their predecessors as Abbott shows FDR to have been? Do they feel any sort of personal link to the ghosts of presidencies past? Indeed, do they know much presidential history at all? Do they care?

Abbott recalls FDR's 1941 dismissal of advocates of a negotiated peace with Hitler as "Vallandighams" (p. 179). How many of our presidents since Lyndon Johnson would have known who Clement L. Vallandigham was? How many could define "Copperhead," another FDR term of abuse? Richard Nixon, it is true, has written a book about leaders, but they turn out to be nearly all foreign contemporaries, not exemplars from American history.

FDR, Harry S. Truman, and John F. Kennedy knew a lot of American history if sometimes in rather random ways; Johnson too had an accumulation of political folklore. Perhaps the rising salience of foreign policy has weakened the grasp of more recent presidents on the American past. It may be that *The Exemplary Presidency* describes an aspect of the presidency that has deplorably vanished into history. Still it remains an original and rewarding essay.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
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The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman *by Warren F. Kimball. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991. 304 pp. $19.95.*

This collection of essays, the majority based on lectures delivered over the past five years, displays both the strengths and weaknesses of a traditional approach to the study of American foreign relations as practiced by one of its undoubted masters, Warren F. Kimball, professor of history at Rutgers University. The author of several excellent monographs, notably on Lend Lease and the Morgenthau Plan, as well as the editor of the superb collected correspondence of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, Kimball offers a thoughtful appraisal of FDR's wartime diplomacy with special attention paid to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the western hemisphere.

If there is not much to fault in Kimball's meticulous research or the sensible

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conclusions he draws, neither will this volume require us to revise existing estimates of Roosevelt's ideas and conduct during that titanic struggle. The large pieces of terrain covered by Kimball have been mapped extensively by others before him, notably Herbert Feis, James MacGregor Burns, Gaddis Smith, Robert Dalleck, Lloyd Gardner, John Gaddis, and Robert Divine. *The Juggler* adds highlights and shadings to an old, familiar portrait. It is a confirmatory work of scholarship, not a revelatory one.

Like most earlier studies of FDR's approach to world affairs, moreover, this one sustains its focus upon the thoughts and deeds of the powerful rather than upon lesser mortals, a perspective that remains the principal drawback to what is still sometimes referred to in the academy as diplomatic history. While other fields of historical inquiry experienced either a methodological or theoretical revolution in the past thirty years, the study of foreign relations remained firmly anchored in elite archival sources and narrative explanations. Even works that challenged reigning paradigms in the field such as William A. Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* or Gordon Levin's *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics* did so largely within these basic conventions.

The Juggler will not launch a major revisionist school with respect to Roosevelt's conduct of American foreign policy, but it will serve as a powerful statement of certain themes within his policy that have been too often slighted or not given sufficient emphasis by others, for instance: British imperialism, not Soviet expansion, remained the central preoccupation of FDR and other American leaders for a considerable length of time during the war, despite the so-called special relationship with England and Churchill's determined efforts to deflect Roosevelt's attention away from His Majesty's existing empire onto Joe Stalin's potential one.

Although his policies often fell short of his rhetoric, especially with respect to the French in Indochina, FDR was a tenacious opponent of traditional European colonialism, which he perceived as an untenable anachronism in a world of rising nationalism.

Roosevelt never lost hope in reaching a modus vivendi with the Soviets over Eastern Europe that would have avoided the fear and rancor of our post-1945 relationship. He was not naive about Soviet intentions. But neither was he the first cold warrior.

His vision of the postwar world resembled a cross between free trade imperialism and the Good Neighbor Policy writ large, a system of sophisticated great power relations that eschewed crude military intervention, but gave regional hegemony to "Four Policemen" (the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China) who operated within a framework of international accountability.

He believed the world to be moving slowly but inexorably toward the American model of both economic and political development, which would one day make the world safe by also making it thoroughly American.

If there are areas that one wishes Kimball had explored in somewhat greater depth, they concern Roosevelt's continued myopia with regard to one of the

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Four Policemen (China), his apparent indifference to British efforts that helped reestablish French colonialism in Southeast Asia, and his failure to grasp how Anglo-American secrecy surrounding the atomic bomb would ultimately poison relations with the Soviets.

MICHAEL E. PARRISH
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An American Life: The Autobiography *by Ronald Reagan. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1990. 248 pp. $24.95.*

Presidential memoirs typically produce self-serving pablum. Ronald Reagan's are no exception. Aside from compiling his likes and dislikes of other leaders, we learn little about the eight years of his administration other than what Reagan and his writers want us to know. Nor do we gain startlingly new insights about the person who occupied the presidency for the longest stretch of time since Dwight Eisenhower. That may be because Reagan was already an open book. So, his memoirs spin a very ordinary tale of a very ordinary man whose presidency by most standards was quite extraordinary.

The first section of the book deals with Reagan's life and development up to the start of his presidency, which began at an age when people usually think of retiring rather than taking on new responsibilities. The succeeding section covers Reagan's first year in the White House—a period that has powerfully affected the course of governance in Washington ever since. Major emphasis is given here to the former president's economic program. Reagan's economic policies also are covered in the following section that takes his administration through the recession that dominated 1982 and threatened the political viability of those policies. The subsequent three sections focus on foreign policy. Of these, we learn little more about Iran-contra than a reiteration of the standard line that run-away hired hands acted without the president's knowledge. We do learn, however, that despite the press releases then prevailing about the urgency of the U.S. troops' mission in Lebanon, President Reagan shares his own uncertainties about their mission. The final section dealing with the administration's relations with the Soviet leadership is perhaps the most useful, in part because it also is the best documented and in part because it also reveals Reagan's flair for simplistic moralisms, his persistence (or stubborness) in pursuing his goals, and his pragmatic flexibility in dealing with contending voices within his own administration.

Among recent U.S. presidents, Ronald Reagan is the least mysterious on the personal level. What he stood for and how he operated were not in the realm of state secrets. He was a president with simple, but ardently held goals. These deep convictions, however, reflect thinking that skims along the surface of first and often unshakeable impressions. By his own words, Reagan's antibureaucracy, antigovernment views formed early, dating from the first days of the New Deal

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when his father ran a local Work Projects Administration office in Illinois. The lesson learned in the former president's words is that "the first rule of a bureaucracy is to protect the bureaucracy" (p. 69).

Similarly, Reagan's faith in both unbridled capitalism and the moral superiority of the United States in international relations runs deep and is virtually untouched by doubt. Reagan apparently never met a market failure he recognized. Neither could he conceive of legitimate interests on the part of the Soviet state. Nor could he comprehend that conflicts in Central America were not a simple morality play between leftist thugs and "freedom fighters" as in Nicaragua or "democratically-elected" governments as in El Salvador. Ronald Reagan could not comprehend the subtleties of these issues because, even more than most who inhabit the presidency, he was a man of exceedingly limited range and curiosity.

Indeed, the combination of Reagan's faith in his goals and his limited curiosity led him to be perhaps the most extraordinary advocate of policy change we have seen in the White House. Reagan was not a president stymied by doubts about his objectives. He knew what he wanted. And his memoirs suggest that what he believed was quite radical. Government for Reagan was indeed the problem. And since in his view all institutions in Washington were designed to further government-based solutions, deinstitutionalizing government was vital to the pursuit of his policy agenda. Because the present institutions were organized around a belief in government programs and populated by believers in those programs, bringing in outsiders was essential to the Reagan strategy.

Like most Americans, Reagan is an informal man. His memoirs are dotted with personal impressions. Clearly, he is comfortable with people much like himself—the gregarious Helmut Kohl, for instance—and uncomfortable with people very much unlike himself. The didactic styles of Helmut Schmidt and Menachem Begin repelled Reagan, as did the perceived untrustworthiness of François Mitterand and Pierre Trudeau. Reagan's real soul mate, though, was his fellow ideologue, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Ronald Reagan's memoirs testify to the power of the democratic idea in America—that ordinary people such as Reagan can achieve extraordinary results. For better or worse, the consequences of the Reagan years in Washington are ones we will be living with for some time to come.

BERT A. ROCKMAN
The Brookings Institution

The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate *by Dan Caldwell. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1991. 234 pp. $32.95.*

As the author notes, arms control negotiations involve not only direct interaction between the parties—in this case the United States and the Soviet Union—but

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also between the United States and its allies, within the executive branch of the American government, and between the White House and the Congress. This book analyzes the SALT II Treaty ratification process in 1979, encompassing the latter two stands of interaction. It represents the most thorough study of its subject and is a useful contribution to the history of the SALT process and U.S.-Soviet relations. It is also a case study in executive handling—or, to be more accurate, a divided executive mishandling—of public and congressional relations.

The author analyzes the subject dispassionately, and his conclusions are objectively grounded. He faults President Jimmy Carter and his administration for a series of errors, some in negotiation with the Soviet Union, but even more in the management of SALT within the executive branch, in working with the Congress, and in overall handling of treaty ratification. While most of those flaws have been described earlier, this study documents them and presents the broad overall pattern. The author criticizes Carter for not choosing between the incompatible Soviet policies of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. He criticizes Brzezinski for undercutting the administration's position and undermining SALT II ratification prospects by pursuing his own hard-line policies. He criticizes Carter for belated selection of a team to manage the ratification process and for some of his choices for that effort, for not having either devised a strategy for pursuing SALT in relation to other policy goals or a strategy for ratification of the treaty. The prior successful but debilitating campaign for the Panama Canal treaties eroded support for SALT II.

Caldwell suggests that while the public had not supported the Panama Canal treaties, it did support SALT. Sentiment in the Senate, on the other hand, was more supportive of the Panama Canal treaties than of SALT II. Yet the Carter administration used the same ratification strategy of public appeal for both, rather than tailoring its approach to the difference.

The author correctly notes the fatal consequences for ratification of the delays in concluding the SALT II agreement. But he fails to point out some other important aspects of misplaced priorities. Brzezinski was pushing to normalize relations with China in late 1978 and doing so delayed SALT, but Caldwell doesn't mention that playing an anti-Soviet China card was a major obstacle impeding the negotiations with the Soviet Union. The author writes that the Soviets were angered by both the content and public presentation of the March 1977 comprehensive SALT proposal, but he doesn't say why. The United States not only upset an earlier understanding by taking an initial limited approach, but also attempted to unbalance the substance of previously balanced concessions—and did so publicly to put the Soviets on the spot.

On the whole, the discussion of the SALT II ratification debate is well considered and presented. It is a useful study of the interrelationship of domestic politics and arms control.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
The Brookings Institution

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Falling Friends: The United States and Regime Change Abroad *edited by Martin Staniland. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1991. 155 pp. Cloth, $38.00; paper, $10.95.*

This volume collects four case studies drawn from a project of The Pew Charitable Trust in collaboration with various universities, which seeks to foster the use of the case-method of teaching in courses on international relations. Thus the book's principal objective is pedagogical: to present fascinating material in a descriptive manner, eschewing interpretation, in order to induce instructor and students to think through the interpretation of the evidence on their own.

The four cases focus on U.S. responses to the collapse of political regimes governed by erstwhile U.S. allies in Third World countries. Chapter 2 focuses on the U.S. response to the fall of Cuba's Fulgencio Batista (1958–1959); the chapter is an edited version of a case study by Pamela Starr and Abraham Lowenthal. Chapter 3 looks at the U.S. response to the fall of Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza (1978–1979); the chapter is primarily based on a case prepared by Douglas A. Chalmers. Chapter 4 describes the U.S. response to the fall of the shah of Iran (1978–1979); it is primarily based on a case prepared by Gregory Treverton (with James Klocke), with additional material inserted by the editor from a case prepared by Andrew Steigman. Chapter 5 narrates the U.S. response to the fall of Ferdinand Marcos (1985–1986); it is primarily based on a case prepared by William E. Kline, with additional material inserted by the editor from a case prepared by Donald M. Goldstein. The subsections in each chapter are fairly standardized to enable the reader to compare the four cases.

Though editor and authors eschew interpretation (quite properly, given their purposes), the narration is organized in response to analytical concerns such as the asymmetry of power between the United States and its clients, the capacity of the client to lobby the U.S. government, bureaucratic politics and decision-making processes as they bear on each case, the patterns of domestic and international negotiations, and the significance for U.S. policy of events in Third World countries in the midst of turmoil.

At first blush, the cases can be categorized in simple fashion: the outcomes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Iran were adverse to U.S. interests, whereas the outcome in the Philippines was much more favorable. And yet the cases are much richer than that. A reader can infer that the principal explanation for the outcomes may be found in the character of each domestic opposition rather more than in the U.S. response. The outcome in the Philippines was more favorable to the United States, for example, because there was a moderate opposition committed to peaceful and democratic procedures that had ample political support; such was not the case to any comparable degree in the other three cases. Moreover, the quality of the U.S. government response may be somewhat unrelated to the outcome. There were important divisions in the U.S. government in each of the four cases. Interestingly, the role of the president of the United States was an obstacle to an outcome favorable to U.S. interests, especially in the case of the Philippines.

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Though the quality of U.S. intelligence bears some relationship to the outcome (best in the Philippines, worst in Iran), intelligence on Cuba was also acceptably good. The U.S. ambassador on the scene was clearly inept only in the case of Cuba (though the ambassador was quirky in the case of Iran). In brief, though a scholarly, analytical book remains to be written to compare these cases, this volume is certainly intriguing and valuable for classroom teaching purposes.

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ
Harvard University

The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st-Century Capitalism *by Robert B. Reich. New York, Knopf, 1991. 331 pp. $24.00.*

Many academics and policy makers have attempted to analyze critically the current political and economic position of the United States, but few have provided the kind of insightful global perspective that Robert Reich provides in this book. He brings together in a readable way a vast amount of information about changes in our corporate institutions, arguing that it is time for Americans to abandon "vestigial" assumptions about them if we are to remain an integral part of the international economic system.

It makes little sense to adhere to a narrow economic nationalism, Reich argues, particularly the sort that instills in Americans a passionate defense of U.S. corporations along with cynicism about and hatred of all things foreign. Given the structural changes that have taken place over the last twenty years, economic nationalism is shortsighted and ignores a fundamental reality: what we think of as American corporations are in fact international corporations with management, production, and financing organized on a worldwide basis. New production and communication technologies, new information systems remove geographical constraints and have led to a transformation from localized (that is, national), core, pyramid-shaped firms to decentered webs of economic activity with extranational, fluid boundaries. Thus, he argues, we are witnessing the globalization of corporate entities.

For Reich, these changes are cause for celebration rather than occasion for fear about foreign competition and involvement in U.S. economic activities. They present tremendous opportunities for Americans to develop the resources and assets that will attract new information-based economic activities. Specifically, the new economy values and seeks a workforce with more abstract skills such as problem identification, problem solving, and strategic brokering.

For Reich, countries whose citizens can best exercise these skills, used in the work of "symbolic analysts"—a variety of consultants, engineers, lawyers, scientists, and researchers in diverse industries—will be well positioned to guarantee the economic prosperity of their populace. Nations that are aware of the mobility

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and importance of symbolic analytic work and that prepare their workers to perform it can attract any number of corporate activities. American society or any that wants to play a key role in the twenty-first century must develop an internationally inclusive perspective and commit itself to cultivating these skills in its workforce, not emphasize outmoded practices such as protectionism or encourage a misguided patriotism.

Reich remains optimistic about the future, especially about the will and the abililty of the United States to learn about the complexity and requirements of the current economic order and to allocate its resources accordingly. Yet he also cautions about the difficulties of forging this common national agenda, which would improve the standard of living for all. As Reich points out, the institutional changes of the 1970s and 1980s improved the life styles of a minority of Americans (the current symbolic analysts) but worsened those of the majority—those blue collar and local service workers stuck with undesirable jobs that American employers couldn't export. Indeed, according to Reich, the prosperous symbolic analysts have seceded politically, spatially, and professionally from their less fortunate fellow citizens.

For Reich, secession, whether real or symbolic, is problematic because it undercuts the rise of a collective spirit of cosmopolitanism that, if shared across classes, could guide the United States toward policies that would benefit all. He leaves open the question of how exactly Americans will forge the new cosmopolitan outlook, but for the time being he has done an admirable job of demonstrating the possibilities opened up by our changing industrial structure.

VICKI SMITH
University of Pennsylvania

The Next Century *by David Halberstam. New York, William Morrow, 1991. 126 pp. $16.95*

David Halberstam, the author of big books on such diverse topics as the Vietnam war, the power of the media, and the decline of the American automobile industry, has written a very brief book reflecting on the position of the United States at the end of the cold war. Writing in response to the dramatic events in the fall of 1989 that culminated in the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, Halberstam concludes that Japan, not the United States, was the real victor in the cold war.

Halberstam's indictment has a familiar ring. Without offering any new evidence, he presents as given the American overreaction to the Soviet threat, the decline of American education, the irresponsibility of the Reagan administration in incurring huge debts while failing to call for restraint and national sacrifice, and the growing division of the nation into two classes—a highly educated oligarchy and a vast underclass made up of minorities and others who lack the skills

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to compete in the complex world of the future. In tones reminiscent of Jimmy Carter's 1979 denunciation of a national malaise, Halberstam warns it may already be too late for America to recover its once impressive sense of national purpose.

Halberstam's American century lasted only twenty years—from the end of World War II until the mid-1960s, when Vietnam marked the beginning of our economic decline. In painting the two postwar decades as a kind of golden age, he ignores many of the realities—from the excessive reliance on weapons of mass destruction to the unreasoning fear of the Soviet Union, which reached its height with the furor over Sputnik.

Many of the dilemmas of modern American life that Halberstam portrays are very real, but he fails to acknowledge many of the nation's strengths. The end of the cold war has left the United States as the only surviving super power. It has a political system that has shown surprising flexibility and remains the envy of the rest of the world. The consumer goods revolution that took place in the United States in the 1920s has become the model that other nations seek to emulate and has made this nation the world's most desirable market.

The Next Century offers considerable reassurance for those who are certain that the United States is already in an advanced stage of national decline. For those with more open minds, it is a thin and disappointing book from an author who has contributed so splendidly to our understanding of twentieth-century America.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas, Austin

Television and the Crisis of Democracy *by Douglas Kellner. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990. 287 pp. Cloth, $48.50; paper, $14.95.*

Media scholar David Therborn once said that he decided to study television when the only thing he could count on his students to know were all the words to the theme song from "The Brady Bunch." Douglas Kellner seems to have had a similar conversion experience. Recognizing that, like it or not, the medium has become the repository of political, cultural, and historical knowledge in the United States, in *Television and the Crisis of Democracy* he attempts to develop a critical theory of " . . . television that articulates its relations with the chief institutions of contemporary capitalist society and defines its impact on social and political life" (p. 2).

Kellner begins by distinguishing between two directions taken by leftist media criticism. On the one hand, deterministic Marxist approaches (labeled "instrumentalist") see television as a direct reflection of the interests of the capitalist class. On the other hand, "hegemonic" approaches, drawing on the work of

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Antonio Gramsci, acknowledge that as a popular medium television reflects the tensions between and within capitalism and democracy. Finding the latter much more satisfactory, in Chapter 2 Kellner describes the ways these conflicts have varied over time and have been reflected in changes in programming. Refreshingly, in addressing the political impact of the medium he includes entertainment programming, as well as the news. He provides insightful contrasts between programming in the 1970s and 1980s. During the former period, reflecting tensions in the wider society, the medium was a contested terrain with many political and social perspectives finding their way onto television. In contrast, the "conservative hegemony" of the 1980s resulted in more uniform programming.

In Chapter 3 Kellner develops his own approach, one that will be familiar to those acquainted with the work of scholars like Todd Gitlin, Ben Bagdikian, and Daniel Hallin. However, while these scholars focus almost exclusively on the content of broadcasts, Kellner incorporates into his theory a focus on audience reception of media messages, a central concern of critical media studies today. Kellner wisely reminds us that whatever the intentions of programmers the way audiences "decode" meanings "encoded" in shows is extraordinarily complicated, allowing a variety of interpretations and critical uses of television. This insight renders moot much of the tedious argument that dominates scholarly and public debate over whether programming is biased in liberal or conservative ways.

In Chapter 4 Kellner attempts to apply his theory to television in the 1980s. Given the subtlety of his theoretical argument, this chapter is disappointing. His outrage at media failures to investigate scandals of the Reagan administration leads to an analysis closer to the arguments of instrumental theorists than the approach developed in Chapters 2 and 3. In attempting to fix the blame for the electoral successes of Reagan and Bush on a media conspiracy to cement a conservative hegemony, Kellner's analysis seems considerably less subtle or convincing than the work of other critical scholars (Robert Entman or Mark Hertsgaard, for example), who analyze the connection between the practices of American journalists and the sophisticated manipulation techniques developed by Republican media advisers.

A second problem with this analysis is Kellner's failure to address the sizable body of empirical work produced by mainstream social scientists. While he obviously disagrees with this literature, it needs to be addressed since his arguments often fly in the face of many well replicated findings. So, for example, Kellner attributes to television an ability to affect voting decisions that is contradicted by mainstream research on the determinants of voting (especially work on the influence of economic performance on elections).

Nevertheless, *Television and the Crisis of Democracy* is a useful summary of and addition to critical media scholarship. Yet it reflects a troubling schism in the field of media studies. Critical scholars who quite correctly note the failure of mainstream researchers to satisfactorily theorize the mass media have developed a rich body of theoretical work that situates television in its political and economic

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context. Yet, critical scholars tend to ignore the results of mainstream empirical work directly relevant to their own theoretical purposes.

BRUCE A. WILLIAMS
University of Kentucky

Media Messages in American Presidential Elections *by Diana Owen. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1991. 198 pp. $42.95.*

This is a well designed, well executed, and amply documented study of the 1984 and 1988 presidential election campaigns. It focuses on the different types of messages to which voters are exposed in presidential elections and the impacts these messages have on their opinions about candidates and issues and the campaign in general. Political scientist Diana Owen distinguishes between the types of campaign news disseminated in newspaper and television stories, televised presidential debates, public opinion polls, and political advertisements. Using survey research, she assesses the relative importance and usefulness of each of these sources of campaign news for a sample of voters drawn from assorted counties in Wisconsin, Iowa, and New Jersey. Each chapter begins with an excellent, brief review of the literature. The chapters devoted to the various media then proceed to discuss the general features of media output during 1984 and 1988, followed by detailed analysis of voters' perceptions of this output and its relations to their needs in the counties included in the study. Opening and closing chapters delineate the theoretical foundations of the study and analyze the findings in light of these theories.

Owen argues that the four channels for campaign messages have distinctive characteristics and, therefore, serve different voter needs. Voters know this, and since they seek different gratifications from media use, they employ those channels that best fill their needs. This is precisely what would be predicted by the uses and gratifications theories that form the theoretical basis of Owen's study. In turn, the medium chosen influences how audiences process information and how they are affected by it. Since media impact varies substantially among audiences, Owen deems it imperative that research on media effects take audience differences into account. Owen also advises media effects researchers to study and compare population clusters, as she did when she chose populations clustered in counties for analysis, because many of the audience differences are related to the political culture of particular communities.

Like other scholars, Owen found that her respondents were amply exposed to all the message types that she examined, but that their level of attention for the most part was low. She also asserts, albeit with little supportive evidence, that much of the information presented to voters in 1984 and even more so in 1988

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was the flawed product of clever presidential campaign staffs who manipulated the news. She criticizes campaign news for being shallow, overly personalized and dramatized, and urges voters to rebel against it. But she fails to explain that more serious news finds few takers in the United States, where people have many news and non-news interests. To gratify all of them, brevity—which entails shallowness—is of the essence. Owen believes that voters sense that they are being duped and that they are not gratified by campaign news despite the claims by media personnel that they are catering to voters' wishes.

Overall, the weakest links in Owen's study are the limited sample population and interview technique that consisted mostly of mail questionnaires with a response rate range between 29 and 49 percent. While the idea of sampling counties is excellent, because it captures groups that share the same media environment and often the same political culture, a sample of only two counties in 1984 and three counties in 1988 is inadequate to judge the representativeness of some of Owen's major findings. Nonetheless, the study carries important messages for scholars of elections. It demonstrates that the uses and gratifications paradigm continues to be valuable in media effects research, that various audiences do indeed use the media differently, and that the messages delivered through diverse technologies and in varied political contexts have different effects. Other scholars have reached similar conclusions, but few have demonstrated their validity as persuasively as Diana Owen.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

The Cynical Society: The Culture of Politics and the Politics of Culture in American Life *by Jeffrey C. Goldfarb. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1991. 200 pp. $22.50.*

Jeffrey Goldfarb adds his name to the list of social observers concerned about the quality of democratic culture in the United States. The topic rightly deserves the renewed attention it has recently received; it also deserves careful, precise arguments, a respect for evidence, and balance rather than polemics. Goldfarb's book is mainly nonpolemical, but it is also careless and imprecise, sloppy in its argumentation, lacking in evidence, and for all these reasons superficial.

Goldfarb's principal contention is that cynicism, which he never explicitly defines, has undermined rational democratic debate. Instead of confronting important political issues rationally, the public mocks public life. This is because cynicism has become the prevailing political wisdom and serves to dismiss public life as a sham, manipulation, ideology, or self-interest—anything but the real business of a democratic society. Thus, the promise of democratic participation in public life has degenerated into, among other things, the excesses of religious

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fundamentalism, neo-conservatism, the New Left, image presidential campaigns, and mass-produced mass society.

Tracing these disparate phenomena to a single phenomenon—cynicism—is a pretty tall order. To make the argument even plausible, Goldfarb would have to do three things in addition to defining cynicism carefully: demonstrate cynicism's pervasiveness; account for its appearance; and explain its consequences. Yet he does none of these.

Goldfarb describes his effort less as a "'pure' academic exercise" (p. ix) than as an essay drawing on seminal works, such as Robert N. Bellah et al.'s *Habits of the Heart* and Alexis de Tocqueville, etc. This won't do, given the argument Goldfarb tries to make. He simply cannot establish cynicism as his central concept without systematically investigating empirical research on the subject. Had such a literature not existed, he could be excused. But, of course, cynicism—in the forms of apathy, alienation, distrust, lack of efficacy—is a favorite topic for social research. Attitude data are by no means the last word on these subjects, but they are probably the place Goldfarb should have begun. Certainly doing so would have spared Goldfarb citing Tom Wolfe's *The Bonfire of the Vanities* as somehow indicating, "The cynical attitude [that] exists throughout American society" (p. 25).

Goldfarb tracks cynicism to multiple causes including, for example, "the cynical manipulation of a mass democracy and the ideology of new elites" (p. 82), as well as "relativism" (p. 12). The revival of mass society theory is certainly pertinent, and the argument reminds one slightly of William Kornhauser's *The Politics of Mass Society*. Yet where Kornhauser carefully traced the fatal social ties between elites and masses, Goldfarb merely alludes to such conditions. As for relativism, may it not create the balance, nuance, and respect for other ways of life that a democracy requires? Relativism rightly understood is not an excuse for doing nothing, but a caution against doing too much under the cloak of manipulation and ideology.

What are the consequences of cynicism? "[C]ynicism . . . fosters the development of mass structures in the politics of the left, right, and center in the practice of education and the productions of the culture industry" (p. 170). Examples of these practices and products, according to Goldfarb, are standardized achievement tests, the movie *Mississippi Burning*, and Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind*. Now those who propound the virtues of testing may be wrong, but that fact doesn't necessarily make them cynical. Bloom may be totally off base, but there is no reason to call his argument cynical. And so on. The problem with Goldfarb's approach is that cynicism becomes a label that Goldfarb sticks willy-nilly on things he dislikes, thereby inhibiting the very sort of democratic dialogue for which he calls.

Because cynicism is too weak to carry the argument, *The Cynical Society* becomes a collection of loosely related essays on various features of American life, most of which Goldfarb decries; a few, such as Toni Morrison's *Beloved*,

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he commends. Some of his observations are insightful; but these do not compensate for an effort that delivers considerably less than it promises.

RICHARD M. MERELMAN
The University of Wisconsin, Madison

Churchill, the Great Game and Total War *by David Jablonsky. London, Frank Cass, 1991. 237 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $25.00.*

David Jablonsky's book is a stimulating inquiry into the foundations of Winston Churchill's wartime leadership. He sees Churchill as an essentially Victorian figure stamped with the romanticism and pragmatism supposedly characteristic of the period. These early influences, together with the insight he gained in 1914-1918 into the need for a creative interaction between government, military, and people (Carl von Clausewitz's famous "trinity") prepared him for the premiership.

This is an interesting if not entirely novel approach. That Churchill was shaped substantially by his Victorian inheritance seems indisputable. The precise meaning of "Victorian" is more problematic. One answer, perhaps, is that while other eras were more romantic or pragmatic, the Victorians successfully combined the two. In this sense Churchill was a representative figure. In politics he was as a young man both idealistic (especially about the empire) and highly practical. Vigorous rhetorical tributes to the democratic ideal coexisted with a rather more profound commitment to order and authority. He subscribed fully to two of the great Victorian fetishes: history and science (though not to scientific history). His temperament, exhuberant and emotional, was perhaps more Edwardian, and he lacked entirely the deep earnestness and moralism typical of many Britons in the late nineteenth century. But he was very much the Victorian in his strong ambition, his diligence, and his ability to learn from experience.

This last quality emerges strongly from Jablonsky's interesting study of Churchill in both world wars. Embittered by personal political reverses in the first struggle, Churchill, always ready to rebound, studied the British war effort closely. He saw the cabinet's weaknesses and especially its inability to control the generals. When his turn came in May 1940, he quickly took full personal control of the government as prime minister and of the military-strategic direction of the war as minister of defence. The great speeches followed. These were sometimes emotional, as Jablonsky points out. They were also what is less well-known, full of common sense and interesting detail. It was Churchill's steady practicality and his willingness to take the people into his confidence as much as his inspirational eloquence that commended him to the nation in 1940.

In the end one feels that the Victorian master concept is rather narrow. It works well when Jablonsky applies it to Churchill's fascination with the "Great Game" of intelligence and espionage. Here a certain Victorian amateurishness shines

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clearly through. Taking Churchill's wartime leadership as a whole, however, a more variegated approach seems desirable. It was perhaps a longer, more tortuous road from the Mahdi to Hitler than Jablonsky's somewhat celebratory, whiggish account allows. May we not with equal plausibility see Churchill as a modern power politician, one of that uniquely aggressive generation of leaders thrown up by the peculiar conditions of the 1930s? Men like Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini differed in fundamental ways, for which we can be thankful. They shared, however, a remarkably sharp taste for power and a passion for control. Churchill was certainly no laggard here. Determined to stay on top, he beat down political challenges ruthlessly, intrigued against colleagues and officials, prodded and harassed the exhausted generals and admirals, kept a balefully censorious eye on the tame wartime press, and bridled at the tiniest hint of dissent. His final victims in the ongoing struggle for complete control have been the independent historians, still denied full access to the Churchill papers. One wonders what the high-minded Victorians would have made of all this.

Meanwhile scholars do their best. David Jablonsky's best is very good indeed, illuminating as it does, and in an attractive way, an important dimension of this extraordinary, properly cherished statesman's career.

FRASER HARBUTT
Emory University

Sheathing the Sword: The U.N. Secretary-General and the Prevention of International Conflict *by Thomas E. Boudreau. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1991. 208 pp. $47.95.*

A better time than the autumn of 1990 could hardly be imagined for examining how the United Nations secretary-general (UNSG) can help prevent international conflict. The organization was busy with a long list of disputes, including such heavy tasks as the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar neared the end of his second term, and the campaign bugles of would-be successors sounded. Meanwhile the world political configuration offered new vistas for international organization.

Boudreau's study performs a genuine service in recalling forty-five years of assiduous activity by the five UNSGs. He gives no comprehensive account but rather concentrates, as his title suggests, on action to prevent or dampen conflict. The basic argument, made in the first half of the book, holds that the UNSG has a legal obligation to preclude conflict, derived from Article 99 of the UN Charter, which entitles the UNSG to call to the attention of the Security Council any matter that in his or her opinion threatens or breaches the peace. Moreover, it implies a duty to organize effective information gathering and analysis, which Boudreau treats as the key to conflict prevention. ". . . the Secretary-General's

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preventive role," Boudreau insists, "should be supported by a global system of conflict identification, and telecommunications" (p. 6). The second half of the book sets out recommendations on systems of conflict identification, information gathering, intervening in disputes, fully utilizing telecommunications, and creating a war risk reduction center entailing a better informed diplomatic process.

As Boudreau's study uses an historical and legal perspective, it provides little causal explanation of the varied roles and limitations of the office or person of UNSG. Rather it proposes how the office can be pushed beyond modest baselines; these were set especially by Trygve Lie, the first secretary-general; his successor, Dag Hammarskjöld; and by Pérez de Cuéllar.

The activities of the first two UNSGs are generally familiar. Along with earlier scholars, Boudreau credits Hammarskjöld with originating the fundamental notion of preventive diplomacy. Why it developed as it did, what its inherent limitations were then and are now, given differing world political frameworks, are issues that remain open. Yet they can hardly be overlooked if the UNSG's operations are to expand.

At the end of his first term, Pérez de Cuéllar, according to Boudreau, ". . . may already be judged . . . as one of the most successful Secretaries-General . . ." (p. 82) and ". . . had demonstrated as imaginative and creative a flair for institutional innovation as Hammarskjöld" (p. 99). This judgment derives largely from Pérez's laudable intentions, mediatory zeal, a new interest in humanitarian affairs in his office, and the proposal and creation of the Office for Research and Collection of Information, a rudimentary bureau for analysis of intelligence. All of this must have set off an institutional political process that Boudreau's study rather slights in favor of a focus on high-level diplomacy.

Much of Boudreau's proposals for the UNSG's diplomatic arsenal has a distinctly high-tech quality. Put in place, they necessarily would refresh an institution that sometimes seems retarded in its level of telecommunications and computerization, let alone in modern analytical procedures. There is much charm in the notion of, for instance, face-to-face satellite meetings or electronic offices next to the Security Council chamber. Even more useful would be the genuinely systematic collection and analysis of much-augmented information by skilled civil servants.

Yet the argument that the secretary-general is legally obliged by the UN Charter to expand informational capacities and that high-tech facilities would help hardly settles the matter. As earlier UNSGs discovered, the Charter predicts neither the real limits of their activities nor their acceptability to member governments. Boudreau's program at bottom assumes that reasonable proposals would be accepted by a political leadership group that still has a notable taste for active and passive unreasonableness.

LEON GORDENKER
Princeton University

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Gorbachev and His Enemies: The Struggle for Perestroika *by Baruch A. Hazan. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990. 335 pp. $49.50.*

This analysis of what may prove to be the longest and rosiest phase of Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership is reminiscent of the best writing on the Khrushchev era: densely documented. Hazan's account is nonetheless highly readable and lucidly argued. And unlike the necessarily gloomy literature on Nikita Khrushchev's opposition, this volume is able to highlight General Secretary Gorbachev's skillful manipulation of would-be enemies as allies from 1985 through March 1989, with some reference to the acerbic first session of the Congress of People's Deputies later that year.

As the author notes, the Soviet media have become a far better source of information than ever before on conflict among the leadership. This flood of information carries its own risks, but Hazan gives the reinvigorated press organs a carefully nuanced reading as he charts opposition in its sometimes subtle, more often swinging attacks on Gorbachev's program of *perestroika*. The instigators of opposition range from individuals (Yegor Ligachev and Boris Yeltsin) to institutions (the army, the KGB, the Communist party, and the bureaucracy).

Not surprisingly, the conservative opposition is the primary focus of investigation here. The Soviet central press organs, increasingly dominated by reform-minded editors and encouraged by Gorbachev, took to speaking of "reactionary forces," "braking mechanisms," and that catch-all Russian insult "bureaucratic tendencies." Hazan takes up the hue and cry and provides solid evidence to attest to resistance, most often in the form of noncompliance, as when ". . . the initial reaction of the Soviet military to Gorbachev's reforms was to interpret them in its own way . . .": excluding the army (p. 121).

But this is the very issue that began to alienate progressive forces: the fluidity of *perestroika* leaves it open to too many interpretations. Gorbachev's lack of a clear economic and political platform is certainly a political survival tactic, but Hazan underestimates the disillusionment of reformers—or paints a very grim scenario, indeed—when he portrays the intelligentsia as "Gorbachev's most loyal allies" (p. 256). As early as 1988 Moscow was buzzing with the dissatisfaction of leading reformers. Private agreement with the bold statements of former dissident Andrei Sakharov, radical historian Yuri Afanasev, and of course Boris Yeltsin was widespread in elite circles; what kept many individuals from printing the full extent of their criticism at that time was fear of empowering "the bureaucrats."

It is thus fortunate that this rendering of Gorbachev's enemies stops short of the watershed year of 1990. The opposition became too numerous once Gorbachev took on the title of president, the party lost its constitutionally mandated "leading and guiding role," no solution appeared for the ever-deepening economic crisis, and the nationalities issue assumed primacy. And an analyst's reliance on even the improved traditional media becomes an issue once the independent press sharpened its teeth and by late 1989 moved into realms—such as direct criticism of Gorbachev—that even the racy *Moscow News* and the (here, underutilized) *Argumenty i fakty* hesitated over.

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But Hazan's fine interpretive skills and well chosen time period illustrate that study of the still highly reified discourse among the Soviet leadership served a key function right up to the institutional shake-ups of 1990. Save for the apparent lack of personal interviews (which could not have helped but dim the author's view of commitment among the intelligentsia for "Gorbastroika" early on), the tools of analysis in a master's hand prove very revealing.

MARTHA MERRITT
University of Texas, Austin

George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment *by David L. Di Leo. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1991. 265 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $12.95.*

"You're like a flock of old buzzards sitting on a fence, sending the young men off to be killed." George Ball remembers himself exploding at his colleagues during a meeting of the "Wise Men" called by President Lyndon Johnson in late fall 1967. "You ought to be ashamed of yourselves" (p. 170).

In his respectful treatment of George Ball's opposition to U.S. policy in Vietnam, David DiLeo finds little occasion for shame on Ball's part. An early dissenter—he was profoundly critical of the 1961 Maxwell Taylor–Walt Rostow recommendation to send a small U.S. force to Vietnam—Ball was never persuaded that Vietnam was worth any American candles. Eurocentric, dubious about the capacity of small underdeveloped Asian nations to become serious global players, Ball consistently advised the two presidents he served as deputy under secretary of state (1961–1966) to cut their losses and negotiate their way out of Vietnam. Vietnam, he argued, was not Korea: North Vietnam had not invaded the South; there was no UN mandate for intervention; South Vietnamese politics were chaotic and unstable; there were no Chinese or Russian troops involved; in the eyes of the world the United States had simply inherited an unsavory remnant of the French empire. Ball predicted American defeat, feared Chinese intervention, despaired of the waste of life and fortune, and until he left the government in 1966, remained an effective spokesman *for* presidential policy. In an American version of democratic centralism, Ball accepted a reprimand from John Kennedy in November 1961 and did not again raise the issue of Vietnam with him. In July 1965, having lost in his effort to prevent an American invasion of South Vietnam, Ball "personally associated himself with a policy he adamantly believed was doomed to failure" (p. 134). Thereafter, Ball "crisscrossed the United States and Europe, warning against an 'expansionist China' while in Dallas, applauding the 'effective work toward creating a Vietnamese Great Society' and promising to 'resolutely fight to the end' in Washington, linking America's Vietnam policy to the 'Principles of '76' in Philadelphia, 'recalling the unpunished aggressions of the Rhineland' in Lake Como, Italy . . ." (p. 137). He believed

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not a word of it. Ball attacked Charles de Gaulle's efforts to mediate the conflict in 1965 and Robert Kennedy's peace plan in 1966. But Richard Nixon's election in 1968 freed Ball from the constraints of party and personal loyalty. He publicly denounced the Nixon-Kissinger escalations and remarked in a letter to John Kenneth Galbraith that Henry Kissinger's Nobel Peace Prize "refutes the old canard that the Swedes have no sense of humor" (p. 181).

DiLeo reviews Ball's choices and seems to conclude that a combination of ambition and conviction restrained the under secretary from a protest resignation. The book ends with an analysis of Ball as a modified Realist. There is little evidence here that Ball rethought containment, only that like George Kennan, among others, his interest in applying it to Asia was minimal. DiLeo's epilogue is a small moment of wistful, wishful contemplation of Ball as a presidential candidate. The reader might well share his feeling that the prospect pleases more than most we've been offered in the past decade. Given everything else we've learned about Ball in this book, it is a sobering thought.

MARILYN B. YOUNG
New York University

Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America *edited by Abraham Lowenthal. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. 422 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $25.90.*

This book helps explain why the U.S. government has such a dismal record in promoting democratic reform in Latin America. Its fourteen essays relentlessly demonstrate that the U.S. primary interests in Latin America have always been strategic protection and economic expansion, not democracy. The United States has occasionally encouraged democratic reforms when they appear not to endanger its primary interests, but these reforms are usually abandoned when they threaten to unleash forces that Washington cannot control.

The book makes this familiar argument with clear narratives and great attention to historical detail. Its contributors share a common theoretical approach that defines democracy narrowly in electoral terms and assumes that the United States itself is democratic and therefore capable to varying degrees of "exporting" its political system.

Four historical chapters analyze the periods in which the United States emphasized democracy most strongly in Latin America—during and after World War I, after World War II, in the early 1960s, and in the mid-1980s. Five essays examine the history of U.S. policy towards Argentina, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Two chapters focus on the role of U.S. business and labor in the region as a whole, while three offer various conclusions.

Several essays stand out. Elizabeth Cobbs argues persuasively that U.S. business after World War II has generally been more positive about democracy in

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Latin America than the U.S. government. In one of the few essays to use new evidence, Carlos Escudé describes the Carter administration's two-faced policy toward Argentina in the late 1970s. He shows that while the State Department's Office of Human Rights loudly condemned Argentina's human rights violations, the Treasury Department oversaw unprecedented inflows of official aid and private capital to the country. Heraldo Muñoz discovers a similar pattern in U.S. policy towards Augusto Pinochet Ugarte's Chile.

Lowenthal's concluding chapter does not really fit the argument presented throughout the book. While he eloquently summarizes the book's findings, he goes on to offer U.S. policy makers quixotic advice on how to promote democracy in Latin America. He fails to discuss why one should expect a century-long pattern of intervention and frequent support of authoritarian governments to change overnight. For example, he urges the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to support democratic processes without identifying itself with particular political outcomes, when pushing for particular outcomes is precisely what the Reagan administration created it to do. Lowenthal seems to overestimate the potential of Washington's foreign policy bureaucracy to fulfill the benign, watchdog role he wishes for it.

However, Lowenthal does question the theoretical premise of the book by arguing that the United States can best help Latin America by safeguarding its own democracy. He thus shatters the complacency that imbues much North American writing on Latin American politics and leads one to question whether the U.S. political system is one that others should be urged to emulate.

Laurence Whitehead's essay makes a point that serves as a fitting epilogue to the volume. He compares the European Economic Community's (EEC) recent policy toward Eastern Europe with U.S. policy toward Cuba. Whereas the EEC offered incentives to Eastern European reformers by presenting them with the possibility of EEC membership, the United States continues to isolate and intimidate Cuba—a policy that stifles reform and allows Cuban leaders to equate sovereignty with the maintenance of communist orthodoxy.

Perhaps greater economic integration of the hemisphere will eventually force the United States to do what good intentions have not—treat Latin America as sovereign and equal nations worthy of accommodation. After reading this book, one ardently wishes that this is so.

ANTHONY PEREIRA
New School for Social Research

East-West Trade and the Atlantic Alliance *edited by David A. Baldwin and Helen V. Milner. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1990. 221 pp. $49.95.*

This book has three notable virtues. First, it has greater internal coherence than edited volumes often do. The articles are not just collected under the same cover.

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The editors clearly had certain objectives in mind and have done a considerable job of soliciting papers that fit together well as a set. Too often the articles in edited volumes may have a general topic in common but do not truly constitute a book in anything more than the physical sense of the term. That is not the case with the Baldwin-Milner volume.

Second, the editors largely achieve their objective of overcoming the traditional "parochial" pattern of debate on East-West trade, "with Europeans talking to Europeans, Americans to Americans, economists to economists, and so on" (p. vii). The contributors are both American and European (French, British, German, Swedish), and by profession include an international lawyer and two economists as well as political scientists. This is a healthy approach for an issue that has been the subject of ongoing debate within the western alliance (although a Japanese contributor could have been a useful addition) and that by its nature is interdisciplinary.

The third virtue is the subject matter itself. This long has been an important and contentious issue. The debate has gone through numerous phases (going all the way back to the Bolshevik revolution and especially during the cold war). But the central question has remained the same: how much and what type of trade and other economic relations should the West have with the Soviet Union?

One of the limitations of the book, however, is how much the meaning of this question has changed since the contributors held their conferences in 1988–1989. This, of course, cannot be held against the editors or the authors. As a French colleague once stated, anyone who claims to have foreseen events like the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, German reunification, and the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe is either a liar or a charlatan (or both). Nevertheless, it does impose limits on the relevance and continuing value of the book.

Some of the articles do stand up well to the passage of time. James Mayall's article on the General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT), for example, is quite useful for understanding the continuing debate over Soviet membership in the international trading system. It is telling to be reminded that over five years have passed since Mikhail Gorbachev first sought greater involvement in GATT as a participant in the Uruguay Round. As another example, the statement by Philip Hanson that the "Soviet approach to trade with the West is also, and fundamentally, affected by the leadership's attitude to economic reform" (p. 47) was not only valid when he wrote it but has been even further corroborated by recent developments, such as the debates over the "500 Day Plan" and the "Grand Bargain." The issue of where to draw the military significance line, and what goods and technologies should not be exported to the Soviets for security reasons despite improved political relations, also will continue to be with us for the foreseeable future. In this respect the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls can continue to place a useful role, and Michael Mastanduno's observations still pertain. But there is something anachronistic about the very term "East-West" trade. It surely has lost most of its applicability to the former Warsaw Pact members (one of whom no longer even exists as a separate nation-

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state). Its descriptive value for issues relating to the Soviet Union also is questionable. The new key issue is how to transform these highly inefficient and weak command economies into market economies capable of economic growth and modernization, and how to more fully integrate them into the international economy—an issue that is perhaps even more akin to the traditional issues and challenges of North-South relations than to East-West in its pre-1989 meaning.

BRUCE W. JENTLESON
University of California, Davis

Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul *by Raymond William Baker. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1990. 365 pp. $35.00.*

The ambitions of this book are intriguing. Tired and frustrated by "works [that] reduce Egyptian politics to the study of an underlying social or economic system," Raymond William Baker is "interested in actual human responses . . . rather than the structures themselves, . . . [in] what people do with and through systems rather than what systems do to them" (p. 278). Baker is not alone in his impatience with structural approaches in political science: perspectives that emphasize individual choices rather that systemic constraints also characterize much of the rational action and game theory in vogue today.

Baker's own efforts eschew rational choice theory, however, in favor of examination of what he calls group practice or group narratives. He selects eight groups (or, in some cases, "trends") whom he identifies as having visions of Egypt and its future that represent alternatives to that of the regime. Egypt, in other words, is not of one mind and Egyptian society, far from being a shapeless mass of followers, is a lively, diverse, even argumentative crowd.

To illustrate this proposition, Baker gives us for each of his eight groups what he describes as "the political practice of an alternative group in terms that approximate its own self-understanding" (p. 4). Thus we read clear and faithful renderings of diagnoses of Egypt's ills and suitable political prescriptions from Egypt's largest contractor, the liberal bar association, the leading Marxist journal, the most prestigious think tank, an independent economic weekly, a small but renowned art school, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Nasserists. None of these groups are known for brevity, and Baker is determined to let them have their full say. As a result, the narratives sometimes flag: rhetoric, even eight different versions each sympathetically presented, is a difficult thing in which to sustain a consistently lively interest for 300 pages.

More of a problem is Baker's oversolicitious concern to let Egyptians speak for themselves and to avoid imposing an inevitably partial interpretive structure on Egyptian society. As a result, he leaves his readers to interpret for themselves. If the readers are already familiar with Egypt, they will find no authorial interpretation to challenge or provoke them to rethink their own. (And some will be

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annoyed by details. Why is Aly Eddine Hillal not identified as the same person known to readers of English as the excellent political scientist Ali Dessouki?)

For readers unfamiliar with Egypt, the danger of unwitting distortion in Baker's modesty is even greater. To convey the potential confusion, perhaps it is useful to turn the tables. What would an unsuspecting Egyptian reader make of a book called, say, "Carter and After" that elaborated the world views of Lee Iaccocca, the ACLU, George McGovern, *The Nation* and *Commentary* magazines, George Balanchine, the Moral Majority, and the Brookings Institution without any effort to place them in their historical, political, and social context? Although the impulse is altogether understandable—perhaps even laudable—Baker ultimately abandons his reader and abdicates his responsibility to provide a framework or interpretation beyond the true but somewhat banal observation that Egyptian opinions about society and politics may differ.

LISA ANDERSON
Columbia University

Party and Policy in Israel: The Battle Between Hawks and Doves *by Samuel J. Roberts. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990. 212 pp. Softcover, $26.50.*

Whatever else the foreign policy of a country is designed to achieve, its primary task is undoubtedly to ensure the survival of the state. In the case of Israel this principle has more than a mere theoretical application. No people have ever had a premeditated Holocaust inflicted upon them as have the Jewish people, and no state in the international community is currently threatened by its enemies with a new Holocaust as is Israel. These facts set the parameters for considering and analyzing the formulation of Israeli foreign policy as it emerges from the give and take of the Israeli political system.

These lines were written before the Gulf war erupted on 16 January 1991. During the six-week conflict that ensued, Saddam Hussein actually endeavored to implement his threat (issued months before the Kuwaiti crisis burst) to incinerate half of Israel. Nightly, Israeli citizens experienced the terror of sitting in sealed rooms waiting for Scud rockets to land and devastate entire city blocks. At a later stage most of the Scuds, fortunately, were either intercepted by U.S. Patriot missiles or fell harmlessly into open fields. Nonetheless, the experience has seared the national consciousness and has provided a new dimension wherewith to gauge the security needs of the state. For the menace to Israel from the Arab world is by no means removed with the defeat of Saddam. Both Syria and Libya have accumulated vast quantities of poison gas as well as the means of delivery, and each has issued dire threats of waging genocidal warfare. In effect, then, recent events have given Israelis and the world a fresh appreciation of the challenges Israel faces in its determination to survive as a sovereign state. These events also provide a dramatic backdrop to reviewing a book devoted to an analysis of Israeli party politics as this affects foreign policy.

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The author, Samuel J. Roberts, a senior political analyst in the Department of State, has done an outstanding job in probing the Israeli political scene and analyzing the inputs that make for a hawkish or dovish foreign policy. No less than a dozen political parties are represented in the Knesset, Israel's parliament, and the author is to be congratulated on his skill in deciphering the relative contribution of the dominant parties in the formulation of policy. Thus, Roberts is quite correct in stating that coalition politics compelled the Labour party after 1967 to adapt a more hawkish policy than it might have really wanted. The external factor of an Arab refusal to negotiate (proclaimed at Khartoum in 1967 in the form of three no's), combined with the internal factor of Labour's dependence on the Mafdal, the National Religious Party, to produce a more militant policy toward the territories. Consequently, if in the immediate aftermath of the Six Day War the Labour party regarded the territories simply as a bargaining chip in the quest for peace, as time progressed and Arab obduracy and belligerence waxed stronger, the territories more and more assumed the character of a vital element in Israel's defense make-up. After all, prior to 1967, Israel at its narrowest point had been a mere nine miles wide and was extremely vulnerable to an Arab drive to sever the country into two. Even after 1967, with the addition of territories, the country was still only forty miles wide from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River. Roberts is acutely aware of the geographic factor in Israel's defense considerations. But he is no less aware of the demographic factor involved and what it means for Israel to be administering territories in which over a million Arabs reside. He depicts quite accurately the dilemma Israeli parties face as they each attempt to square their priorities in matters of defense with the need to preserve the Jewish identity of the state. Roberts acknowledges that the debate over territories, settlements, demography, and Arab intentions all boil down to one thing—how best to ensure the security and identity of the Jewish state. In a noteworthy passage Roberts says: "The memory of persisting Arab animosity, and the blood history of Arab-Israeli wars, continuous terrorist acts, and a painful awareness of Israel's geographic vulnerability and demographic and financial inferiority to the Arab worlds have generated an obsessive concern with security" (p. 159). The nomenclature of hawk and dove may thus not be fully accurate in the Israeli context.

This is an important work, which should command particular attention as the United States endeavors to capitalize on its victory in the Gulf to promote a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The author writes with skill and style in presenting an insightful analysis of the Israeli political scene. Regrettably the format of the book does not match the quality of the study. The footnotes are relegated to the back, and the print quality is more akin to a typewriter than a printer. With a little more investment the appearance of the book could have been enhanced considerably.

SHLOMO SLONIM
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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Echoes of the Intifada: Regional Repercussions of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict *edited by Rex Brynen. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1991. 314 pp. Softcover, $36.50.*

The uprising (*intifada*) on the West Bank and Gaza Strip has spawned numerous studies that seek to interpret the significance of the Palestinian's intense and sustained campaign to end alien rule. Those analyses include Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, eds., *Intifada*, Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., *Intifada*, Don Peretz, *Intifada*, and Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada*. Those volumes focus almost exclusively on the intense relationship of Israelis and Palestinians: Israeli policies before and during the uprising, Palestinian attitudes and organization, and the prospects for an externally mediated, diplomatic resolution of the deepset conflict.

In contrast, Rex Brynen widens the scope of analysis in his carefully edited volume. He examines three levels—the Israeli-Palestinian dimension and the regional and international repercussions of the *intifada*. Salim Tamari, sociologist at Bir Zeit University, reflects on the extent to which the *intifada* has moved the center of gravity of the Palestinian national movement from the diaspora to the occupied territories and assesses the growth of a populist political movement which seeks initially to disengage the Palestinian community from Israeli control and then build alternative bases on which an independent state can be established. Paul Noble, a political scientist at McGill University, adds that the *intifada* initially bolstered the position of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by underlining the Palestinians' effort to advance their own cause through their own efforts. But, just as Tamari wonders whether there is enough political space in the occupied territories for the Palestinians to create viable state structures, Noble fears that Israel's stalling in the effort to foster negotiations could renew PLO dependence on Arab regimes and undermine the diplomatic leverage gained by the uprising. Nadim Rouhana, psychology professor at Boston College, adds a fascinating footnote in his sophisticated analysis of the impact of the *intifada* on the political attitudes of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Rather than increasing their identification with the national demands of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the *intifada* has enhanced their sense of separation. Those Palestinians express solidarity with the *intifada* but recognize that their own goal must be achieving equality within Israel.

Israeli attitudes and policies are analyzed by Raja Shehadeh, a leading human rights lawyer on the West Bank, and Mark Tessler, political scientist from the University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee). Shehadeh details the forms of administrative and coercive control that the Israeli government wields over the occupied territories. He argues that the economic benefits to Israel have dropped dramatically as a result of the *intifada*, while the reliance on force to maintain control has become increasingly obvious. Tessler, however, points out that Israelis draw differing political conclusions from those statistics. The dominant tendency is to demand the ending (by force, if necessary) of the *intifada* before any political

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negotiations can be undertaken to ameliorate conditions and alter the political status of the Palestinian community. Moreover, the *intifada* has deepened ideological divisions concerning the long-run solution: the extreme right, which calls for the mass expulsion of Palestinians, has gained enhanced legitimacy, as has the left, which seeks a political accommodation with the Palestinian national movement.

The remaining essays emphasize the extent to which Arab and foreign governments react to the *intifada* through the prism of their own domestic and foreign policy concerns. Bahgat Korany (University of Montreal) attributes the Egyptian government's efforts to mediate a resolution to its need to extricate itself from the contradiction between sympathizing with the Palestinians while adhering to the peace accord with Israel. Fred Lawson (Mills College) explains how Syria's preoccupation with the strife in Lebanon prevents it from playing an active role in promoting or influencing the course of the *intifada*. Lamis Andoni, a journalist in Amman, emphasizes the crucial role that the Palestinian uprising played in compelling the Jordanian government to seek new bases for legitimacy, a search that led to the democratization measures in late 1989. Similarly, Tamar Weinstein (television producer for the Canadian Broadcasting Company) stresses that internal changes in Moscow dictate alterations in Soviet policy toward Israel, Syria, and the Arab world in general. And Fred Khouri, professor emeritus at Villanova University, explains how domestic politics in the United States prevent policy makers from taking risks in order to promote peace.

Although written prior to the Gulf crisis, the arguments remain relevant in its aftermath. Brynen's volume is an important contribution to scholarly understanding of the complex issues associated with the Israeli-Palestinian problem.

ANN M. LESCH
Villanova University

America Insecure: Arms Transfers, Global Interventionism, and the Erosion of National Security *by Miles D. Wolpin. Jefferson, NC, McFarland & Company, 1991. 385 pp. $35.00.*

This book would test the patience of a saint. Bristling with charts, graphs, numbers, percentages, thirty-four pages of small-typed footnotes, and thirty pages of bibliography, its appearance would suggest that it has been produced primarily to combat insomnia. Few educated laypersons and even fewer undergraduate or graduate students would willingly pick it up to wade through the mass of material presented here. Even a specialist in the field would approach it with a heavy heart knowing that it would take hours to read and assimilate all of the information contained within the book. If it were just another irrelevant product of the academic enterprise it could easily be dismissed as the harmless result of an overly

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conscientious researcher who was adrift on a sea of data. But this is not an irrelevant book addressing some arcane issue of interest to only a few academics. It is one of the most important books of our times and should be read by any American who is concerned with the future of this country. Almost overwhelmed by all of the facts and figures is the primary message that Wolpin has for us: the United States is in the process of losing its heart and soul as well as its standard of living unless something is done quickly. Its message calls for the broadest possible readership and its style ensures the opposite.

By focusing primarily on arms transfers Wolpin demonstrates that "the quest for military dominance has decreased rather than strengthened American security—psychological as well as physical" (p. 2). He argues that the East-West nuclear arms race was related to North-South arms transfers and interventionism, which in turn slowed development in Third World countries and reduced American security. Finally, he offers a more populist-based American security policy that would renounce interventionism, radically reduce arms transfers to countries that can ill afford them, and provide the necessary funds for the American people to begin dealing with problems that have been ignored for a generation or more.

Defining national security in much broader terms than simple reliance on guns and ammo, Wolpin argues for a more civilianist view that avoids the "threat inflation syndrome" that characterizes militarist thinking and concentrates on the socioeconomic costs of increasing militarization (p. 7). Such a position is familiar to all Americans, since it was well articulated by one of the most popular presidents and a former general, Dwight Eisenhower. Wolpin believes that contemporary American militarism is "serving a corporate-oriented hegemonic global design that is undermining rather than enhancing our security" (p. 7). Five chapters are devoted to describing the arms transfers, primarily to the Third World, that have characterized American policy in recent years with special emphasis on the Reagan administration and on showing the principal corporate interests in the United States that profit most obscenely from this trade.

After discussing the relative ineffectiveness of most contemporary liberal critiques of this process, the author devotes a fifty-six-page chapter to the domestic costs of this disastrous foreign policy. For the average person in the United States who is experiencing the end of the American Dream, this chapter should come as no surprise. Two additional chapters then describe the impact of all these weapons on the Third World countries that have seen their dreams of development and peace destroyed by militarism and war. After presenting some of the dominant characteristics of the garrison state that America is increasingly manifesting, Wolpin then offers an alternative national security approach that seems much more sane and productive than the current course. Unfortunately, having done such an excellent job of showing all the powerful players who are profiting from the present system, he leaves the reader wondering just how a new policy will emerge. With gigantic corporate interests dominating much of the American economy, most of the political process, and even the press, the present system seems so deeply entrenched and so profitable to a few major players that it is

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difficult to see how the average citizen is going to bring about a change in the prevailing way of doing business that characterizes modern America.

PHILIP W. DYER
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

After the Cold War: Questioning the Morality of Nuclear Deterrence *edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Kenneth L. Schwab. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1991. 276 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $16.95.*

In a fast-changing world, crafting thoughtful and timely perspectives on new developments becomes both more valuable and more difficult. The editors assign this volume just such a task: "to take a critical look at the morality and efficacy of that core pillar of peace—nuclear deterrence—in the new geopolitical context" (p. ix). A wide variety of notable contributors, grouped into three categories, are assembled to meet this challenge.

For many readers the most informative contributions may be those of the "moral philosophers and religious leaders" (p. viii). Joseph Cardinal Bernardin gives a good feel for the degree of public engagement and attention to ethical concerns that distinguished debate over nuclear deterrence in the 1980s and a sober yet optimistic assessment of the challenges of the 1990s. Janice Love's typology of religious perspectives on nuclear deterrence—"from pacifism to apocalyptic visions"—is a clear and illuminating look at the theological dimension of past deterrence debate. James Turner Johnson supplies a full discussion of Christian interpretations of just-war doctrine in the nuclear era and some good observations about the possible repercussions of current events.

Among the "policy analysts and peace researchers," Paul Kattenburg nicely frames his outlook on future deterrence debate by asking, "What further is there to argue about in this relatively arcane area?" His answer, drawing on his clear assessment of the logic of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war world, is the ultimate desirability of "minimum assured deterrence" (p. 115). Bruce Russett also provides incisive and intriguing observations about the future role of nuclear weapons, though primarily in his epilogue to a chapter devoted largely to discussing the place of the U.S. Catholic Bishops' 1983 pastoral letter in deterrence thinking. John Mueller furnishes cogent observations on the concept of deterrence and a provocative claim about the irrelevance of nuclear weapons, but few ties of this discussion to issues of the immediate future. Kenneth Boulding's contribution offers little more than loosely collected, sometimes curious remarks, culminating in the suggestion that, "Now that communism has collapsed, the next candidate for the loss of legitimacy is the military" (p. 105).

The section by "policymakers and strategic theorists" breaks no new ground (p. vii). Richard Perle's predictable point of view is tempered only by its brevity.

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Sir Hugh Beach's consideration of what stakes might justify the use of nuclear weapons is at times highly sensitive to the nuances of the issue, but ultimately superficial and equivocal, deeming a price of "twenty or fifty megadeaths" in order "to prevent a global tyranny" as "incommensurable" (p. 53). Only Paul Warnke, in putting the case for "no first use," offers positive suggestions to meet the new future; yet much of his essay is spent asserting that "no first use" was previously a pretty good idea anyway (p. vii).

As a general observation, the essays comprising the core of *After the Cold War* tend to pay more attention to past features of the nuclear deterrence debate than to prospective future directions. The chapter reviewing the deterrence literature, the extensive bibliography, and the clutter of references in the editor's introduction all complement this retrospective weighting. As a result, the book serves more as a wrap-up to the deterrence issues of the bygone cold war era than as a first cut into how these issues will evolve in the turbulence of the cold war's wake.

WADE HUNTLEY
University of California, Berkeley

America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World *by Donald E. Nuechterlein. Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 1991. 269 pp. $28.00.*

The end of the cold war continues to produce a plethora of articles and books reassessing the future role of the United States in the world. Unfortunately, these writings tend to be quickly dated. In the first seven chapters of this book, the Middle East and Persian Gulf are hardly mentioned; the eighth chapter was apparently added after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait but before the war. The outcome, as well as some of the latest happenings in the Soviet Union, is therefore included in a brief epilogue. While a rapidly changing world always makes it hard to quit writing and let the publisher go ahead, in this case the book would have seemed more organized and unified had publication awaited the conclusion of the war and had the author—despite his disclaimer that it did not change his conclusions—rethought to what degree, if any, his previous prescriptions about U.S. policy, based solely upon the collapse of Soviet power, needed further refinement, if not changes.

An additional problem is that of the 247 pages of text 124 are devoted to the introduction, a chapter explaining the author's framework, and three more look backward over the cold war. Again, while providing a sense of perspective for contemporary problems can be helpful, especially for student readers who may have no historical background, only half of this short book discusses how to restructure the nation's foreign policy. This is bound to affect the amount of space available for thoroughly exploring major issues.

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The author's analytical framework, as in earlier books, continues to be based upon the concept of national interest, refined into different categories: defense of homeland, economic well-being, favorable world order, and promotion of values. This schema is applied to U.S. interests in three regions: North and South America, East Asia and the western Pacific, and Europe and the Soviet Union. While one might question the distinctions between national interest categories and wonder why some events are placed in one category rather than another, the regional analyses, while short, are interesting; U.S. policy options are discussed at the end of the chapter. Still, there are a number of problems. One was the lack of emphasis on domestic politics. No analysis of Soviet foreign policy can be based only upon what Mikhail Gorbachev has said and done. *What* future Soviet policy may look like, assuming there will be a Soviet Union, will surely depend on *who* will emerge as victor in the domestic struggle for power. Similarly, while Nuechterlein feels that President George Bush is the right leader for the 1990s and hints that if the Democrats won the presidency U.S. policy would be different, the deep differences between the two parties that emerged after Vietnam—and still continue—needed greater exploration in a book devoted to the future of U.S. foreign policy.

Lastly, perhaps because of its regional approach, this analysis downplays the growing role of economics. There is virtually no attention given to the possibilities of interregional economic competition as a result of the formation of mercantilist trading blocs and what impact this will have on western cohesion; the likelihood is simply dismissed. Nor is the short discussion of the U.S. decline thesis very satisfactory. One might share the author's faith in American "resilience," but still worry about the nation's future economic competitiveness because of the continuing impact of the federal deficit, the lack of savings, and insufficient investments in nonmilitary research, new machinery, and the nation's infrastructure, as well as the continuing failure to improve the nation's educational system.

JOHN SPANIER
University of Florida

Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990–1990 *by Charles Tilly. Cambridge, MA, Basil Blackwell, 1990. 269 pp. $34.95.*

In 1975, the final volume of the Social Science Research Council's (SSRC) seminal "Studies in Political Development" appeared under the title *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Since that time, interest within political science in the historical evolution of the European state has grown ever stronger. Now Charles Tilly, who was both the editor of and a major contributor to the SSRC volume, has produced an ambitious, wide-ranging monograph that seems destined to raise the theoretical discussion surrounding this subject to a new level of sophistication.

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The starting point for Tilly's book is a central, though often overlooked feature of pre-twentieth-century Europe—the remarkable variety and complexity of political forms to be found there. Thus the continent contained at least 500 distinct state-like units in 1490, ranging from tiny city-states through city-empires, territorial states both secular and ecclesiastical, right up to multinational empires. Over the course of the next four centuries, however, this landscape was drastically reshaped, leaving about thirty independent states, all of relatively uniform character, by the late 1900s. This set of facts leads the author to ask: "What accounts for the great variation over time and space in the kinds of states that have prevailed in Europe since AD 990, and why did European states eventually converge on different variants of the national state" (p. 5)?

Tilly responds by identifying three divergent paths of political development in late medieval and early modern Europe: a "capital-intensive" path followed by the city-states and city-empires of northern Italy, Switzerland, southern Germany, and the Low Countries; a "coercion-intensive" path characteristic of the continent's eastern and northern rim (Russia, Poland, Hungary, Scandinavia); and finally an intermediate path of "capitalized coercion" exemplified by England, France, and later Prussia (p. 30). This third path produced the large, wealthy, centrally-ruled "national states" (not to be confused with nation-states) that thanks to their superior resources and organization soon came to dominate the continent, thereby forcing their neighbors to adopt their methods or perish. But how can the existence of these three separate paths itself be explained? The answer lies, according to the author, in the very uneven distribution of coercive and financial resources that obtained in medieval and early modern Europe. Commercial activity and hence capital was for many centuries heavily concentrated in a corridor running from northern Italy up to the Low Countries, whereas much of eastern Europe lay under the control of large landowners who possessed substantial coercive power. Western Europe enjoyed an altogether more balanced socioeconomic structure. Such variables long acted, Tilly argues, to constrain the kinds of states that could be constructed in a given region.

Among the many merits of this complex book three deserve special mention. First, very much in the spirit of the late Stein Rokkan, Tilly adopts a truly *continental* perspective in this work, taking as his object of study *all* of Europe, rather than just a few select cases. This permits him to generate generalizations about European political development that carry far greater weight than those derived solely from the comparative analysis of England, France, and Prussia. Second, by concentrating on *variations* in state structure, the author is able to move a step beyond the state-building literature of the 1970s and 1980s, which often contented itself with demonstrating the central causal role played by war in the process of institutional modernization without exploring further the differential impact of this force on a range of polities. Finally, Tilly seeks to integrate both sociopolitical (coercion) and socioeconomic (capital) variables into his analysis in a way that overcomes the limitations of both purely state-centered and neo-Marxist approaches.

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Not all of Tilly's results are entirely convincing. For example, the differences between the eighteenth-century Polish and Russian states seem far greater than those between the Russian and Prussian states of the same period, even though the first two were supposedly following the same path of development, whereas the last two were not. Also, although the trajectories followed by England and France might look quite similar when compared to those of Venice or Hungary, recent historical work like that of John Brewer lends support for the view that these two states were in fact virtual opposites prior to the French Revolution. Nevertheless, this book represents an important new addition to the literature on European development and on state building more generally. It will stimulate further research and controversy in both these fields for years to come.

THOMAS ERTMAN
Harvard University

Congress, Human Nature, and the Federal Debt: Essays on the Political Psychology of Deficit Spending *by Cole S. Brembeck. New York, Praeger, 1991. 192 pp. $39.95.*

In a series of five essays, Cole S. Brembeck, professor and associate dean of international studies at Michigan State University, makes an ambitious effort to link the current problem of public indebtedness in the United States to shortcomings in the Congress that are ultimately traceable to flaws in human nature described by some major political philosophers.

The essays are written with a directness and lack of excessive economic jargon that make them accessible to those untutored in the "dreary science." The author is able quite efficiently and accurately to provide thumbnail sketches of the view of human nature of a number of thinkers ranging from Aristotle to Walter Lippmann. Brembeck is particularly effective in rendering some crisp abstracts of the state of nature theorists on the subject of man in the prepolitical state. So what we have in these essays is in effect an effort to tie Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau to Phil Gramm, Warren Rudman, and Ernest Hollings.

Brembeck makes the case that human nature and the nature of politicians lead inevitably to indebtedness, because elected officials are much happier conferring pleasure than inflicting pain. Brembeck defines pleasure as responding to the entreaties of interest groups for boons, benefices, subsidies, and programs not by raising taxes to defray their costs but by borrowing money and passing the bill to future generations unborn and for the present voteless. Pain, accordingly, is either rejecting these importunings or providing the benefits only after finding tax dollars to pay for them.

It is possible to accept both Brembeck's assertions on human nature and his

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characterizations of the origins of public debt as arguable premises. But the author's argument poses one very troubling, even incapacitating problem: he does not tell us how earlier Congresses, which we assume were subject to the same eternal constraints of human nature, managed to bite the bullet while contemporary Congresses refuse to acknowledge that a bullet even exists. If human nature is indeed unchanging, we would look to nineteenth-century legislators to be every bit as debt prone as today's members. And while it is true that historically public debt was smaller and more frequently discharged, older Congresses found other ways of rewarding interest groups that had consequences as enduring and as deleterious as the debt: the grant of huge tracts of the public domain to railroads and the mining and grazing concessions on public land are prime examples. Recalling Alexander Hamilton's observation that, "A public debt if it be not excessive is a public blessing," prompts us to wonder just how phobic early politicians were on the subject of debt.

It is somewhat surprising for a book with a 1991 imprint date not to mention the 1990 budget summit of the president and congressional leaders that resulted in the most draconian spending limitations in modern history. While Brembeck correctly pronounces the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings resolution to have been a failure in stemming deficits, the jury is still out on the summit. If the path to public indebtedness is paved with projects designed to ingratiate members of Congress with their constituents, the virtual disappearance of money for new federal programs has been painful in the extreme for members of Congress, especially Democrats. Also unaddressed in Brembeck's etiology of debt is the chronic unwillingness of Americans to submit to taxation—a factor that weighs in as heavily in our current plight as the cupidity and cravenness of politicians.

Ross K. Baker
Rutgers University

The Republic of Choice: Law, Authority and Culture *by Lawrence Friedman. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1990. 248 pp. $27.50.*

The more usual and historic methods of legal analysis often represent efforts to balance the rights of society with the rights of the individuals within that society. Traditionally, this weighing of interests has been used to justify limitations upon individual entitlements, so that, for instance, even though one's behavior might not directly injure another person, the act complained of could well be judged as criminal. Criminal law has been as much an effort to curb deviant behavior and establish desired conventions as it has been an effort to redress wrongs to individuals. The idea of victimless crime is a rather recent phenomenon. Traditional legal thought almost always had a significant regard for the concept of the greater public good when it sought to define the rights of individuals. These rights

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were invariably exercised in pursuit of certain larger social goals, often expressed in terms of duties.

Friedman's thesis, and it is skillfully put forward, is that the balance is no longer there. Over time there has been considerable growth in the ability to exercise effectively individual choice in American society without much regard for the social consequences. The vagrant who was once charged with a crime now has the right to be homeless and also has the right to be sheltered by the state if he cares to avail himself of that benefit. The rights of members of the family are no longer principally defined by their status as family members. These members can now have rights defined by contract through devices such as prenuptial agreements. Elderly can now insist on employment virtually for life, even though the employer would seek to limit the term of such employment. The list presented by Friedman is exhaustive, and the instances are clear enough and show signs of a significant shift in the direction of individual power within the republic of choice.

For Friedman, the concept of individual rights within American – indeed, western – law and society represents a departure from nineteenth-century concepts, where individual rights were defined in terms of social control, adherence to traditional community values, the support of norms, and ideas about self-discipline. Traditional ideas about individual rights were always developed in the context of community. Over time, some critics have charged a decline in individuality. Friedman disputes this, arguing that the opposite is actually true. He argues quite persuasively that in the name of private choice, social forces and the legal system have accepted a full and broad set of individual rights quite unencumbered by traditional forms of authority. These traditional forms of authority are no longer supported by legal and social systems.

This is a well argued and well presented thesis. As a result, Friedman notes, the situation may be that instead of a legal system that tolerates, accommodates, and respects diversity and pluralism, we may move toward one that indulges selfishness and reinforces parochialism.

FRANK J. MACCHIAROLA
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Yeshiva University

Watch on the Right: Conservative Intellectuals in the Reagan Era *by J. David Hoeveler, Jr. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1991. 333 pp. $24.95.*

In the contemporary United States, a conservative intellectual seems like a contradiction in terms, and the figures portrayed in this series of sketches do little to overturn this common impression. Half of Hoeveler's subjects are not, strictly speaking, intellectuals. William Buckley, George Will, Irving Kristol, and R.

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Emmett Tyrrell are newspaper columnists and editors. Most of the rest are only conservative in the broad sense that anyone professing anticommunism can now claim the title. Hilton Kramer had a long and useful career as art critic for the New York *Times*, and Kramer's differences with the *Times* are trivial in comparison with the gap that stretches between him and the reactionaries and libertarians of the Old Right.

Hoeveler's two exceptions prove the rule. Robert Nisbet is unquestionably both conservative and an intellectual: his analyses of community and authority are sacred texts on the right, but Nisbet only occasionally appeared in conservative journals and hardly ever attended their meetings. His inclusion in the crowd of 1980s journalists and pundits creates an impression of Gulliver among the Lilliputians. Michael Novak is also an intellectual and even a conservative of sorts, but Novak's original and interesting work was all done in the days when he was a follower of Jacques Maritain.

Without a thesis that makes sense of Reaganism or even an adequate definition of conservatism, Hoeveler contents himself with providing outlines of his subjects' careers. In this limited task, Hoeveler has largely succeeded. His sketches are for the most part accurate and persuasive surveys that help to fill in the broader canvases that have been painted by intellectual and social historians.

Occasionally, however, Hoeveler has been seduced by his subjects into accepting their own valuation of themselves. He has clearly been overwhelmed by the personality of William F. Buckley, who is certainly the most famous conservative of the postwar era. But it is hard to think of any original contributions he made to the movement's ideology. Under the tutelage of Frank Meyer, Willmoore Kendall, and James Burnham, Buckley became the leading spokesman for McCarthyism and the free-market traditionalism that Meyer called "fusionism." But no one has ever mistaken the witty and urbane WFB for an intellectual.

Hoeveler portrays Buckley as the champion of civil liberties and free expression, when in fact his first book (*God and Man at Yale*) called for alumni supervision of university faculty and the extrusion of un-American ideas from the academy. As early as 1952, Buckley was arguing that the crusade against communism made internal security measures, which he would otherwise find offensive, an absolute necessity; and in later years he repeated this argument in his debates with libertarians. Buckley's very restricted notion of open debate is clear from the editorial policies pursued by his magazine, *National Review*, which devoted much of its energies to purging the conservative ranks of dissidents: Ayn Rand, Murray Rothbard, Gary Wills, and the John Birchers—to name only a few.

The biggest puzzle in Hoeveler's study is the inclusion of R. Emmett Tyrrell, conservatism's oldest undergraduate. As a student at Indiana University, Tyrrell and his friends started a campus magazine that has served as the model for most of the undergraduate conservative magazines founded in the 1980s. Taking Buckley and H. L. Mencken as his models, Tyrrell embarked on his career as the

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bad boy of the American Right, making fun of feminists, environmentalists, pacifists et al. in a style that Hendrik Hertzberg called "Chicken McMencken."

Are there, then, no conservative intellectuals in the 1980s? Of course there are. On the Old Right or reactionary side, one might have included Russell Kirk, the undoubted dean of American conservative thought, as well as constitutional historian Forrest McDonald, literary critic M.E. Bradford, and Hungarian-born John Lukacs, among many others; among neoconservatives (in the broadest sense), Joseph Epstein, Edward Shils, Irving Louis Horowitz, and Gertrude Himmelfarb. What Hoeveler has really given us is a set of Plutarchean lives of conservative movement celebrities, and if he is correct in supposing that such men are mistaken for intellectuals in conservative circles, then his book is the most powerful condemnation of the American Right to appear in many years.

THOMAS FLEMING
Rockford Institute

Crisis and Reform in Eastern Europe *edited by Ferenc Fehér and Andrew Arato. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1991. 531 pp. $49.95.*

Ferenc Fehér and Andrew Arato have assembled some of the more interesting and memorable essays written about the situation in Eastern Europe in the 1980s. As the vast majority of the contributions (eight out of eleven) have already been published elsewhere, the main utility of the book is simply to bring them together in a single collection. At the same time, if sifting through articles that have already attracted much scholarly attention makes the contents of the volume less novel, it also mitigates the problems of quality control that are normally the *bête noire* of edited collections. Thus, although one may quibble about the inclusion of this or that article, on the whole the level of analysis is reasonably high and the contributions well chosen, with individual pieces treating various aspects of the past decade in Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania.

If a single theme can be said to run through the essays, it is that of evolution: in economic policy (János Kornai and Tamás Bauer on Hungary and Evan Kraft on Yugoslavia), in social change (Elemér Hankiss on Hungary, Zagorka Golubovic on Yugoslavia), in the thinking and behavior of the opposition (Aleksander Smolar and Andrzej Walicki on Poland and Tony Judt on Czechoslovakia), in the international arena (Fehér on Yalta), and even in the obscure machinations of Romanian communists (Vladimir Tismaneanu). For those who see the role of social science as supplying policy makers with a crystal ball, such an emphasis might appear oddly misplaced, given the distinctly nonevolutionary turn of events that took place but a few months after the volume apparently went to press.

Yet for those who see even revolutions more as altered trajectories than as wholesale transformations and who are skeptical of the thesis that major social,

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economic, and even political changes occur overnight, the essays in the volume remain as insightful as when originally written and help to illuminate why everything is both very different yet very much the same in post-1989 Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, there are numerous elements in the contemporary political scene that remain inexplicable in terms of the analyses contained in the *Crisis and Reform* volume. In particular, no contribution sheds very much light on why certain patterns of behavior that characterized the region in the precommunist, interwar period have suddenly returned to haunt it with a vengeance. The reemergence of national chauvinisms is the most obvious phenomenon in this regard, but other precommunist spectres have also returned to center stage: weakly institutionalized relationships between president and parliament are hardly a new occurrence in Poland, nor is controversy over land distribution a novelty in Hungary. Philosophers never became kings in Greece, but they captured the presidency in Czechoslovakia before Vaclav Havel was born; the combination of apolitical masses and a hyperactive intelligentsia has a long tradition in many parts of the region, and controversies regarding the political authority of the Catholic Church can be traced back hundreds of years. Contributing to one's sense of *deja vu* in the region is the fact that not only have the old issues resurfaced, but the protagonists in the debates about them often embody the same social forces they represented in the interwar period as well, almost as if socialism had never happened.

That *Crisis and Reform in Eastern Europe* does not really prepare us for the resurrection of these traditional patterns of cleavage is in part due to a second theme running through many of the essays in the volume: the dichotomy between the state on the one hand and civil society on the other, a contrast described most explicitly if often cryptically in Arato's introductory essay. Certainly, analyzing the East European experience in terms of this metaphor helps one to understand how a significant and genuine constituency in support of liberalism could form for perhaps the first time in the area's history; indeed, many of the essays in the volume can be read as a description of how regime critics moved from Marxist humanism to one or another variety of classic liberalism, abandoning Georg Hegel in favor of Immanuel Kant—and even Friedrich August von Hayek.

Unfortunately, however, the state/civil society metaphor does not come to grips nearly as well with why so many constituencies opposed to liberal precepts have suddenly come to life as well, either because it exaggerates the power of the state to erase traditional lines of social cleavage and overestimates the unity of (former) ruling elites, or because it too often equates civil society with the liberal opposition by making short shrift of the many nonliberal elements simply waiting in the wings for an opportune moment to emerge. The degree the essays on Poland by Smolar and Walicki escape this problem is partly because they were written at a time (1989) and about a situation in which it was already clear that the main consensus was largely a negative one—and as such, shared by large sections of the ruling elite as well.

Nevertheless, as a volume that contributes to our understanding of Eastern Europe on the eve of the great political landslide, *Crisis and Reform in Eastern*

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Europe is quite a solid work. While it is perhaps a bit too sophisticated for undergraduate teaching, it should prove a welcome addition to graduate syllabi in the field.

ELLEN COMISSO
University of California, San Diego

From Yalta to Glasnost: The Dismantling of Stalin's Empire *by Agnes Heller and Ferenc Fehér. Cambridge, MA, Basil Blackwell, 1991. 288 pp. $32.95.*

Heller and Fehér were pupils, friends, and colleagues of George Lukacs in Budapest. Since 1973 they have been living in the West, recently at the New School for Social Research in New York. Their work straddles several disciplines, among them history, philosophy, and sociology; and this book straddles several targets, not all of them successfully. It is intended to represent a "dramatic chronicle of the process that the authors term 'Eastern Europe's' long revolution against Yalta" (p. vi). Virtually all of the material in the book, however, has been published before at various times between 1979 and 1989. The result is an uneven collection, located on both sides of the East European revolution, which tells us more about the intellectual odyssey of its authors than about the subjects ostensibly under discussion.

There are really two parts to this book, the first (in two sections) on Hungary and "Kadarism" and the second (also in two sections) on Mikhail Gorbachev and his reforms. Both have occasional insights, but neither could be said to provide the thorough and properly supported discussion that the serious student would wish. The sections on Hungary and Kadarism, for instance, draw on a limited range of secondary literature together with some recent journalism and the authors' own earlier writings. The sections on Gorbachev include an extended book review and make no use of sources in Russian. Earlier essays have interpolations from a later date, there are some very curious turns of phrase (what is a "monographer?" p. 208), and the rendering of Russian names is often erratic.

The authors claim that their forecasts have generally been borne out by subsequent events; and there is certainly a discussion of German unification that is still of interest. In other respects, it seems difficult to justify the reprinting of a series of occasional papers. The sections on the Soviet Union, for instance, argue that Gorbachev "has inherited no crisis of legitimation" (p. 254): but how else is one to interpret the attempt to maintain party dominance within a context of open and largely competitive elections? Again, there is virtually no discussion of the national question, which has placed the survival of the state itself in question; and a chapter that deals with the possible "Vichyization" of Europe reads more than a little oddly after the collapse of the Soviet position throughout the continent.

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These two authors, with Georgy Markus, published *Dictatorship over Needs* in 1983; it was widely welcomed as a cogent, often penetrating analysis of Soviet-type societies and their particular characteristics. It is doubtful if the same welcome will be extended to *From Yalta to Glasnost*.

STEPHEN WHITE
University of Glasgow

China's Changing Relations with the Middle East *by John Calabrese. New York, Pinter Publishers, 1991. 183 pp. $49.00.*

Until its arms sales to the region garnered international headlines in recent years, China was not usually considered a significant actor in the Middle East. In reality, as Calabrese's excellent monograph reminds us, China has been very much involved in the region from the mid-1950s, although its influence has never been on a par with that of the superpowers. This excellent addition to the small number of books dealing with China and the Middle East is concise, substantive, and very well balanced within the limits of its predominantly state-oriented approach. It is based exclusively on western-language sources, except for those Chinese materials available in English translation.

The chapters follow a similar format for each of the periods under consideration, providing background information, general observations on the main trends in Middle East politics, comments on China's overall foreign policy, an analysis of China's relations with the main Middle Eastern actors, and an assessment of the degree to which Chinese policy accomplished its objectives during the period. To students of Chinese foreign policy, the succinct and lucid explanations of Middle East politics are particularly helpful in enabling one to evaluate Beijing's goals and methods.

Calabrese argues that the ebb and flow of superpower influence in the Middle East provided the opportunity for China to play a role in the region. At times, China tried to align itself with the policies of one or another of the superpowers in the region; at other times, such as over the past decade, China has used the Middle East as an arena in which to define for itself a distinctive role as an independent world power. During the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing's emphasis on revolution served to limit its influence in the region. China's continuing support of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which Calabrese aptly notes is part opportunity and part dilemma, is a vestige of this earlier period. According to Calabrese, Beijing's Middle East breakthrough came in the 1970s as a side-effect of Sino-American reconciliation. Therefore, Chinese diplomacy focused on state-to-state relations. At first, a security interest predominated, motivated by fear of the USSR. By the 1980s, with Moscow and Beijing growing closer, China's economic interests in the Middle East, including lucrative arms sales, came to the fore.

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Calabrese asserts that no grand strategy underlies China's present policies in the Middle East. Instead, a loosely connected series of bilateral relationships is integrated by a common stress on economic and military ties. China's unusual behavior in the Gulf crisis of 1990–1991 — passively supporting the UN resolutions concerning Iraq while opposing in the abstract the use of force — is explicable in terms of the extensive preconflict relations China had with both Iraq and Kuwait. Calabrese believes that the effect of China's Middle East wheeling and dealing over the past decade, particularly the arms trade with the region, has been to damage China's international reputation and undermine its policy of South-South economic cooperation. In addition, a major strain has been placed on China's relations with the United States. Calabrese also very usefully pulls together disparate information about China's rather extensive technological and economic dealings with Israel, a state that Beijing does not officially recognize. (China recognized the state proclaimed by the PLO in 1988).

One looks in vain in the book for any information about Chinese views of Middle Eastern culture, Chinese attitudes toward Islam and toward Arabs, or anecdotal information about how Chinese and Middle Easterners have actually gotten along with each other at both the official and working levels of interaction. Despite these lacunae, Calabrese has given us a very sane and sensible book, filled with numerous insights and solid analysis on an important subject that students of Chinese foreign relations too often neglect.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
Boulder Run Research

Electing a President: The Markle Commission Research on Campaign '88 *by Bruce Buchanan. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1991. 252 pp. $27.95.*

Prior to the 1988 presidential election, the John and Mary R. Markle Foundation funded a high-level Commission on the Media and the Electorate to explore the connections between citizens, the media, and candidates in the process through which the United States leader is chosen. The Markle Commission was chaired by Robert O'Neill, the director of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression and the former president of the University of Virginia; other commissioners included former politicians, political activists, political scientists, and journalists. Bruce Buchanan served as executive director and research director of the project. This book presents his analysis of the commission's findings.

The strength of the book lies in the information gathered about the role the media plays in informing citizens during the general election phase of a presidential election. First, the commission contracted for an extensive content analysis of the campaign coverage of eighteen news organizations — five television networks, nine local newspapers, and four weeklies. Stories were categorized and coded as to their content and as to whether or not they favored one candidate over another.

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Second, the commission contracted with Louis Harris and Associates to undertake two public opinion surveys in 1988—one in mid-September, one in late October—to examine attitudes toward voting, the media, and the candidates, and information and beliefs about issues. One goal of this aspect of the project was to measure citizen "learning" during the campaign. Finally, together with the Roosevelt Center for American Public Policy Studies, the commission held sixteen focus groups to determine the extent of citizen preparation for and concern about the presidential election.

The data from these three sources are presented and analyzed separately by Buchanan. Among the major findings are: news organizations focus more of their attention on "horse race" stories than on stories involving discussions of issues; much of what voters recalled about the campaign came from the advertising (and political rhetoric) of the Bush campaign; voters were poorly informed about issues and candidates, but most voters watched the presidential debates, were influenced by them, and claimed that the election was personally important to them.

The Markle Commission was designed to be prescriptive, to propose reforms to improve the system. And herein lies the flaw in the book. The major finding of the entire study is that the voters are the problem. The conclusion is based on certain premises about elections in democratic theory—including among other things that there must be majority turnout and that "*citizens must insist upon candidate and media behavior that respects their sovereignty and responds to their need for relevant information and guidance*" (p. 21, emphasis in original). From there the theoretical basis emphasizes citizen responsibility in an almost classic grade-school civics class manner.

Too many of the recommendations follow from the premise and not from the research: for example, create an "'American Citizens Foundation'—a permanent nonpartisan organization devoted to improving democratic practice" (p. 157) and "establish a national education program to improve understanding of the individual's stake in the political process" (p. 158). Others, such as a 20-hour simultaneous polling day and simplified voter registration, seem to appear out of thin air. This book is useful for students of elections and the media because of the data it contains; it is far less useful, however, as an analysis and evaluation of the current system or as a prescription for reform.

L. SANDY MAISEL
Colby College

Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America *by Richard D. Alba. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990. 374 pp. $35.00.*

The assimilation of European immigrants into American society has been hailed many times in the past. Richard Alba, reporting on research conducted with 524

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respondents in Albany, Rensselaer, Saratoga, and Schenectady counties in New York, joins his voice to the celebrants of the death of ethnicity from ages past. He adds the politically correct fillip that the descendents of the white immigrants are merging into a "European American" ethnic group.

Blacks and Hispanics are politically correct ethnics these days. Irish, Poles, and Italians are not—and as far as that goes never were. For Jews the matter is ambiguous (and Alba does not have enough Jews in his sample to report on them), but one suspects that in the politically correct campus environment they too are doomed to be classified as European Americans.

Yet, quite independent of data, one would be permitted to be skeptical of any model that lumps 80 percent of the population into a single ethnic group. Moreover, while one may encounter self-professed European Americans on some university campuses, there are not many of them walking the streets of America's cities. Alba and those who would rejoice in the disappearance of white ethnic diversity might well be advised to postpone the party. In fact, Alba's data present, as data usually do, a much more problematic, ambiguous, and uncertain picture, a gray portrait that he acknowledges in his analysis and then blurs in the conclusions of his chapters when he says that such differences as he has found cannot be expected to endure.

The fatal flaw of *Ethnic Identity*, however, is a defect of analysis that perhaps is imposed by the constraints of Alba's assimilationist model. This defect is most strikingly revealed in a chapter on "Cultural Expressions of Ethnic Identity." Ethnic culture is reduced to language, cuisine, and festivals. If one considers by way of example an ethnic group of which I know something, one must say that the Irish have never had a specific cuisine, that traces of the Irish language were all that remained even a hundred years ago, and that there is only one Irish festival. Not much of a culture, huh? Does this inferior ethnic group, however, have unique family structures, patterns of alcohol usage, political styles, religious beliefs, preferred career choices that have endured for four generations in America and despite a high level of ethnic intermarriage? There is a very substantial literature that suggests that it does and that Alba ignores.

One could rewrite the previous paragraph with the Italians as the referent. The issue is not whether these ethnic subcultures are going away but how they survive, especially given high rates of intermarriage. That is a critical question for sociological study; unfortunately, assimilationists like Alba cannot investigate it because limited imagination blinds them to the possibility of a subculture that consists of anything more than language, festivals, and cuisine.

Is it, for example, merely luck or merely position in the immigrant queue that accounts for the Irish position in current Chicago politics—mayor, president of the county board, assessor, county treasurer, sheriff, states attorney, Speaker of the Illinois House, majority leader of the State Senate, and chairman of the Finance Committee of the City Council? Or might there be a subculture of political skills, refined in the crucible of foreign occupation, that has provided the Irish with distinctive political skills? Perhaps not. Perhaps in the next generation

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they'll all be European Americans. But if it comes to a vote for a patron saint of this residual group, I'll bet on a man who was born in one European country, educated in another, and worked in a third. Out of which he is alleged to have driven the snakes.

ANDREW GREELEY
The University of Chicago

Blacks in the White Establishment? A Study of Race and Class in America *by Richard L. Zweigenhaft and G. William Domhoff. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1991. 198 pp. $27.50.*

Much intellectual debate has surrounded the issue of the relative importance of race and class for middle-class blacks. This issue is particularly relevant for black adults who as young people were initiated in elite prep schools where they acquired the cultural and social capital deemed necessary for governance. Another critical question is whether or not those blacks who have successfully adopted an upper-class style and identity have been able to penetrate the decision-making white establishment. In this book, Zweigenhaft and Domhoff provide an answer to these questions by examining the experiences of blacks who participated in A Better Chance (ABC) program. Unlike other minority programs, ABC "took students away from their homes, their neighborhoods, and their local high schools to attend the finest secondary schools in the country . . . brought into contact with the top one-half of one percent of the social structure, the rich and the super-rich" (p. 3).

The book's greatest strength is also its basic weakness. Using material from interviews with thirty-eight respondents, the authors provide accounts of both prep school and later experiences taken from the perspective of and employing interpretations of the actual participants. We learn what this golden opportunity meant to those who were initiated into the elite prep schools. More than anything else, this was an invaluable contribution. At the same time, Zweigenhaft and Domhoff correctly point out that one problem with a white male interviewer is that he might not be able to "elicit the full depth of concerns, fears, and problems facing these highly educated blacks" (p. 12). After acknowledging this problem, however, the authors too quickly dismiss it. The failure to adequately address this drawback is one of the book's main weaknesses. Having participated in the initial school desegregation process in a major southern city and having worked as an interviewer of middle-class blacks, I felt that many issues had been left unexplored and particularly that the long-term effects of the experiences of racism were deliberately understated.

Despite this shortcoming, the book carefully documents the personal journeys of those who were a part of ABC. We learn about their summer program experiences, prep school years, undergraduate and graduate school training, friend-

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ships, dating and marriage patterns, as well as where they are in their present careers. Zweigenhaft and Domhoff reveal many ABC success stories of those who overcame the barriers and obstacles before them and became stars. They rightly point out that when given a chance, blacks can successfully compete with the best and the brightest from the country club set. They conclude that this is not enough however. In an earlier work, *Jews in the Protestant Establishment*, the authors conclude that social class is more important than religion at the top of the American social structure. In this latest work, they conclude that racism, particularly institutional racism, is still a fundamental problem and the white power structure continues to exclude even those blacks who had been "prepped for power" (p. 163).

In the clearly written and persuasively argued final chapter, Zweigenhaft and Domhoff suggest that race is still more important than class, even for those blacks who have acquired upper-class styles. They continue to fare poorly on all indicators of assimilation, and race remains the most salient component of their personal and social identities. According to the authors, this lack of black assimilation into the white establishment can only be remedied if another battle is fought. They end with the stimulating challenge that "What power created, power can undo" (p. 177).

LESLIE B. INNISS
Florida State University

Robust Unionism: Innovations in the Labor Movement *by Arthur B. Shostak. Ithaca, NY, ILR Press, 1991. 384 pp. Cloth, $42.00; paper, $18.95.*

Much recent discussion of the state and prospects of unionism in the United States has stressed the steady decline in membership, ebbing effectiveness in bargaining, and the prospects of more of the same. Shostak sought evidence to support a different view: "Contrary to the impression of passivity conveyed by hostile commentators, the American labor movement contains many imaginative and risky ventures" (p. xiii). He has cast a wide net in his search for evidence of innovation and new energy. The examples and case studies that constitute the bulk of the book cover a range of issues and challenges to unionism. The fifteen chapters are organized in six sections. They report on union responses to health and safety problems, organizing women, professional workers and other segments of the work force, worker ownership, politics, public relations, links to the larger community, and negotiations with employers, among others. The author relied on a large network of informed observers, labor educators, colleagues, scholarly and popular writing, and observed first-hand most of the models he studied in many parts of the country. His reporting is concrete and in most cases accurate and up to date.

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The metaphor that he uses is that of the trimtab, a small flap attached to the rudder on a large vessel. To move the large rudder the deck officer need only apply a small force, which then moves the much larger main rudder. By analogy, the innovations described here serve to begin the process of correcting the drift and lack of focus on mainstream labor. But another metaphor, also maritime, may apply more precisely. A large school of small fish and minnows does not add up to a shark or whale that will eat rather than be eaten. The possibility that the examples collected with such care in this book may add up to nothing to reshape or reenergize the mainstream is one the author does not consider despite its plausibility.

While the author begins with the trimtab model, he seldom tests its application to the example being discussed. Some may meet the test, but most appear not to. Important examples include the resurrection of a union of air traffic controllers from the wreckage inflicted in 1981 by the Reagan onslaught and the renewed organizing among professional workers. One may wonder about the omission of the musicians union, one of the earliest and in its heyday most colorful as under James Petrillo's leadership it faced the challenge of recorded music. The Doctors' Council in New York, whose members work for the city, is included; but the Committee of Interns and Residents, which has national links and an interesting history of organizing house staff in voluntary hospitals, is not.

Some of the stories are incomplete or outdated. The author cites the role of the United Auto Workers, which cooperated closely with the company in the federal rescue of Chrysler when it was in jeopardy of financial failure. But he omits the fact that Owen Bieber, who succeeded Douglas Fraser as president, was later kicked off the Chrysler board of directors. The role of nurses in shaping new technological tools in diagnosis and patient care appears overstated, as does the new managerial prerogatives of public school teachers. The demise of the Roslyn, Pennsylvania O&O (owned and operated) supermarket does not dampen the author's enthusiasm about the potential of worker ownership as an alternative to conventional plant or store closings, though there are few serious, successful, and sustained examples.

Major labor struggles of the recent past receive only brief attention or none at all. For example, the prolonged and successful strike by the United Mine Workers against the Pittston corporation; the prolonged unsuccessful strike of Local P-9 of the United Food and Commercial Workers against the Hormel corporation; the struggle of a rare coalition of airline unions with Frank Lorenzo and Eastern Airlines; the rescue and revitalization of Local 1199 of the Health and Hospital Workers under the leadership of Dennis Rivera, the first union leader in many years to receive the compliment of a *New Yorker* magazine profile. Many observers see these as symbolic of the key issues facing unions in the United States. They involved imaginative methods to build coalitions and find more effective ways to redress the imbalance of power grew during the Reagan years.

By contrast, many of the case studies in the book lack either resonance in the broader labor world or reliable life expectancies. The range of examples included

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precludes examination in sufficient depth to find their wider significance. The author frequently refers to labor without distinguishing among the several levels of union life and power. He regularly cites skeptics who "grumble," constitutional dyspeptics somehow unable to see the self-evident merits in his chosen examples. Most are local and many reflect idiosyncratic conditions.

One wants to share the author's enthusiasm and optimism, because democracy and justice require a viable and effective labor movement. But brave new words do not create a brave new world, and anecdotal evidence, however eloquent, does not make the case that the author puts forward. He expects to revise and update the book later. When he does, a better balance between the scope and depth will better meet the need that clearly exists and that he has attempted to address.

SUMNER M. ROSEN
City University of New York

REFERENCE BOOKS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST RECEIVED

American Leaders 1789–1991: A Biographical Summary *compiled by Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Washington, DC, CQ Press, 1991. 534 pp. $22.95.*

The Book of the States, 1990–91, vol. 28 *compiled by the Council of State Governments. Lexington, KY, Council of State Governments, 1990. 623 pp. $42.50.*

The British Electorate 1963–1987: A Compendium of Data from the British Election Studies *by Ivor Crewe, Neil Day, and Anthony Fox. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991. 500 pp. $160.00.*

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand

by Leonard Peikoff

The definitive statement of Ayn Rand's philosophic system, written by her foremost interpreter

To the general public, Ayn Rand is best known for her defense of egoism and individualism, but her most radical and original contributions lie in basic philosophy—particularly in her theory of concept-formation and in her thoroughly non-Kantian theory of the relationship of consciousness to existence.



This 500-page work is based on a 1976 lecture course that Peikoff prepared with the assistance of Rand herself. Rand described this course as "the only *authorized* presentation of the entire theoretical structure of Objectivism, i.e., the only one that I know of my own knowledge to be fully accurate."

Leonard Peikoff was Rand's close associate from the early 1950's until her death in 1982 and is recognized as the leading exponent of Objectivism. Peikoff has taught philosophy at New York University, Long Island University, Hunter College, and the University of Denver. He is the author of *The Ominous Parallels* (a study of the philosophic roots of Nazism), and of numerous articles on Objectivist philosophy, including "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy," which Rand included in her work *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.*

Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand covers such topics as:

- Existence, Consciousness, and Identity as the basic axioms
- Causality as a corollary of Identity
- Existence as possessing primacy over consciousness
- The senses as necessarily valid
- Human actions as both caused and free
- Concept-formation as a mathematical process
- Concepts as objective
- Knowledge as contextual and hierarchical
- The arbitrary as neither true nor false
- Reason as man's basic means of survival
- Man's life as the standard of moral value
- Rationality as the primary virtue
- Justice as rationality in the evaluation of men
- The initiation of physical force as evil
- Individual rights as absolutes
- Capitalism as the only moral social system
- Art as a concretization of metaphysics

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